HO+corruption+cites+2010

=7/20 cites= Madalene O’Donnell, program coordinator at NYU’s Center on International Cooperation, Post-conflict Corruption: A Rule of Law Agenda?, Draft chapter prepared for Civil War and the Rule of Law, 2006 , www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/corruption_conflict_and_rule_of_law.pdf Pressure on the part of donors and the public to address corruption can have unintended effects
 * Many many good cards in this article***

Deepa Ollapally, Program Officer, Special Initiative on the Muslim World, US Institute of Peace, USIP Special Report No. 105, April 2003, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr105.html Opinion among the participants was split about the best way to deal

M K Bhadrakumar, diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for 29 years, Asia Times, 2-6-08, http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JB06Df01.html

New York Times, August 28, 1999 ''I'm an economist -- I focus on what can be done, not moral rearmament

Taking on corruption provokes a violent backlash Mark Sedra, research associate at the Bonn International Center for Conversion, and Dr. Peter Middlebrook, independent consultant who has been working in Afghanistan since early 2002, Foreign Policy in Focus, November 2, 2005, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/2912 The accommodationist approach, endorsed by the United States, is characterized

Demands for corruption reform collapse NATO – ensures perception of imperialist occupation Adrian Hamilton, The Independent, 2-8-08, http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/adrian-hamilton/adrian-hamilton-nato-should-not-be-fighting-this-war-in-afghanistan-779753.html That is not the same question, although inextricably linked, with the question of whether

Philippe Le Billon, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia, Journal of International Development, 15, 413-426, abstract, 2003, http://www.geog.ubc.ca/~lebillon/corruption.pdf According to the ‘corruption buys peace’ argument, corruption facilitates the creation of a political [many other cards in this article]
 * Corruption is key to limit conflict. Economic and political opportunity for powerful insurgents is a key safety valve to contain violence

Empirical results prove corruption doesn’t hurt growth Fred Oluoch, April 13, 2005, http://www.newsfromafrica.org/newsfromafrica/articles/art_10229.html In his opposition to the much-touted growth model where developing countries

Appeasement of warlords is key to Karzai – pressure on corruption threatens the state William Arkin, Policy Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, 2-28-08, http://blog.washingtonpost.com/earlywarning/2008/02/why_a_surge_isnt_right_for_afg.html On the other hand, the figure should not be surprising to anyone who has been paying

The aff leads to PMC shift Carl Robichaud, program officer at the Century Foundation, World Politics Review, October 30, 2007, http://www.e-ariana.com/ariana/eariana.nsf/allDocs/8951B04F55F156218725738400709B1A?OpenDocument "If you don't have enough military forces, very

Colonel Vincent Dreyer, “Retooling the Nation-Building Strategy in Afghanistan,” submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the U.S. Army War College, February 28, 2006 Other critics agree with the end state of Afghan nation-building but advocate changes
 * Cracking down on warlords causes regime collapse and nationwide chaos

Cracking down on militias reduces stability – it removes their stake in peace Dr. Sean Maloney, teaches in the Royal Military College War Studies Programme, “Afghanistan Four Years On: An Assessment,” Parameters, Autumn 2005 Militia forces are leadership-dependent. The main issue in this

Integration of the Northern Alliance is the only thing holding Afghanistan together Barnett Rubin, director of studies and a senior fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, September 2, 2007, http://icga.blogspot.com/2007/09/administrations-iran-drug-policies.html There has been much speculation about how Iran would respond, mostly

Iran misperceives the crackdown as encirclement, risking miscalc Barnett Rubin, director of studies and a senior fellow at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University, September 11, 2007, http://icga.blogspot.com/2007/09/collapse-of-legitimacy-in-pakistan.html The status of those Taliban leaders branded by the U.S. as harborers of al-Qaida

=7/19 cites= Empowering the police increases insecurity Andrew Wilder, Research Director for Politics and Policy at the Feinstein International Center at Tufts, The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police, July, 2007 , http://www.boell.de/en/05_world/5182.html The historical role of police in Afghanistan, especially in rural areas, has been very limited. Their main task Public perception of corruption makes all their impacts inevitable, even if they result in a substantial overall reduction UK Department for International Development, Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme, Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan, February 16, 2007, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/anti_corruption_roadmap.pdf Available data on perceptions and anecdotal evidence indicate that corruption is seen to be very widespread,

Anti-corruption efforts fail – too deeply ingrained UK Department for International Development, Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme, Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan, February 16, 2007, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/anti_corruption_roadmap.pdf Anti-corruption agencies can fail because of : • Weak political will – vested interests and other pressing

Lack of judicial reform makes police reform useless Andrew Wilder, Research Director for Politics and Policy at the Feinstein International Center at Tufts, The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police, July, 2007 , http://www.boell.de/en/05_world/5182.html The failure of the government and the international community to develop and implement an effective Cracking down on corruption causes warlord backlash, destroying security Time, March 8, 2004 The Karzai government has attempted to rein in recalcitrant warlords. Most recently Karzai appointed

Rising expectations turn the case – setting anti-corruption goals too high results in disillusionment UK Department for International Development, Asian Development Bank, United Nations Development Programme, Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan, February 16, 2007, http://www.unodc.org/pdf/afg/anti_corruption_roadmap.pdf A nother serious issue is the combination of high expectations and widespread cynicism and doubts about the

Corruption guarantees total state collapse Arthur Kent, BBC correspondent for Afghanistan since 1980, Jul./Aug. 2007 . [Policy Options, Covering Up Karzai & Co., p. http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/jul07/kent.pdf] Abdul Rab’s tale might seem grim enough if Minister Zarar were just a small-time hood, using local cronies