HO+2010+Afghan+Surge+1AC



Contention One: Pakistan

Pakistan is cooperating to defeat Al Qaeda and other militants now. Steve Coll,  president of the New America Foundation, 10-13-200  9. [Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. Interests and Policy Choices in Afghanistan. p. http://www.newamerica.net/publications/resources/2009/us_interests_and_policy_choices_in_afghanistan] The relationship between the Pakistani security services and Islamist extremist groups -  Al Qaeda, the Taliban , sectarian groups, Kashmiri groups,  and their  many  splinters - is not static or preordained. Pakistani public opinion, while it remains hostile to the United States,  has  of late  turned  sharply and  intensely against violent Islamist militant groups. The Pakistan Army, itself reeling as an institution from deep public skepticism, is **proving to be responsive** to this change of public opinion. Moreover, the Army, civilian  political  leaders , landlords, business leaders  and  Pakistani  civil society have entered into a period of competition and freewheeling discourse over how to  think about the country's national interests and how to  extricate their country from  the Frankenstein-like problem of  Islamic radicalism created by the Army's historical security policies. There is a growing recognition in this discourse among Pakistani elites that the country must find a new national security doctrine that does not fuel internal revolution and impede economic and social progress. The purpose of American policy should be to create conditions within and around Pakistan for the progressive side of this argument among Pakistani elites to prevail over time.

 1AC—Pakistan (2/7)

Continued cooperation isn’t assured—U.S. has to balance against deep mistrust within the Pakistan military. Pakistan Observer, 7/22 /10, http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=42759 US Special Operations Forces have begun venturing out with Pakistani forces on aid projects, deepening the American role in the effort to defeat Islamist militants in Pakistani territory that has been off limits to U.S. ground troops, a report in the Wall Street Journal said(WSJ)Wednesday. The expansion of U.S. cooperation is significant given Pakistan’s deep aversion to allowing foreign military forces on its territory. The Special Operations teams join the aid missions only when commanders determine there is relatively little security risk, a senior U.S. military official said, in an effort to avoid direct engagement that would call attention to U.S. participation. The U.S. troops are allowed to defend themselves and return fire if attacked. But the official emphasized the joint missions aren’t supposed to be combat operations, and the Americans often participate in civilian garb. Pakistan has told the U.S. that troops need to keep a low profile. “Going out in the open that has negative optics, that is something we have to work out,” said a Pakistani official. “This whole exercise could be counterproductive if people see U.S. boots on the ground.” Because of Pakistan’s sensitivities, the U.S. role has developed slowly. In June 2008, top U.S. military officials announced 30 American troops would begin a military training program in Pakistan, but it took four months for Pakistan to allow the program to begin. The first U.S. Special Operations Forces were restricted to military classrooms and training bases. Pakistan has gradually allowed more trainers into the country and allowed the mission’s scope to expand. Today, the U.S. has about 120 trainers in the country, and the program is set to expand again with new joint missions to oversee small-scale development projects aimed at winning over tribal leaders, according to officials familiar with the plan. Such aid projects are a pillar of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy, which the U.S. hopes to pass on to the Pakistanis through the training missions. U.S. military officials say if U.S. forces are able to help projects such as repairing infrastructure, distributing seeds and providing generators or solar panels,  they can build trust with the Pakistani military , and encourage them to accept more training in the field. “You have to bring something to the dance,” said the senior military official. “And the way to do it is to have cash ready to do everything from force protection to other things that will protect the population.” Congressional leaders last month approved $10 million in funding for the aid missions, which will focus reconstruction projects in poor tribal areas that are off-limits to foreign civilian aid workers. The Pakistani government has warned the Pentagon that **a more visible U.S. military presence could undermine the mission** of pacifying the border region, which has provided a haven for militants staging attacks in Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. The U.S. has already aroused local animosity with drone strikes targeting militants in the tribal areas, though the missile strikes have the tacit support of the Pakistani government and often aid the Pakistani army’s campaign against the militants. Providing money to U.S. troops to spend in communities they are trying to protect has been a tactic used for years to fight insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. The move to accompany Pakistani forces in the field is even more significant, and repeats a pattern seen in the Philippines during the Bush administration, when Army Green Berets took a gradually more expansive role in Manila’s fight against the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf in the southern islands of Mindanao. In Pakistan, the U.S. military helps train both the regular military and the Frontier Corps, a force drawn from residents of the tribal regions but led by Pakistani Army officers.

 1AC—Pakistan (3/7)

Pakistan is the key to defeating Al Qaeda, but a surge would make it politically impossible. The Nation 2-4-200  9. [Don't Escalate in Afghanistan, http://www.thenation.com/article/dont-escalate-afghanistan] The key to defeating Al Qaeda and its extremist protectors  lies with the Pakistani government  and its ability to control its remote territories. But there's the rub: major groups within Pakistan's military and intelligence services are reluctant to act against Pakistan's extremists for fear it would help the U  nited  S  tates and India gain control over Afghanistan. Thus military escalation would likely counter our efforts to get Pakistan's government to secure its territory against Al Qaeda. Worse, expanding the war may only deepen divisions in Pakistan and further weaken its fragile democratic government. Even if US escalation  achieves the limited goal of denying Al Qaeda a presence in Afghanistan, it  could lead to the destabilization of Pakistan,  with devastating implications for regional and international security. As Andrew  Bacevich, a  retired Army colonel and  professor of history and i  nternational  r  elations at Boston University, recently  wrote, "To risk the stability of that nuclear-armed state in the vain hope of salvaging Afghanistan would be a terrible mistake." By any measure, the disintegration of nuclear Pakistan would pose a much greater threat to our national security than would the continued presence of Al Qaeda in remote border areas. In fact, the value of Afghanistan and Pakistan as Al Qaeda safe havens is greatly exaggerated. Pakistan's tribal areas are of limited use in training extremists to blend into US society or learn how to fly airplanes or make explosives (most of the planning for the 9/11 attacks took place in Germany and Florida, not Afghanistan). Nor is this remote, isolated area a good location for directing a terror campaign, recruiting members or threatening global commerce. That is why Al Qaeda is a decentralized network whose leaders in Pakistan can offer little more than moral support and encouragement. American safety thus  depends not on eliminating  these  faraway safe havens but on  common-sense  counterterrorist and security measures--intelligence cooperation, police work, border control  and the occasional surgical use of special forces to disrupt imminent terrorist attacks.

 1AC—Pakistan (4/7)

The threat of a nuclear Al Qaeda is high Stephen J. Cimbala , Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State U, 200  6. [Comparative Strategy, 25:1–18, ebsco] Are fears of nuclear terrorism exaggerated? According to Graham Allison, three observations make a compelling case for the imminence of the threat.2 First, thousands of nuclear weapons and tens of thousands of potential weapons  (highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium  are located in places where security  against theft or diversion  is insufficient  . Second,  the only “high hurdle  ” preventing terrorists from obtaining a nuclear weapon  is access to fissionable material  . Terrorists might easily obtain fissile material from rogue states. The possibility that the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq might transfer nuclear technology and weapons to terrorists was one of the principal justifications for the U.S. war to depose the Iraqi dictator in 2003. Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction failed to appear in postwar inspections, but the threat of rogues-to-radicals technology and weapons transfer remains a realistic concern. North Korea and Pakistan are now acknowledged nuclear weapons states. North Korea is a politically isolated Stalinist regime run by a dictator of uncertain personal qualities and political intentions. North Korea has previously transferred nuclear technology to Iran and Pakistan, among others. Pakistan’s current government has supported the U.S. in its war against al Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations. But the Musharraf  regime has been under siege  from terrorists and other domestic political opponents. Its survival is uncertain, and if it were to fall , political power in Islamabad might pass into the hands of anti-American leaders. Pakistan’s intelligence services and military are suspected of being penetrated by persons sympathetic to al Qaeda. Additional concerns about Pakistan’s management of its nuclear complex resulted from revelations about off-the-shelf activities of  the scientist who was the father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb. According to reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Dr. A. Q. Khan headed a transnational network that supplied a “Wal-Mart of private sector proliferation” for profit, including designs and components for centrifuges, blueprints for warheads, and tons of uranium hexafluoride gas.3 North Korea’s exchange of its ballistic missile technology for Pakistani centrifuge designs may have been expedited by the same etwork.4 North Korea and Pakistan represent only two potential fronts in the effort to prevent nuclear weapons or materials from falling into the hands of terrorists. A third problem is Iran. Iran has declared its intention to develop a nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes. The U.S. and its European allies suspect that Iran plans to use its completed fuel cycle to produce nuclear weapons. The IAEA has danced with Iran on the issue of nuclear inspections; some Iranian facilities have been acknowledged and inspected, but other suspected facilities have not. Iran’s political leadership is increasingly hostile toward the United States and Israel.5 Iran has strong ties to some of the more active anti-Israeli and anti-American terrorist groups in Palestine and elsewhere, including Hezbollah and Hamas. Another state of concern with regard to the possible leakage of fissile material to terrorists is Russia. In Russia the problem from the U.S. standpoint is not political intentions: the Putin administration had declared its shared interest in fighting terrorism, seen as a strategic threat to Russia. But Russia’s capability to protect its own vast storehouse of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade material has been doubted by Western experts.6 Russia’s post-Soviet nuclear weapons complex suffered from frostbite and neuralgia combined: interruptions of state funding for personnel and other expenses; inadequate accounting systems for weapons and fissile materials; former Soviet nomenklatura going “private” with state assets under their control, and in cahoots with criminals; and loss of scientific and weapons engineering expertise as formerly prestigious and highly paid experts were reduced to bartering for their services.7 A third reason for the U.S. and its allies to be concerned about the proximate threat of nuclear terrorism is the apparent ease with which a nuclear device might be smuggled onto American territory. Nuclear material sufficient for a bomb might be smaller than a football and easily concealed within a cargo container or airline baggage. Of some seven million cargo containers reaching American ports each year, fewer than five percent may be inspected.8 Depending on the type of weapon assembly and the yield required, terrorists could sneak into U.S. or allied territory  a device sufficient to kill tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of innocent civilians, apart from any damage done to military or government targets. For this purpose, terrorists might purchase an already assembled nuclear weapon or obtain fissile material and assemble it themselves. Instructions for making nuclear weapons, as in the case of other weapons of mass destruction, can be obtained from “open sources” including the internet.

 1AC—Pakistan (5/7)

An attack causes extinction even if it fails Mohamed Sid-Ahmed , (Political Analyst for Al-Ahram Weekly), August 26, 200  4. Al-Ahram Weekly. Issue No. 705. http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/705/op5.htm What would be the consequences of a nuclear attack by terrorists  ? Even if it fails, it would further exacerbate the negative features of the new and frightening world in which we are now living. Societies would close in on themselves, police measures would be stepped up at the expense of human rights, tensions between civilisations and religions would rise and ethnic conflicts would proliferate. It would also speed up the arms race a  nd develop the awareness that a different type of world order is imperative if humankind is to survive. But the still more critical scenario is if the attack succeeds. This could lead to a third world war, from which no one will emerge victorious. Unlike a conventional war which ends when one side triumphs over another, this war will be without winners and losers. When nuclear pollution infects the whole planet, we will all be losers.

 1AC—Pakistan (6/7)

Independently, surge will cause rampant instability in Pakistan—flood of militants from the South. The Nation (Pakistan) 11-28-200  9. [Pakistan Cannot Allow American Surge Along its Border, http://worldmeets.us/thenationpk000083.shtml] C-SPAN VIDEO: President Barack Obama announces his long awaited strategy on Afghanistan, calling for 30,000 additional U.S. troops, Dec. 1, 00:39:34RealVideo Prime Minister Gilani has  voiced Pakistan's legitimate concern over the anticipated  U.S.  surge in Afghanistan ,  particularly with regard to a troop surge in Helmand  Province  that threatens **to inundate Baluchistan with militants fleeing Helmand**. Given the poor track record of the U.S. and NATO in sealing borders  - some would call it a deliberately poor record -  any **expansion of America's presence** in provinces of Afghanistan that border Pakistan pose an **immediate threat** to this country. On a broader level, the United States simply cannot make decisions that relate to Afghanistan without consulting Pakistan, given that there is a direct linkage between the two in terms of fallout. Furthermore, Pakistan is a frontline state in this erroneous, U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, and it's Pakistan that also continues to pay the biggest price for it in terms of the destruction of civil society and the environment. The costs aren't simply the qualitative improvement in the threat posed to Pakistan by terrorists and militancy since September 11;  there's also the  continuing cost of Afghan refugees who are again fleeing in greater numbers. The United States and the Afghan government are in no mood to take back the Afghan refugees and the international community has been niggardly in helping shoulder the burden - effectively leaving Pakistan on its own. At a strategic level, Pakistan must be more assertive about protecting its interests. The leadership must take a firm stand on the issue of the surge and insist on being consulted before Washington makes a paradigm shift in its Afghan policy. Up until now, Pakistan has never been asked for its input on America's Afghan policy; we have simply been confronted with the consequences and have effectively been told to accept U.S. policy regardless of the costs to our nation. This must end and Pakistan now has the capacity and space to have an impact on U.S. decisions, since without our cooperation, the U.S. would suffer even greater losses. On this point there can be no doubt. What makes this insistence on the part of Pakistan  such a strategic imperative is the volatile situation not just in the F  ederally  A  dministered  T  ribal  A  reas,  but in Baluchistan  as well. With the government  finally moving to rectify decades of neglect in this province, it  cannot afford to have the situation destabilized by an American surge. Already, India is using Afghanistan to this end.

State collapses causes nuclear conflict in South Asia Karin von Hippel,  co-director of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 5-5-200  9. [New York Times, Other Threats: A Coup or Chaos, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/05/pakistan-scenarios-us-solutions/] The second  nightmare scenario would be  continued  state disintegration , resulting in competing militias, terrorist groups and criminal gangs in charge of most of Pakistan’s provinces and territories,  with the government exercising only nominal control  over parts of the capital city and —  maybe — some of the nuclear weapons. Any of these formulations will have  direct and  enormous consequences  not only  for the people and governments in  the greater  South Asia  region — home to nearly half the world’s population and several nuclear-armed states —  but  also further afield  in Europe and North America.

 1AC—Pakistan (7/7)

South Asia war causes global nuclear war. Ghulam Nabi Fai, Executive director, Kashmiri American Council, 7-8-2001. [Washington Times, p. ln] The foreign policy of the United States in South Asia should move from the lackadaisical and distant (with India crowned with a unilateral veto power) to aggressive involvement at the vortex. The most dangerous place on the planet is Kashmir, a disputed territory convulsed and illegally occupied for more than 53 years and  sandwiched between nuclear-capable India and Pakistan. It has ignited two wars between the estranged South Asian rivals in 1948 and 1965,  and a third could trigger nuclear volleys and a nuclear winter threatening the entire globe. The United States would enjoy no sanctuary. This apocalyptic vision is no idiosyncratic view. The director of central intelligence, the Defense Department, and world experts generally place Kashmir at the peak of their nuclear worries. Both India and Pakistan are racing like thoroughbreds to bolster their nuclear arsenals and advanced delivery vehicles. Their defense budgets are climbing despite widespread misery amongst their populations. Neither country has initialed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or indicated an inclination to ratify an impending Fissile Material/Cut-off Convention. The boiling witches' brew in Kashmir should propel the United States to assertive facilitation or mediation of Kashmir negotiations. The impending July 14-16 summit in New Delhi between President Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee featuring Kashmir on the agenda does not justify complacency.

 

Contention Two: Jirga

The June Jirga was a promising first step to bring stability to Afghanistan, but the process remains fragile. Fazel Rabi Haqbeen , Asia Foundation’s Program Planning & Development Director,  6-23  -2010. [Asia Foundation, Can Afghanistan’s Traditional Jirgas Bring Hope for Peace?, http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2010/06/23/can-afghanistan%E2%80%99s-traditional-jirgas-bring-hope-for-peace/] During last year’s presidential election, Hamid Karzai promised to call a jirga to promote peace and reconciliation for Afghanistan’s future. After two postponements, the peace jirga finally took place in  early  June  with 1,700 delegates gathering in Kabul. Some in the Afghan and international press  have criticized the results, but the primary goal of the jirga  – ** to take initial steps toward peace – was largely accomplished. ** Afghanistan peace jirga Nearly 1,700 delegates gathered in Kabul for a peace jirga in early June. Many involved in organizing the jirga adhere to an old Afghan proverb: Blood cannot be washed by blood. According to a 2008 report by the International Council on Security, the Taliban now hold a permanent presence in 72 percent of Afghanistan. This has contributed to a shift within some in the Afghan government and  the international community to think that  inclusive negotiations are imperative to achieving peace and stability;  and that  reconciliation will not come if fighting continues. The jirga, a traditional council comprised of elders and influential, elected community leaders, stands as one of Afghanistan’s long-standing customs. National and regional multi-tribal jirgas date back to the 18th century, when Afghans – under Mirwais Khan Hotak’s leadership – sought independence from Gorgin Khan, the Persian governor of Kandahar, when jirga members collectively decided to force Gorgin’s troops from Kandahar. In 1747, community elders in Kandahar convened a jirga to appoint their new leader, Ahmad Shah Abdali (or Ahmad Shah Baba), the founder of modern Afghanistan. Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, jirgas have continued to address momentous issues. The 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga nominated representatives to facilitate the transition from the interim administration, established by the Bonn Agreement, to the formation of the transitional administration. Some 1,550 delegates – including 200 women from Afghanistan’s 364 districts – attended. In November 2003, Afghanistan’s new constitution was unveiled, debated, and subsequently approved by 502 delegates at the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2004. In 2007, President Karzai initiated a joint Afghanistan-Pakistan Peace Jirga to foster cross-border communication and cooperation. The Asia Foundation was one of two NGOs providing support (the other was the German GTZ) for the 2010 peace jirga. Asia Foundation staff from our office in Kabul – Abdullah Ahmadzai, Najibullah Amiri, Roohafza Ludin, Abdul Ghafoor Asheq, Najla Ayubi, and myself – helped by providing logistical, procedural, and administrative assistance, as well as by organizing outreach campaigns to inform the Afghan public about the jirga’s objectives. Meeting security and logistical needs for 1,700 delegates was an enormous challenge that took several months. Coordination with the president’s protection services, which controlled the overall security for the jirga, was especially difficult. In addition to time and funding constraints, there was no clear mandate on how to convene the jirga, while the relationship between the government and the international community was unclear, partially because the international community didn’t clearly announce their support for the jirga. Despite ambiguity and confusion, the jirga’s Secretariat was able to meet many difficult challenges, like refurbishing the giant tent where the jirga took place and the Kabul Polytechnic University dormitory where delegates stayed, while simultaneously building a dining hall. Delegates came from many positions and backgrounds, including members of the National Assembly and Provincial Councils, governors, members of the National Ulema Council, refugees living in Pakistan and Iran, the disabled, nomads, businessmen, elders, and representatives from educational, cultural, and social institutions. Twenty percent of the delegates were women. Members of armed opposition groups did not receive invitations since the jirga was consultative in nature and specifically designed to determine how to negotiate with these groups. Two prominent, controversial Afghan leaders, Mohammad Mohaqiq and Abdul Rashid Dostum, did not participate. Both claimed they were not invited, although Dostum’s name was announced as a delegate.

Card Continues—No Text Removed  1AC—Jirga (2/8) Card Continues—No Text removed

During President Karzai’s opening speech, several rockets exploded nearby, causing a small battle to break out, followed by two suicide bombings that detonated just outside of the jirga site. Despite the attacks, the jirga continued. Soon after his speech, and after the dust settled from the scare outside, members from 28 elected committees debated common areas of concern, including: the strength of the government; the administration’s reputation as corrupt and for granting un-merited appointments; civilian house searches by the international military; timeframe for the coalition’s presence; influence from Afghanistan’s neighbors; lack of preconditions for peace negotiation; role of Ulamaas in both Afghanistan and other Islamic countries; removal of certain opposition leaders from the United Nations blacklist; and how inclusive negotiations should be. A proposal to send a group of women to the families of Taliban members was accepted by the jirga and acknowledged by President Karzai. In Afghan culture, women have historically served as agents of peace and have often at times acted as mediators between opposition sides. A few days after the jirga concluded, the president ordered a review of all prisoners being held in Afghan jails, and declared that those prisoners held without evidence would be released – a move well received by most Afghans. The following Sunday, two respected members of Karzai’s government resigned after being questioned over the attack on the jirga by anti-government elements. This move gave the impression that the president is serious and the international community appears supportive of the jirga’s stated resolutions. On June 6, 2010,  Tolo TV quoted a Taliban spokesperson as saying that the Taliban agrees with some of the peace jirga’s resolutions. In this environment – **albeit extremely fragile** – if the Afghan government implements the resolutions, the Taliban may be in the position to enter negotiations with the government. This jirga is the first time in eight years that the Afghan government has consulted with the people on a national issue. A great percentage of the delegates will deliver messages of peace to their constituencies and, in turn, will create greater opportunity for involvement in the new civic education peace process. However, expectations must be managed: the Afghan public should not falsely be led to believe that the jirga will magically resolve all issues and bring peace. As the long road has shown, peace cannot come overnight – but **a much-needed process has begun.**

 1AC—Jirga (3/8)

The surge will block any chance of successful Jirga reconciliation—blocks Taliban participation. Mohamed Abdel-Magid , researcher for Voice for Nonviolence,  7-16  -2010. [Eurasia Review, The Impediment For Political Settlement In Afghanistan, http://www.eurasiareview.com/201007165137/the-impediment-for-political-settlement-in-afghanistan.html] During Afghanistan’s 2009 presidential election, Hamid Karzai promised to call a jirga to encourage peace and political settlement for Afghanistan’s future. Jirga is a Pashto term for a tribal assembly of elders which makes decisions by consensus. For centuries, Afghans have used jirgas to resolve differences and tribal conflicts. In the past, Afghans organized jirgas for their own affairs that were free of foreign interference and demands. This time, the National Consultative Peace Jirga (NCPJ) that Hamid Karzai convened on June 2nd  to June 4th, 2010, has been criticized as a waste of time for not following normal tribal structure and, more importantly, because the central government was influenced by foreign support. President Hamid Karzai hosted the three-day Peace Jirga in Kabul for discussing the terms by which tribal leaders, the Taliban and the government could envision an end to the ongoing war. Top Taliban leaders boycotted the Jirga because they did not trust the foreign influence over the Afghan government. Nevertheless, the Jirga moved forward with the following terms: NATO forces are to end house searches and aerial bombings; the Karzai government and international forces are to assure the safety of Taliban members; and Taliban prisoners in American and Afghan custody are to be released. Karzai supported the Jirga’s proposal for amnesty for Taliban members and removal of their names from the United Nation’s black list. The gathering ended with the agreement that the Afghan government must pursue talks with the Taliban. Many Afghan officials believe the Peace Jirga will not bear fruit unless top Taliban leaders are included in all levels of negotiation. Since 2001, the U.S. government  has persistently discarded proposals made to hold any dialogues with the Taliban  for a political settlement. Instead, the Bush and Obama administrations chose a military solution to the Afghan problems. However, some U.S. officials have started to realize that this war will not come to an end with military force. Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. special envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan says “the continuing Afghan war will not end in a military triumph,” as the U.S. faces increasing casualties amongst its troops. He also indicated that Washington comprehends that a political settlement in Afghanistan will ultimately be necessary to bring the war to an end , saying, “This war is not going to end on the deck of a battleship like World War II  .” Holbrooke believes that the political settlement should entail the participation of the Taliban members in the Afghan government. He pointed out, however, that the U.S. will not allow any settlement with al-Qaeda. Taliban groups have not totally excluded talks as an option, but they have so far rejected joining any negotiations until all coalition forces leave the country. The problem is that in the most recent Jirga, President Karzai informed the delegates at the outset; “There is no mention of a key Taliban demand that NATO troops leave Afghanistan,” when in fact that was one of the Taliban’s key demands. Ironically, the Jirga took place as US  and NATO  military planners were preparing to escalate an offensive against the Taliban in Kandahar  province. The military surge was an added  impediment  which  undermined the  already controversial  Jirga process and any hope for legitimate peace talks in the future. Meanwhile, the rising number of Afghan civilian casualties caused by mistaken NATO attacks during the operation is blocking any justification for the continued U.S. and NATO presence.

 1AC—Jirga (4/8)

The jirga process is key to stability in Afghanistan. Khaleej Times,  6/6/  10, “Jirga shows the way ahead”, http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?xfile=data/editorial/2010/June/editorial_June11.xml&section=editorial&col= Afghan tribal elders have suggested the obvious. Urging President Hamid Karzai to immediately open a line of communication with the Taleban, ** the jirga has ** at least **hinted at a way out of the mess**. On the conclusion of the three-day national peace talks in Kabul, tribesmen were unanimous in asking the government to offer amnesty and job incentives to induce militants to give up arms. This is in contrast to the approach that the fragile  government  in Kabul  is exercising, by  concentrating on capturing and  eliminating all those who differ with the order of the day. Karzai must heed to this piece of advice, as the trigger-happy approach and successive hunt-and-flush operations  have only led to chaos and conflict  in the region. ** If such a process is initiated, it could be the beginning of a path to help return Afghanistan back to stability **. Though the Taleban are not an easy nut to crack, it will at least lead to a sense of confidence building measures. Karzai, whose despicable governance and Kabul-confined writ are supposed to be the main weaknesses,  has an opportunity to deliver. He has himself hinted at bringing the Taleban on board, in order to accelerate the process of nation building and restoring the sense of oneness in the war-weary country. While going through the jirga’s recommendations, Karzai should not exhibit politics of exigency, and ensure that the task of reconciliation and rapprochement is carried forward at the earliest. Indeed, this will be a leadership test for the president, who will be required to do a lot of balancing act in advocating the cause of a just peace with the so-called rogue elements on board. The coalition of the willing, which apparently plans to stay put  in Afghanistan  for a long time,  also has an opportunity to recast its strategy. The history of this landlocked  country is  witness to the fact  that no foreign occupier could dig heels , come what may. Rather, Afghanistan has been Soviets and Americans Waterloo, alike. The Pakhtoon, who constitute more than 70 per cent of the population, need to be harnessed and accommodated in the affairs of the state. So is the status quo with the Taleban. Militant or otherwise, Talebanisation is a frame of mind in this part of the world, as it stands for a country and government free from the strings of occupation. Neither is this a debatable demand, nor an illegitimate one to be brushed aside. This is why even military strategists in Brussels and P  entagon had hinted at cultivating moderate elements in the Taleban’s rank and file to achieve a **broad-based settlement**. It’s time for Karzai to do some trekking in the barren and inhospitable landscape of the country, and reach the people who have been condemned and coerced since 2001. The 1,600 tribal leaders who had pinned their hopes in nationalism and politics of fraternity should not be taken for a ride. Their words of wisdom can make the difference. Karzai will be better advised to act as a catalyst in the process of change.

 1AC—Jirga (5/8)

Reconciliation is the only route to Afghan peace. Only the bottom-up format allows integrated responses and sustainable peace Matt Waldman , Policy and Advocacy Adviser, Oxfam International, Afghanistan, “Afghanistan: Development and Humanitarian Priorities,” Oxfam Report, January 31,  200   8 Almost all of the peace-building work in Afghanistan  has been at a political level , where there are links to warlordism, corruption or criminality,  or  it is  target-limited  , such as the disarmament programmes. Initiatives such as the Action Plan on Peace, Reconciliation and Justice are significant, but lack clarity and are primarily concerned with peace and reconciliation at a national level. Implementation of the Plan has been non-existent or extremely limited. 67 Moreover, most peace-building measures only marginally , indirectly or partially  concern the people  of Afghanistan. The capacity of Afghan  communities to resolve their **own disputes**, and  build and sustain peace,  has largely been neglected. The recent deterioration  in security, particularly in the south and south-east of Afghanistan,  is evidence **that top-down approaches** are  by themselves  inadequate , without parallel nationwide, peace-work at ground level. War has fractured and strained the social fabric of the country and has deepened widespread poverty, which is itself a cause of insecurity. An Oxfam Security Survey of 500 people in six provinces shows that disputes at a local level often have root causes in poverty, and  are largely related to resources, particularly land and water, family matters or  inter-community  and tribal  differences. Local disputes frequently  lead to violence  and insecurity,  which  not only destroys quality of life and  impedes development work, but is also exploited by  commanders or  warlords to strengthen  their positions in the wider  conflict. Security threats, are diverse – not only the Taliban as is sometimes portrayed –  and  in many cases they  have local roots  or connections. In rural areas, predominantly local mechanisms are used to resolve disputes, especially  community or tribal councils of elders (known as ** jirgas ** or shuras), and district governors. Recommendations Promote community peace-building There is a clear need for  widespread community peace-building. This is a participatory, **bottom-up** approach, which strengthens community capacities to resolve  disputes and  conflict  ; to develop trust and social cohesion within and between communities;  and to promote  inter-ethnic and inter-group  dialogue. It focuses on capacity building in mediation, negotiation and conflict resolution techniques and supports civil society and schools’ involvement in local peace and development. Existing community peace- building  programmes,  implemented by Afghan and international NGOs, including Oxfam, ** have been highly effective **. An independent analysis of the work of one peace- building NGO in western Afghanistan concluded that the programmes had a major positive impact on local security and that it was ‘ a creative initiative at the forefront of enabling  and supporting ** what is truly wanted by Afghan ** partners and ** communities ** .’// 68 // Thus,  donors should significantly expand support for  NGOs and civil society actors carrying out  such work.

1AC—Jirga (6/8)

Collapse spills over to a Central Asian war Nicholas Watt and  Ned  Temko , The Observer, July 15, 200  7 Britain's most senior generals have issued a blunt warning to Downing Street that the military campaign in Afghanistan is facing a catastrophic failure , a development that  could lead to an Islamist government seizing power in  neighbouring  Pakistan. Amid fears that London and Washington are taking their eye off Afghanistan as they grapple with Iraq, the generals have told Number 10 that the collapse of  the government in  Afghanistan,  headed by Hamid Karzai,  would present a grave threat  to the security of Britain. Lord Inge, the former chief of the defence staff, highlighted their fears in public last week when he warned of a 'strategic failure' in Afghanistan. The Observer understands that Inge was speaking with the direct authority of the general staff when he made an intervention in a House of Lords debate. 'The situation in Afghanistan is much worse than many people recognise,' Inge told peers. 'We need to face up to that issue, the consequence of strategic failure in Afghanistan and what that would mean for Nato... We need to recognise that the situation - in my view, and I have recently been in Afghanistan - is much, much more serious than people want to recognise.' Inge's remarks reflect the fears of serving generals that the government is so overwhelmed by Iraq that it is in danger of losing sight of the threat of failure in Afghanistan. One source, who is familiar with the fears of the senior officers, told The Observer: 'If you talk privately to the generals they are very very worried. You heard it in Inge's speech. Inge said we are failing and remember Inge speaks for the generals.' Inge made a point in the Lords of endorsing a speech by Lord Ashdown, the former Liberal Democrat leader, who painted a bleak picture during the debate. Ashdown told The Observer that Afghanistan presented a graver threat than Iraq. 'The consequences of failure in Afghanistan  are far greater than in Iraq  ,' he said. 'If we fail in Afghanistan then Pakistan goes down. The security problems for Britain would be massively multiplied. I think you could not  then ** stop a widening regional war that would ** start off in warlordism but it would  become  essentially  a war  in the end  between Sunni and Shia  right  across the Middle East.' 'Mao  Zedong  used to refer to the  First and Second  World Wars as the European civil wars. You can have a regional civil war. That is what you might begin to see. It will be catastrophic for Nato. The damage done to Nato in Afghanistan would be as great as the damage done to the UN in Bosnia. That could have a severe impact on the Atlantic relationship and maybe even  damage the American security guarantee for Europe.'

Global war S. Frederick Starr , Chairman, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus, December 13 , 200  1 This imperial hangover will eventually pass, but for the time being it remains a threat. It means that the Central Asians, after cooperating with the US, will inevitably face redoubled pressure from Russia if we leave abruptly and without attending to the long-term security needs of the region. That we have looked kindly into Mr. Putin’s soul does not change this reality. The Central Asians face a similar danger with respect to our efforts in Afghanistan. Some Americans hold that we should destroy  Bin Laden, Al Queda, and  the Taliban and then leave  the post-war stabilization and reconstruction to others. Such a course runs the danger of condemning all Central Asia to further waves of instability from the South. But in the next round it will not only be Russia that is tempted  to throw its weight around in the region  but  possibly  China, or even Iran or India. All have as much right to claim Central Asia as their “backyard” as Russia has had until now. Central Asia may be a distant region but when these nuclear powers begin bumping heads there it will create terrifying threats to world peace that the U.S. cannot ignore.  1AC—Jirga (7/8)

Central Asian war goes thermonuclear. Dr. Ehsan Ahrari , (Prof National Security and Strategy of the Joint and Combined Warfighting School at the Armed Forces Staff College), August 200  1  , “Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan and the New Great Game,” Strategic Studies Institute, www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubID=112 Even though in the Clinton era the United States paid attention to Central Asia only sporadically—through its involvement in the oil and gas pipeline issues and regarding the capture or extradition of Usama Bin Ladin— the priorities  of the new administration  toward South and Central Asia must change. As Russia increasingly asserts itself under the youthful leadership of President Vladimir Putin in different regions of the world, Russo-American ties, especially in Central Asia, are likely to become competitive. The significance of that competition also increases when one considers the growing strategic involvement of the PRC in Central Asia. Since all indicators point toward Sino-American relations remaining competitive, that becomes one more reason why the United States should develop a proactive strategy toward South and Central Asia. South and Central Asia constitute a part of the world where a well-designed American strategy might help avoid crises or catastrophe. The U. S. military would provide only one component of such a strategy, and a secondary one at that, but has an important role to play through engagement activities and regional confidence-building. Insecurity has led the states of the region  to seek w  eapons of  m  ass  d  estruction, missiles, and conventional arms. It has also  led them toward  policies which undercut the security of their neighbors. If such activities continue, the result could be  increased  terrorism, humanitarian disasters, continued low-level conflict and  potentially even major regional war or a  thermonuclear exchange. A shift away from this pattern could allow the states of the region to become solid economic and political partners for the United States, thus representing a gain for all concerned.

 1AC—Jirga (8/8)

Freezing troop levels will get the Taliban on board for the Jirga Syed Saleem Shahzad , Pakistan Bureau Chief, Asia Times Online, February 3, 20  10  , http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LB03Df01.html At the major international conference on Afghanistan in London last Thursday, Afghan President Hamid  Karzai called on the Taliban to take part in a loya jirga  (assembly of elders) - as a start to peace talks. The Taliban are widely reported as having responded that first they want all of the more than 110,000 foreign troops in Afghanistan to leave the country by 2011. Asia Times Online, however,  has learned from well-connected sources in Afghanistan who have been **directly involved in** backchannel **negotiations** with the Taliban that there is an important nuance to the Taliban demand. That is, the U nited  S  tates ** must put an immediate halt to its plans to send ** **a** ** further 30,000 troops to Afghanistan ** before withdrawal begins in 2011. In return, the Taliban would be prepared to open up a channel of dialogue with the Americans, through Saudi Arabia,  while at the same time taking measures to reduce the level of hostilities in the country. **The key issue** boils down to one of trust, that is, whether the US would be prepared to only send in replacements for previously deployed troops, given that the surge in forces was meant to be a cornerstone of its counter-insurgency plan as a means of softening up the Taliban before talks could begin in earnest.

 

Contention Three: Solvency

The surge will fail—Afghanistan lacks the conditions that made previous surges successful. Fred Kaplan , columnist, 9-19-200  8. [Slate, Afghanistan Isn't Like IraqWhy a "surge" won't work there, http://www.slate.com/id/2200406] The problem is, the conditions that made the surge succeed in Iraq  to a limited degree (more on that caveat later)  are very different from those in Afghanistan  —so much so that the tactics employed in the one country have little relevance to the other. It is indisputable that security in Iraq has improved. Casualties, insurgent attacks, and roadside bombings have greatly diminished. However, the surge is not the only—and probably not the main—cause of these trends. The biggest cause was the "Sunni Awakening," in which Sunni tribes reached out to form alliances with U.S. forces—at the tribal leaders' initiative, before the surge began—in order to beat back the Islamist jihadists of al-Qaida in Iraq, whom they had come to hate more than they hated the American occupiers. Petraeus promoted this development by paying other Sunni militiamen who joined their ranks. (He had pacified Mosul in just this way in the early days of the occupation, until the money ran out and the Bush administration didn't give him more, at which point Mosul went up in flames.) To the extent that the surge played a role, it wasn't so much the surge itself—the infusion of 25,000 extra U.S. combat troops—but rather what Petraeus ordered those troops to do. Rather than stationing them on remote superbases, as his predecessor had done, he put them in the neighborhoods to mix with the Iraqi people, earn their trust, gather intelligence, and try to keep them secure. In Baghdad especially, they also built massive walls throughout the city, physically separating the warring ethnic factions. But the situation in Iraq bears little resemblance to that of Afghanistan. Barnett Rubin, a professor at N  ew  Y  ork  U  niversity and author of several books about the country,  spells out some of the differences  : Iraq's insurgency is based in Iraq; Afghanistan's Taliban insurgents are based mainly across the border  in Pakistan. Iraq is urban, educated, and has great wealth, at least potentially, in its oil supplies;  Afghanistan is rural, largely illiterate, and ranks as one of the world's five poorest countries. Iraq has some history as a cohesive nation (albeit as the result of a minority ruling sect oppressing the majority); Afghanistan never has and, given its geography, perhaps never will. Moreover, the Taliban's insurgency is ideological, not ethno-sectarian  (except incidentally). Therefore, while some warlords and tribes have allied themselves with the Taliban for opportunistic or nationalistic reasons, and therefore might be peeled away and co-opted, the conditions are not ripe for some sort of Taliban or Pashtun "Awakening  ." Nor is there any place where walls might isolate the insurgents.

 1AC—Solvency (2/3)

Conditions are getting better without the surge—every metric shows improvement. Tom Engelhardt , co-founder of the American Empire Project, runs the Nation Institute’s TomDispatch.com; he is the author of //The End of Victory Culture// and //The American Way of War: How Bush’s Wars Became Obama’s//,  7/12  /10, CBS News, //Remind Me Again: Why Are We in Afghanistan?//, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/07/12/opinion/main6671452.shtml July 12, 2011, Washington, D.C. -- In triumphant testimony before a joint committee of Congress in which he was greeted on both sides of the aisle as a conquering hero, Gen. David Petraeus announced the withdrawal this month of the first 1,000 American troops from Afghanistan. “This is the beginning of the pledge the president made to the American people to draw down the surge troops sent in since 2009,” he said, adding, “and yet let me emphasize, as I did when I took this job, that our commitment to the Afghan government and people is an [|enduring] one.” Last July, when Gen. Petraeus [|replaced] the discredited Gen. Stanley McChrystal as Afghan war commander, he was hailed as an “ [|American hero] ” by Senator John McCain, as “ [|the most talented officer of his generation] ” by the New Yorker’s George Packer, and as “ [|the nation's premier warrior-diplomat] ” by Karen DeYoung and Craig Whitlock of the Washington Post -- typical of the comments of both Republicans and Democrats, liberals and conservatives at the time. Petraeus then promised that the United States was in Afghanistan [|“to win.”] In the year since, the Taliban insurgency has been blunted and “a tipping point has been reached,” says a senior U.S. military official with the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, who could speak only on the condition of anonymity, in keeping with the policy of his organization. ** By every available ** measure -- IEDs or roadside bombs, suicide attacks, Taliban assassinations of local officials, allied casualties, and Afghan civilian casualties -- the intensity of the insurgency has weakened significantly. The Afghan military and police, though not capable of taking the lead in the fighting in their own country, have been noticeably strengthened by American and NATO training missions. President Hamid Karzai’s government, still considered weak and corrupt, has succeeded in putting an [|__Afghan face__] on the war. Democratic critics of Gen. Petraeus, and of President Obama’s surge strategy, were notably quiet this week as the general toured the capital’s power hotspots from John Podesta’s Center for American Progress to the [|American Enterprise Institute], while being feted as the hero of the moment and a potential [|presidential candidate] in 2016. As in 2007, when he was appointed to oversee George W. Bush’s surge in Iraq after the critics said it couldn’t be done, the impressive charts the general brought to his congressional testimony once again vividly indicated otherwise. The situation in Afghanistan has undergone an Iraq-like change since the nadir of July 2010 when critics and proponents alike agreed that the nine-year-old war was foundering, the counterinsurgency strategy failing, and [|__polling__] in the U.S. highlighted the war’s increasing unpopularity.  1AC—Solvency (3/3)

Blocking the surge is best—maintains current upward trajectory in Afghanistan. Rory Stewart,  Ryan Professor and Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights at Harvard, author of The Places in Between and Prince of the Marshes, 7-17-200  8. [TIME, How to Save Afghanistan, p. http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1823753,00.html] So what  exactly  should we do about Afghanistan  now? ** First, the West should not increase troop numbers **. In time, NATO allies, such as Germany and Holland,  will probably want to draw down their numbers  , and they should be allowed to do so. We face pressing challenges elsewhere. If we are worried about terrorism, Pakistan is more important than Afghanistan; if we are worried about regional stability, then Egypt, Iran or even Lebanon is more important; if we are worried about poverty, Africa is more important. A troop increase is likely to inflame Afghan nationalism because Afghans are more  anti-foreign  than we acknowledge  and  the  support for our presence in the insurgency areas is declining. The Taliban, which was a largely discredited and backward movement,  gains support by portraying itself as fighting  for Islam and Afghanistan  against a foreign  military  occupation. Nor should we increase our involvement in government and the economy. The more responsibility we take in Afghanistan, the more we undermine the credibility and responsibility of the Afghan government and encourage it to act irresponsibly. Our claims that Afghanistan is the "front line in the war on terror" and that "failure is not an option" have convinced the Afghan government that we need it more than it needs us. The worse things become, the more assistance it seems to receive. This is not an incentive to reform. Increasing our commitment to Afghanistan gives us no leverage over the government. Afghans increasingly blame us for the problems in the country: the evening news is dominated by stories of wasted development aid. The government claims that in 2007, $1.3 billion out of $3.5 billion of aid was spent on international consultants, some of whom received more than $1,000 a day and whose policy papers are often ignored by Afghan civil servants and are invisible to the population. Our lack of success despite our wealth and technology convinces ordinary Afghans to believe in conspiracy theories. Well-educated people have told me that the West is secretly backing the Taliban and that the U.S.'s main objective was to steal Afghanistan's emeralds, antiquities and uranium — and that we knew where Osama bin Laden was but had decided not to catch him. Playing to Our Strengths A smarter strategy would focus on two elements: more effective aid and a more limited military objective. We should target development assistance in provinces where we have a track record of success. Our investment goes further in stable and welcoming places like Hazarajat than it can in hostile, insurgency-dominated areas like Kandahar and Helmand, where we have to spend millions on security and the locals do not contribute to the project and will not sustain it after our departure. We should focus on meeting the Afghan government's request for more investment in agricultural irrigation, energy and roads. And we should increase our support to the most effective departments, such as education, health and rural development; they are good for the reputation of the Afghan state and the West. Creating more educated, healthier women and men and better transport, communications and electrical infrastructure may be only part of the story, but they are essential for Afghanistan's economic future. Our efforts in nation-building, governance and counternarcotics should be smaller and more creative. This is not because these issues are unimportant; they are vital for Afghanistan's future. But only the Afghan government has the legitimacy, the knowledge and the power to build a nation. The West's supporting role is at best limited and uncertain. The recent elimination of the opium crop in Nangarhar, for instance, was driven by the will and charisma of a local governor and owed little to Western-funded "capacity-building" seminars. The greatest recent improvements in local government have come about through the replacement of local governors rather than through hundred-million-dollar training programs. Since these successes are often difficult to predict, we should invest in numerous smaller opportunities rather than bet all our chips on a few large programs.

Card continues—No Text Removed

<span style="font-family: "Times New Roman","serif"; font-size: 14pt;"> 1AC—Solvency

Card Continues—No Text Removed

Our military strategy, meanwhile, should focus on counterterrorism — not counterinsurgency. Our presence has so far prevented al-Qaeda from establishing training camps in Afghanistan. We must continue to prevent it from doing so. But our troops should not try to hold territory or chase the Taliban around rural areas. We should also use our presence to steer Afghanistan away from civil war and provide some opportunity for the Afghans themselves to create a more humane, well-governed and prosperous country. This policy would require far fewer troops over the next 20 years, and they would probably be predominantly special forces and intelligence operatives. This strategy is far from ideal. But it's the best option we've got. It might not allow us to build an Afghan nation. It would involve a very long-term policy of containment and management, and it may never lead to a clear victory or exit. But unlike abandoning Afghanistan entirely , as we did in 1990, it  would not leave a vacuum filled by dangerous neighbors. And unlike a policy of troop increases, this strategy would be less costly, more popular with voters, ** more sustainable ** in the long term,  less of a distraction  from other global priorities  and less likely to alienate Afghan nationalists and undermine the Afghan state.