KL%202010%20TNW%201AC

Contention One is Inherency The United States has 90 B61 bombs positioned at Incirlik Airbase with no strategic value __Today’s Zaman,__ Istanbul News, 4/3/ __10__ __,__ (“Report: US considers withdrawing nuclear bombs from Turkey”, [|**http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-206266-102-report-us-considers-withdrawing-nuclear-bombs-from-turkey.html**]) The United States may withdraw its tactical nuclear weapons deployed in five NATO member European countries, including Turkey, The Times reported on Friday. The United States positioned B61 gravity bombs in Turkey, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Germany during the Cold War years to serve as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. There are a total of 200 B61 bombs deployed in the five countries, The Times said. Turkey is believed to be hosting 90 bombs at İncirlik Air Base in southern Anatolia. According to the report, the Obama administration is preparing to revise US policy on nuclear weapons -- heralding further reductions in the US stockpile and a pledge not to develop new systems. But a possible decision to withdraw the B61 gravity bombs is not expected to be included in the revised nuclear policy, as it is a matter for discussion within NATO. The strategic importance of the bombs faded following the collapse of the Soviet Union, paving the way for calls for withdrawal of the weapons because there is no longer any justification for keeping them in Europe. “It’s not like the Red Army is going to be coming across Poland and Germany. Conflict between Russia and the US is unfathomable, but the nuclear weapons in Europe give the Russians the cynical excuse not to talk about their own strategy on tactical weapons,” Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, told The Times. And, the number of US bombs in Turkey is projected to increase Richard __Weitz__, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis, the Hudson Institute, 4/12 /__10__ (“The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Weapons on Turkish Soil”, Turkey Analyst, Volume 3 No. 7, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, **[])** As part of the current NATO deliberation, there have been proposals to increase the number of U.S. nuclear weapons stored in Turkey as part of an alliance-wide consolidation of NATO’s TNW arsenal. Some proponents of retaining NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangements favor removing them from those European countries that no longer want them on their soil and relocating them into those countries that do, which might only include Turkey and perhaps Italy. If NATO withdrew U.S. TNW from all other European countries, the Turkish government could find it uncomfortable remaining the only NATO nuclear-hosting state, and might request their removal from its territory as well. But then Turkey might proceed to develop an independent nuclear deterrent in any case for the reasons described above.

Thus the Plan: The United States federal government should remove all of its B61 bombs from Turkey.

Contention One is Israel - Syria 1. Turkey is trying to bring back Syria – Israel relations but it isn’t working ( Daily Outlook Afghanistan, first Afghan newspaper collection, 3/10 /10 “Turkish Mediation in Syrian-Israeli Conflict” Lexis) Peace talks between Israel and Syria collapsed in 2000 over Syrian demands for a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights, a strategic plateau Israel captured in the 1967 war and later annexed. Talks resumed under Turkish mediation last year, but they collapsed after an Israeli offensive in Gaza that killed about 1,400 Palestinians. For years, Turkey has functioned significantly in the Middle Eastern issues and is increasingly partaking to bring about a diplomatic solution for conflicts going on in M.E. Regarding Turkish role in finding a solution for Israeli-Palestinian long running conflict and other regional questions, European countries have frequently asked Turkey to make a move on seeking an answer for the critical circumstances in the region. Considering its positive role and its capacity to improve interstate relations, Turkey has been making all-out efforts to bring about stability in the region and hinder further decline of relations among regional countries. Since adopting its new policy and approach towards European countries and their regional allies, Syria sees Turkey as the aptest mediator trying to find ultimate solution for its standoffish relation with Israel. Syrian President Bashar Assad last month insisted that Turkey should mediate any new talks between his country and Israel, adding that Israel doesn't want Turkish mediation because Ankara is an impartial broker. Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said on Tuesday March 09, 2010 that Israel might accept Turkey as a mediator to restart stalled talks between Syria and Israel. Erdogan said that while Israel has not yet endorsed Syria's proposal of Ankara as an interlocutor in their frozen peace talks, it is moving in that direction. After the indirect peace talks between the two rivals collapsed following Israel's devastating military offensive in Gaza, in December 2009, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman dismissed indirect talks with Syria through Turkish mediation, calling instead for direct talks, to be held in Damascus and Jerusalem. Syria used to act more with a pro-Iran policy so its relations with Lebanon, Israel and the western countries remained unwelcoming. But the country seems to have adopted a fresh policy dealing with the western countries and their regional allies. As Turkey has established political relations with Israel since long ago and is known as a moderate and neutral party, Syria wants it once more organize peace talks between it and Israel. But the job seems easier said than done because of the Golan Heights subject still being unsolved and not sufficient common grounds exist for the two states to kick off negotiations. However, Erdogan is optimist about resumption of talks between the two states and US-led efforts, international pressures put on both parties and recent changes in regional politics may help this optimism come true. 2. Water is the most probable scenario for war in the Middle East Adel Darwish, Writer and commentator on the Middle East for the BBC, 5/30/ 03 “ Analysis: Middle East water wars” [] After signing the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat said his nation will never go to war again, except to protect its water resources. King Hussein of Jordan identified water as the only reason that might lead him to war with the Jewish state. Former United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali warned bluntly that the next war in the area will be over water. From Turkey to Uganda, and from Morocco to Oman, nations with some of the highest birth-rates in the world are all concerned about how to find enough water to sustain urban growth and to meet the needs of agriculture, the main cause of depleting water resources in the region. All of these countries depend on either the three great river systems which have an average renewal rate of between 18 days to three months, or on vast underground aquifers some of which could take centuries to refill. The Nile, the world's longest river, is shared between nine countries whose population is likely to double within two decades; yet the volume of water the Nile provides today is no larger than it was when Moses was found in the bulrushes. The list of 'water-scarce' countries in the region grew steadily from three in 1955 to eight in 1990 with another seven expected to be added within 20 years, including three Nile nations. The hidden factor International law is inadequate in defining and regulating the use of shared water resources. Few agreements have been reached about how water should be shared. Middle Eastern nations have resorted to force over issues less serious than water. Since the Madrid conference in 1991, Palestine-Israel negotiations and the now frozen negotiations with Syria have always stumbled over the issue of sharing water. With the Israeli army in control prohibiting Palestinians from pumping water, and settlers using much more advanced pumping equipment, Palestinians complain of "daily theft" of as much as 80% of their underground water. During the research for the book: Water Wars both my co-author and I, discovered that water was the hidden agenda for past conflicts and one major obstacle to reach a lasting and final settlement in the region. 3. Israel and Syria will go to all-out war (The New York Times 2/5/ 10 “ Israeli Foreign Minister Adds Heat to Exchanges With Syria” Lexis) Israel's blunt-talking foreign minister, Avigdor Lieberman, warned Syria's president , Bashar al-Assad on Thursday that the Assad family would lose power in any war with Israel, ratcheting up bellicose exchanges between the countries in recent days. In a speech at Bar-Ilan University, near Tel Aviv, Mr. Lieberman said: ''I think that our message must be clear to Assad. In the next war, not only will you lose, you and your family will lose the regime. Neither you will remain in power, nor the Assad family. That had to be the message, Mr. Lieberman added, because the only value truly important to them is power.  In an effort to calm the atmosphere, an aide to Israel's prime minister, [|Benjamin Netanyahu,] said that Mr. Netanyahu was ready to go anywhere in the world, at any time, to open peace talks with Syria without preconditions. The aide, Nir Hefetz, added that Israel did not rule out assistance from any fair third party'' that could advance a peace process with Syria. Mr. Lieberman was responding to strident comments from Syria on Wednesday. Mr. Assad told the visiting Spanish foreign minister, Miguel Angel Moratinos, that Israel was not serious about achieving peace and that the facts indicated that Israel is pushing the region toward war, not peace, according to the Syrian news agency SANA. Furthermore, the Syrian foreign minister, Walid al-Moallem, said Wednesday that Israel should not test Syria's determination, adding, Israel knows that war will move to the Israeli cities. 4. That spreads to full regional war ( Philippines News Agency 2/6/ 10 “ Egypt cautions Israel vs war comments” Lexis) Egypt's Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul-Gheit on Friday urged Israel to stop its "hostile" remarks about a possible war in the Middle East. "Egypt opposes Israel's escalating tone of hostility against any Arab country and its threats of war, " Abul-Gheit said in response to a recent Israel-Syria spat in which both countries threatened to declare war. He also warned irresponsible remarks might spoil the on-going peacemaking efforts. "The Israeli remarks came as several regional and international powers, topped by Egypt, work towards reviving hopes for just and comprehensive peace in the region," he noted. Verbal battle between Syria and Israel started when Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak was quoted by Jerusalem daily Ha'aretz as speaking to senior military officers on Monday that "in the absence of an arrangement with Syria, we are liable to enter a belligerent clash with it that could reach the point of an all-out regional war." In response to Barak's warning, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al -Moallem said Wednesday "Israel should not test Syria's determination -- Israel knows that war will move to the Israeli cities." With a threatening tone, Lieberman on Thursday warned Syrian President Bashar al-Assad not to provoke Israel. "If you declare war on Israel, you and your family will lose your reign ," he said during a speech at Israel's renowned Bar-Ilan University. Peace talks between Israel and Syria, technically still at war, bogged down since Israel's massive offensive against the Gaza Strip more than a year ago after both Middle East countries held four rounds of Turkey-mediated negotiations in 2008

5 . A war that breaks out in the Middle East would result in a global nuclear exchange. John __Steinbach,__ Nuclear specialist, Secretary of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki Peace Committee of the National Capitol Area, __’2__ (Center for Research on Globalization, [|**http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html**]) Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, " Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability ."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said " The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional. "(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing , and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration ." (44) 6. Withdrawing nukes lets Turkey bridge Syria – Israel dispute (Mustafa Kibaroglu teaches courses on arms control and disarmament in the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey. He has held fellowships at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. June 2010 []) In addition to improvements in bilateral relations with its immediate neighbors, Turkey has become more involved in wider Middle Eastern political affairs than it ever has been since the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. A key part of this regional involvement is mediation efforts between Israel and Syria. Another element is a willingness to take on a similar role in Iran's dispute with the international community over the nature and scope of Tehran's nuclear program, which is generally considered by Turkey's NATO allies to have the potential for weaponization and thus further proliferation in the region. Top Turkish political and military officials have suggested on various occasions that the most promising way out of the conflict in the longer term would be the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Against that background, the continued insistence of the Turkish security elite on hosting U.S. nuclear weapons has drawn criticism from Turkey's Middle Eastern neighbors.

7. Turkey is key to keeping stability in the Middle East Elliot __Hen-Tov__, Doctoral Candidate, __and__ Bernard __Haykel__, Professor of Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University, 6/18/__10__, (“Turkey’s Gain is Iran’s Loss”, New York Times, [|http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/19/opinion/19haykel.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=turkey's%20gain%20is%20iran's%20loss&st=cse]) Since Israel’s [|__deadly raid on the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara__] last month, it’s been assumed that Iran would be the major beneficiary of the wave of global anti-Israeli sentiment. But things seem to be playing out much differently: Iran paradoxically stands to lose much influence as Turkey assumes a surprising new role as the modern, democratic and internationally respected nation willing to take on Israel and oppose America. While many Americans may feel betrayed by the behavior of their longtime allies in Ankara, Washington actually stands to gain indirectly if a newly muscular Turkey can adopt a leadership role in the Sunni Arab world, which has been eagerly looking for a better advocate of its causes than Shiite, authoritarian Iran or the inept and flaccid Arab regimes of the Persian Gulf. Turkey’s Islamist government has distilled every last bit of political benefit from the flotilla crisis, domestically and internationally. And if the Gaza blockade is abandoned or loosened, it will be easily portrayed as a victory for Turkish engagement on behalf of the Palestinians. Thus the fiery rhetoric of Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, appeals not only to his domestic constituency, but also to the broader Islamic world. It is also an attempt to redress what many in the Arab and Muslim worlds see as a historic imbalance in Turkey’s foreign policy in favor of Israel. Without having to match his words with action, Mr. Erdogan has amassed credentials to be the leading supporter of the Palestinian cause. While most in the West seem to have overlooked this dynamic, Tehran has not. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad used a regional summit meeting in Istanbul this month [|__to deliver an inflammatory anti-Israel speech,__] yet it went virtually unnoticed among the chorus of international condemnations of Israel’s act. On June 12 Iran dispatched its own aid flotilla bound for Gaza, and offered to provide an escort by its Revolutionary Guards for other ships breaking the blockade. Yet Hamas publicly rejected Iran’s escort proposal, and [| __a new poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research__] found that 43 percent of Palestinians ranked Turkey as their No. 1 foreign supporter, as opposed to just 6 percent for Iran. Turkey has a strong hand here. Many leading Arab intellectuals have fretted over being caught between Iran’s revolutionary Shiism and Saudi Arabia’s austere and politically ineffectual Wahhabism. They now hope that a more liberal and enlightened Turkish Sunni Islam — reminiscent of past Ottoman glory — can lead the Arab world out of its mire. You can get a sense of just how attractive Turkey’s leadership is among the Arab masses by reading the flood of recent negative articles about Ankara in the government-owned newspapers of the Arab states. This coverage impugns Mr. Erdogan’s motives, claiming he is latching on to the Palestinian issue because he is weak domestically, and dismisses Turkey’s ability to bring leadership to this quintessential “Arab cause.” They reek of panic over a new rival. Turkey also gained from its failed effort, alongside Brazil, to hammer out a new deal on Iran’s nuclear program. The Muslim world appreciated Turkey’s standing up to the United States, and in the end Iran ended up [|__with nothing but more United Nations sanctions.__] In taking hold of the Palestinian card, Prime Minister Erdogan has potentially positioned Turkey as the central interlocutor between the Islamic/Arab world and Israel and the West, and been rewarded with tumultuous demonstrations lauding him in Ankara and Istanbul. Meanwhile, the streets of Tehran have been notably silent, with Mr. Ahmadinejad’s regime worried about public unrest during the one-year anniversary of last summer’s fraudulent elections. Prime Minister Erdogan has many qualities that will help him gain the confidence of the Arab masses. He is not only a devout Sunni, but also the democratically elected leader of a dynamic and modern Muslim country with membership in the G-20 and NATO. His nation is already a major tourist and investment destination for Arabs, and the Middle East has long been flooded with Turkish products, from agriculture to TV programming.

8. Turkey access to Israel solves Middle East water wars – Syria won’t block pipes ( MidEastWeb is a non-profit organization dedicated to promoting peace and coexistence in the Middle East. 20 02 Water In the Middle East Conflict [] ) The third conclusion is that feasible peaceful solutions to the water problem are at hand, but political considerations and lack of investment capital prevent their implementation. Desalination programs or import of water from neighbors such as Turkey would cost a small fraction of the Gross National Product of Israel, [|__as argued by Arie Issar.__] Below is a graph of current water resources and water use (From [|Issar, 2000] ). In Israel and Palestine and in Jordan, as well as in Egypt, water demand is as great as supply. Turkey, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq have a supply that considerably exceeds demand. Nonetheless, Syria for example, has a water shortage in the areas where water is needed. The water is there, but it is in the wrong place, and moving it is not feasible without investment. Turkey cannot sell water easily to Israel, because the pipes would have to go through Syria.

Contention Two is Iran We’ll isolate two scenarios: First is Iran Proliferation 1. Iran is rapidly enriching uranium- will become weapons grade Iran today announced it holds more than 37 pounds of uranium enriched to 20 percent, Reuters reported (see [|**//GSN//**] , June 22).The Persian Gulf nation in February began further refining low-enriched uranium from its stockpile, ostensibly for producing medical isotopes at an existing research reactor in Tehran. The United States and other Western powers, though, have feared the process could help Iran produce nuclear-weapon material, which has an enrichment level around 90 percent. Tehran has insisted its nuclear ambitions are strictly peaceful. " We have already produced 17 kilograms of 20 percent-enriched uranium, and we have the ability to produce 5 kilograms each month but we do not rush, " said Iranian Atomic Energy Organization head Ali Akbar Salehi, according to state media. "We do not want to produce anything which we do not need and we don't want to convert all our uranium reserves to 20 percent enriched uranium, so we produce 20 percent of enriched uranium according to our needs," he said. Iran could extract enough nuclear-weapon material for a bomb from about 440 pounds of 20 percent-enriched uranium, former U.S. State Department nonproliferation official Mark Fitzpatrick said ( [|**Reuters I**], June 23). 2. Presence of US weapons in Turkey leads to increased Iranian proliferation
 * __Global Security Newswire, 6/23/10__** __,__ (“Iran Claims 37 Pounds of Refined Uranium”, [] )

Mustafa __Kibaroglu__, Teacher at Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey, Fellow at Harvard University, Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of Internation Studies, International Atomic Energy Agency, and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, June __10,__ “ Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey”, Arms Control Association, [] ])

There is a common belief in Turkey that the U.S. weapons constitute a credible deterrent against threats such as Iran’s nuclear program and the possible further proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region in response to Tehran’s program. Others contend that if Turkey sends the weapons back to the United States and Iran subsequently develops nuclear weapons, Turkey will have to develop its own such weapons. These observers argue that even though they are against the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons on Turkish soil in principle, the weapons’ presence in the country will keep Turkey away from such adventurous policies. Similar views have also been expressed by foreign experts and analysts who are concerned about Turkey’s possible reactions to the developments in Iran’s nuclear capabilities in case U.S. nuclear weapons are withdrawn from Turkish territory. The negative effects of the weapons deployments on Turkish-Iranian relations need to be assessed as well. Some Iranian security analysts even argue that the deployment of the weapons on Turkish territory makes Turkey a “nuclear-weapon state .” There is , therefore, the possibility that the presence of the weapons could actually spur Iranian nuclear weapons efforts. This issue may well be exploited by the Iranian leadership to justify the country’s continuing investments in more ambitious nuclear capabilities.

3. Iran proliferation leads to Middle Eastern Proliferation Mustafa **__Kibaroglu__**, Teacher at Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey, Fellow at Harvard University, Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of Internation Studies, International Atomic Energy Agency, and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, December **__2005__** , (“Isn’t it Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?”, European Security, Vol. 14 No. 4 pgs. 443 – 457, http://mustafakibaroglu.com/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Kibaroglu-EuropeanSecurity-USnukesTurkey-December2005.pdf However, the tide is turning, and since the early 1990s Turkey is getting more and more involved in Middle Eastern politics . Apart from Turkey’s attempts to become a facilitator in the Israeli_ / Palestinian dispute, Turkey finds itself at the core of the developments in Iraq . As such, other countries in the region are also reconsidering Turkey’s position vis-a`-vis Middle Eastern politics. Complaints have been heard from regional analysts regarding Turkey’s alliance with the US and Israel. When Turkish scholars and authorities comment on Iran’s nuclear program, their Iranian counterparts point out that US nuclear weapons are still deployed in Turkey. Some even go so far as to qualify Turkey as a ‘nuclear weapons state’, although such a status is not compatible with the definitions in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This expression of how Turkey is seen by the Iranian authorities serves as another justification for Iran’s ambitions to develop nuclear weapons. It is highly likely that ‘Iran has developed the basic infrastructure to detonate a nuclear device. Should the Iranian leadership decide to develop nuclear warheads in the years to come, neither the Middle East nor the world will become a safer place to live. Most probably, some other countries in the region such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia would follow suit. Countries in other parts of the world may do so as well. Iran’s strategy may be to develop ‘break-out’ capabilities by staying in the Treaty for some time and then walking out with a unilateral declaration of its withdrawal, possibly with a small nuclear arsenal in stock. Such an eventuality may also lead to the collapse of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Therefore, preventing Iran from going down that path is crucial and requires taking timely action. One possible action, taken to free the Middle East from all sorts of weapons of mass destruction, might be to ask all the states to agree to a NWFZ/ME (in return for security guarantees). These security guarantees could encompass all the countries in the region, including Turkey and Israel (where nuclear weapons are deployed, even though they have never been formally acknowledged). 4. Wildfire proliferation will trigger preemptive nuclear wars around the planet Victor A. **Utgoff**, Deputy Director of Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of Institute for Defense Analysis, **02** [“Proliferation, Missile Defence and American Ambitions,” //Survival//, Summer, p. 87-90]

Further, the large number of states that became capable of building nuclear weapons over the years, but chose not to, can be reasonably well explained by the fact that most were formally allied with either the United States or the Soviet Union. Both these superpowers had strong nuclear forces and put great pressure on their allies not to build nuclear weapons. Since the Cold War, the US has retained all its allies. In addition, NATO has extended its protection to some of the previous allies of the Soviet Union and plans on taking in more. Nuclear proliferation by India and Pakistan, and proliferation programmes by North Korea, Iran and Iraq, all involve states in the opposite situation: all judged that they faced serious military opposition and had little prospect of establishing a reliable supporting alliance with a suitably strong, nuclear-armed state. What would await the world if strong protectors, especially the United States, were [was] no longer seen as willing to protect states from nuclear-backed aggression? At least a few additional states would begin to build their own nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them to distant targets, and these initiatives would spur increasing numbers of the world’s capable states to follow suit. Restraint would seem ever less necessary and ever more dangerous. Meanwhile, more states are becoming capable of building nuclear weapons and long-range missiles. Many, perhaps most, of the world’s states are becoming sufficiently wealthy, and the technology for building nuclear forces continues to improve and spread. Finally, it seems highly likely that at some point, halting proliferation will come to be seen as a lost cause and the restraints on it will disappear. Once that happens, the transition to a highly proliferated world would probably be very rapid. While some regions might be able to hold the line for a time, the threats posed by wildfire proliferation in most other areas could create pressures that would finally overcome all restraint. Many readers are probably willing to accept that nuclear proliferation is such a grave threat to world peace that every effort should be made to avoid it. However, every effort has not been made in the past, and we are talking about much more substantial efforts now. For new and substantially more burdensome efforts to be made to slow or stop nuclear proliferation, it needs to be established that the highly proliferated nuclear world that would sooner or later [continued, no breaks] [continued, no breaks] evolve without such efforts is not going to be acceptable. And, for many reasons, it is not. First, the dynamics of getting to a highly proliferated world could be very dangerous. Proliferating states will feel great pressures to obtain nuclear weapons and delivery systems before any potential opponent does. Those who succeed in outracing an opponent may consider preemptive nuclear war before the opponent becomes capable of nuclear retaliation. Those who lag behind might try to preempt their opponent’s nuclear programme or defeat the opponent using conventional forces. And those who feel threatened but are incapable of building nuclear weapons may still be able to join in this arms race by building other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as biological weapons. Second, as the world approaches complete proliferation, the hazards posed by nuclear weapons today will be magnified many times over. Fifty or more nations capable of launching nuclear weapons means that the risk of nuclear accidents that could cause serious damage not only to their own populations and environments, but those of others, is hugely increased. The chances of such weapons failing into the hands of renegade military units or terrorists is far greater, as is the number of nations carrying out hazardous manufacturing and storage activities. Worse still, in a highly proliferated world there would be more frequent opportunities for the use of nuclear weapons. And more frequent opportunities means shorter expected times between conflicts in which nuclear weapons get used, unless the probability of use at any opportunity is actually zero. To be sure, some theorists on nuclear deterrence appear to think that in any confrontation between two states known to have reliable nuclear capabilities, the probability of nuclear weapons being used is zero.’ These theorists think that such states will be so fearful of escalation to nuclear war that they would always avoid or terminate confrontations between them, short of even conventional war. They believe this to be true even if the two states have different cultures or leaders with very eccentric personalities. History and human nature, however, suggest that they are almost surely wrong. History includes instances in which states ‘known to possess nuclear weapons did engage in direct conventional conflict. China and Russia fought battles along their common border even after both had nuclear weapons. Moreover, logic suggests that if states with nuclear weapons always avoided conflict with one another, surely states without nuclear weapons would avoid conflict with states that had them. Again, history provides counter-examples Egypt attacked Israel in 1973 even though it saw Israel as a nuclear power at the time. Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands and fought Britain’s efforts to take them back, even though Britain had nuclear weapons. Those who claim that two states with reliable nuclear capabilities to devastate each other will not engage in conventional conflict risking nuclear war also assume that any leader from any culture would not choose suicide for his nation. But history provides unhappy examples of states whose leaders were ready to choose suicide for themselves and their fellow citizens. Hitler tried to impose a ‘victory or destruction’’ policy on his people as Nazi Germany was going down to defeat. And Japan’s war minister, during debates on how to respond to the American atomic bombing, suggested ‘Would it not be wondrous for the whole nation to be destroyed like a beautiful flower?” If leaders are willing to engage in conflict with nuclear-armed nations, use of nuclear weapons in any particular instance may not be likely, but its probability would still be dangerously significant. In particular, human nature suggests that the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons is not a reliable guarantee against a disastrous first use of these weapons. While national leaders and their advisors everywhere are usually talented and experienced people, even their most important decisions cannot be counted on to be the product of well-informed and thorough assessments of all options from all relevant points of view. This is especially so when the stakes are so large as to defy assessment and there are substantial pressures to act quickly, as could be expected in intense and fast-moving crises between nuclear-armed states. Instead, like other human beings, national leaders can be seduced by wishful thinking. They can misinterpret the words or actions of opposing leaders. Their advisors may produce answers that they think the leader wants to hear, or coalesce around what they know is an inferior decision because the group urgently needs the confidence or the sharing of responsibility that results from settling on something. Moreover, leaders may not recognize clearly where their personal or party interests diverge from those of their citizens. Under great stress, human beings can lose their ability to think carefully. They can refuse to believe that the worst could really happen, oversimplify the problem at hand, think in terms of simplistic analogies and play hunches. The intuitive rules for how individuals should respond to insults or signs of weakness in an opponent may too readily suggest a rash course of action. Anger, fear, greed, ambition and pride can all lead to bad decisions. The desire for a decisive solution to the problem at hand may lead to an unnecessarily extreme course of action. We can almost hear the kinds of words that could flow from discussions in nuclear crises or war. ‘These people are not willing to die for this interest’. ‘ No sane person would actually use such weapons’. ‘Perhaps the opponent will back down if we show him we mean business by demonstrating a willingness to use nuclear weapons’. ‘If I don’t hit them back really hard, I am going to be driven from office, if not killed’. Whether right or wrong, in the stressful atmosphere of a nuclear crisis or war, such words from others, or silently from within, might resonate too readily with a harried leader. Thus, both history and human nature suggest that nuclear deterrence can be expected to fail from time to time, and we are fortunate it has not happened yet. But the threat of nuclear war is not just a matter of a few weapons being used. It could get much worse. Once a conflict reaches the point where nuclear weapons are employed, the stresses felt by the leaderships would rise enormously. These stresses can be expected [continued no breaks] [continued no breaks] to further degrade their decision-making. The pressures to force the enemy to stop fighting or to surrender could argue for more forceful and decisive military action, which might be the right thing to do in the circumstances, but maybe not. And the horrors of the carnage already suffered may be seen as justification for visiting the most devastating punishment possible on the enemy.’ Again, history demonstrates how intense conflict can lead the combatants to escalate violence to the maximum possible levels. In the Second World War, early promises not to bomb cities soon gave way to essentially indiscriminate bombing of civilians. The war between Iran and Iraq during the 1980s led to the use of chemical weapons on both sides and exchanges of missiles against each other’s cities. And more recently, violence in the Middle East escalated in a few months from rocks and small arms to heavy weapons on one side, and from police actions to air strikes and armoured attacks on the other. Escalation of violence is also basic human nature. Once the violence starts, retaliatory exchanges of violent acts can escalate to levels unimagined by the participants before hand. Intense and blinding anger is a common response to fear or humiliation or abuse. And such anger can lead us to impose on our opponents whatever levels of violence are readily accessible. In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear ‘six-shooters’ on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations. This kind of world is in no nation’s interest. The means for preventing it must be pursued vigorously. And, as argued above, a most powerful way to prevent it or slow its emergence is to encourage the more capable states to provide reliable protection to others against aggression, even when that aggression could be backed with nuclear weapons. In other words, the world needs at least one state, preferably several, willing and able to play the role of sheriff, or to be members of a sheriff’s posse, even in the face of nuclear threats. 5. Removing TNWs is key to Turkey’s credibility in the Middle East to check Iran proliferation and mediate conflict Mustafa **Kibaroglu**, Teacher at Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey, Fellow at Harvard University, Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of Internation Studies, International Atomic Energy Agency, and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, December **2007** , (“A Turkish Nuclear Turnaround”, Turn back the Clock- Proposals for a Safer World, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 63, No. 6, p. 64) New opportunities exist for taking region-wide initiatives such as revitalizing efforts to establish a nuclear- weapon-free zone (NWZ) in the Middle East. Turkey has supported the idea of a regional NWZ since Iran and Egypt first proposed it to the United Nations in 1974. Yet, because Turkey was hosting U.S. nuclear weapons, Turkish officials did not consider becoming part of the zone. In a nod to geopolitical realities, other countries in the region did not insist on having Turkey on board either. However, the tide has turned since the early 1990s, and Turkey has become more entrenched in Mideast politics. Dramatic events such as the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union shifted Turkey’s attention from its northeastern border to its southern border. Turkey started to play a more active role in the Palestinian question, thanks to its Muslim identity and its strategic relations with Israe l. And since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the situation in Iraq has become the number one issue on Turkey’s foreign policy agenda—primarily due to the uncertainty surrounding the future of northern Iraq, where the local Kurdish administration aspires to an independent state. Indeed, many analysts now see Turkey as a full-fledged regional player. Some Iranian security elite even go so far as to characterize Turkey as a “nuclear weapon state” due to the presence of U.S. weapons on its soil. This serves as yet another justification of their ambitions to develop nuclear weapons. Sending back U.S. nuclear weapons will strengthen Turkey’s position vis- à-vis the aspiring nuclear states in the region and will also improve the prospects of a NWZ in the Middle East. This decision would be perfectly compatible with Turkey’s long-standing efforts to stem proliferation. As a significant regional military power and a NATO member, Turkey will also send a message to Israel, Iran, and the Arab states that nuclear weapons are no longer vital for security considerations. Indeed, U.S. nuclear weapons have not been useful or instrumental in Turkey’s fight against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorism over the last quarter- century. On the contrary, these weapons have aggravated the animosity of Turkey’s neighbors, such as Syria, Iraq, and Iran, prompting them to increase their support for the PKK. If the family of sovereign nations is lucky enough, it may not be too late to implement a number of sober-minded steps to get rid of existing nuclear weapons, wherever they may be stockpiled or deployed. A Turkish initiative could help lead the way. Second is US – Iran Relations 1. Turkey-Iran relations are on the mend but Iran views removal of TNWs as Turkey’s commitment to diplomacy Mustafa __Kibaroglu__, Teacher at Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey, Fellow at Harvard University, Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of Internation Studies, International Atomic Energy Agency, and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, June __10,__ “ Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey”, Arms Control Association, [] ]) On May 17, Turkey signed a joint declaration with Brazil and Iran, providing for the safe storage of Iran’s 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium fuel in Turkey in return for the delivery by France, Russia, the United States, and the International Atomic Energy Agency of 120 kilograms of fuel needed for the Tehran Research Reactor. This “nuclear fuel swap” is potentially a breakthrough in the long-standing deadlock in Iran’s relations with the West over Tehran’s nuclear program. There is no question that the degree of trust that Turkey has built with Iran, especially over the last several years with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, had a significant impact on getting this result. Iran has so far adamantly refused all other offers. Hence, the Iranian political and security elites who have been closely interacting with their Turkish counterparts at every level over the past several months and years prior to the fuel swap announcement may raise their expectations in turn. They may press for withdrawal from Turkey of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, which they fear may be used against them, as a way for Turkey to prove its sincerity regarding its stance toward Iran and, more broadly, its commitment to creating a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East. Turkey clearly has to tread carefully, but the risks should not be overstated. One concern might be the contingencies in which the security situation in Turkey’s neighborhood deteriorates, thereby necessitating the active presence of an effective deterrent against the aggressor(s). Yet, given the elaborate capabilities that exist within the alliance and the solidarity principle so far effectively upheld by the allies, extending deterrence against Turkey’s rivals should not be a problem. Turkey would continue to be protected against potential aggressors by the nuclear guarantees of its allies France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the three NATO nuclear-weapon states. Turkey’s reliance on such a “credible” deterrent, which will not be permanently stationed on Turkish territory, is less likely to be criticized by its Middle Eastern neighbors and should not engender a burden-sharing controversy with its European allies. 6. Turkish Credibility is key to successful negotiations to improve US – Iran Relations Alon **__Ben-Meir,__** Professor of International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies at The New School and New York University, **2/17/__09__** __,__ (“Nuclear Iran is Not an Option, A New Negotiating Strategy”, []) The presence of a third party acting as mediator between the United States and Iran may prove to be necessary, particularly if this party represents a major Muslim state with the stature of Turkey. Apart from Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan’s recent claims that “[Turkey is] ready to be the mediator” between the United States and Iran, due to its recent diplomatic achievements between Israel and Syria, there are many reasons why Turkey may succeed in mediating a peaceful solution to the nuclear impasse. To begin with, Turkey has a vested interest in the success of the negotiations. Many Turkish officials and academics have expressed grave concerns about the growing danger of yet another avoidable and potentially devastating war in the Middle East. For the Turks, finding a diplomatic solution is not one of many options but the only sane option to prevent a horrific outcome. Other than being directly affected by regional events, Turkey generally enjoys good relations with all states in the region; it has not been tainted with the war in Iraq; and it is a predominantly Muslim state, Middle Eastern as well as European. Turkey shares the longest border with Iran, and has maintained good neighborly relations with Tehran for centuries, with expanding trade relations. Moreover, Turkey and Iran have collaborated recently on the Kurdish issue, and both have a shared interest in this regard for the emergence of a stable Iraq. Turkey, as a fellow Muslim state, stands a much better chance to convey to Iran Israel’s sentiments to prevent a terrible miscalculation. Because of Turkey’s standing in the region, and as a credible bridge between East and West, it has the potential to succeed where others have failed. Turkey is a close ally and a reliable [continued] [continued] friend of the United States; it is an important member of NATO; it has worked fervently to maintain the democratic nature of the state; and it has received due praise for its recent diplomatic mediating efforts. Turkey can better understand the nature of Iran’s threats, specifically in connection with the United States, which has made no secret of its efforts to support Ahmadinejad’s opponents. Turkey may also be in a better position than the EU representatives to bypass Ahmadinejad and reach out directly to Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Khamenei, whose power goes practically unchecked in the Iranian government and institutions, has refused to speak to any American representatives. Turkey plays a strategic role in this sense because it can appeal to Khamenei, who will ultimately be responsible for any course of action the Iranian government decides to make on the nuclear issue. In addition, Turkey may offer an alternative where Iran can be persuaded to enrich uranium on Turkish soil under strict IAEA monitoring. Turkey, in short, can change the dynamics by offering a new venue for Americans and Iranians to meet and by generating a new momentum for serious dialogue. Finally, Turkey can provide Iran with a dignified disengagement plan, because if Iran is to make any concessions it will more likely make them to a fellow Muslim-majority state with which it has long and friendly relations.
 * 3. Diplomacy with Iran key to preventing miscalculation and war**

SENATOR RICHARD G. Lugar (R-IN); May 18, 200 6, CAPITOL HILL HEARING, Federal News Service, l/n The witnesses generally shared the view that no diplomatic options, including direct talks, should be taken off the table. Direct talks may in some circumstances be useful in demonstrating to our allies our commitment to diplomacy, dispelling anti-American rumors among the Iranian people, preventing Iranian misinterpretation of our goals, or reducing the risk of accidental escalation. Our policies and our communications must be clear, precise and confident, without becoming inflexible. I noted a comment by Dr. Henry Kissinger in an op-ed on Iran that appeared in Tuesday's Washington Post. Dr. Kissinger wrote, I quote: " The diplomacy appropriate to denuclearization is comparable to the containment policy that helped win the Cold War , i.e. no preemptive challenge to the external security of the adversary but firm resistance to attempts to project its power abroad and reliance on domestic forces to bring about internal change. It was precisely such a nuanced policy that caused President Ronald Reagan to invite Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev to a dialog within weeks of labeling the Soviet Union the evil empire," end of quote from Dr. Kissinger. Now, Dr. Kissinger's analogy, as well as the testimony we heard yesterday, reinforced the point that Iran poses a sophisticated policy challenge that will require the nuanced use of a range of diplomatic and economic tools. 5. U.S. – Iran war escalates to global nuclear war Mark Gaffney. (Researcher, Bachelor in Physical Science, Colorado State University, author, pioneer in the study of Israeli nuclear weapons program), 05/08/0 3. www.informationclearinghouse.info/article3288.htm

Would such an air war succeed? Yes, perhaps, then again, maybe not. In their current state of hubris the men around the president obviously believe they can accomplish anything with U.S. military power, now supreme on the planet. However, our leaders are not infallible. For every action there is a reaction, and, all too often, unintended consequences. Such a war would undoubtedly be perceived by the world as a serious escalation, and would likely produce a new anti-U.S coalition. Various states, in defiance of U.S. threats, might even come to Iran's assistance. The common border shared by Russia and Iran raises the stakes. To understand why, we need only consider how the U.S. would respond to a foreign attack on, say, Mexico. The Russians might supply Iran with advanced military arms, ground-to-air missiles, etc. Pakistani strong-man Pervez Musharraf would face growing pressure at home to assist a fellow Islamic state. With assistance from Russia and/or Pakistan, the Iranians might reconstitute their nuclear program in deep tunnels carved out of the country's rugged mountains, impervious to bombardment. To insure military success, the U.S. might be compelled to launch commando assaults with special forces, or even invade and occupy the country. Notice, this implies regime change, precisely what Ariel Sharon has advocated. Such a path--I hasten to add--would be insane, for reasons that should be apparent to anyone who can find Iran on a map. Iran is not Iraq! Iran is five times larger, a rugged mountainous country of sixty-five million people. What if invading U.S. forces should meet return fire, in kind? One shudders at the reaction in Washington should the Iranians turn on U.S. troops the same depleted uranium weapons that the U.S. has been using with such horrible effect on others. That would bring George W. Bush eye ball- to - eye ball with Vladimir Putin, the obvious supplier, and who knows , possibly with Pervez Musharraf. Lest we forget, both are nuclear-armed (unlike Saddam Hussein) and capable of defending themselves. The assumption  that Putin will back down in a crisis on his own border could be a serious miscalculation. If U.S. hawks insist on victory, and escalate, events could spin out of control...

5. Improving US – Iran relations key- diplomacy is the only way to prevent Israeli strikes James **Phillips**, Senior Research Fellow for Middle Eastern Affairs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, Heritage Foundation, 1/15/ **10,** (“An Israeli Preventive Attack on Iran’s Nuclear Sites- Implications for the U.S.”, Heritage Foundation, []) Israel's Preventive Option Against Iranian Nuclear Threat Israel has acceded to the Obama Administration's engagement strategy despite having strong doubts that it will succeed. Israeli leaders have stated their preference: that the Iranian nuclear weapons program be halted by diplomacy --backed by punish­ing sanctions. But they warn that they must regard the use of force as an option of last resort. Israel has repeatedly signaled a willingness to attack Iran's nuclear sites if diplomacy fails to dissuade Iran from continuing on its current threatening course. The Israel Air Force staged a massive and widely publicized air exercise over the Mediter­ranean Sea in June 2008 in which Israeli warplanes, refueled by aerial tankers, simulated attacks on tar­gets that were more than 870 miles away, approximately the same distance from Israel as Iran's uranium enrichment facility at Natanz. Lt. General Dan Halutz, the Chief of Staff of the Israel DefenseForces in 2006, when asked how far Israel would go to stop Iran's nuclear program, replied simply: "Two thousand kilometers." [|[1]] Last year, Israeli officials leaked the details of a secret Israeli air attack against a convoy transporting Iran-supplied arms in Sudan that was headed for Egypt's Sinai Peninsula to be smuggled through tunnels to Hamas. The officials stressed that the long distances involved signaled Israeli preparedness to launch other aerial operations against Iran if necessary. [|[2]] The government of Israeli Prime Minister Ben­jamin Netanyahu has sent even stronger signals since entering office last March. In an interview con­ducted on the day he was sworn into office, Netan­yahu warned that, "You don't want a messianic apocalyptic cult controlling atomic bombs. When the wide-eyed believer gets hold of the reins of power and the weapons of mass death, then the entire world should start worrying, and that is what is happening in Iran." [|[3]] Significantly, both Netan­yahu and his Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, for­merly served as commandos in the Israel Defense Forces and would be open to bold and risky action if the circumstances warrant it. From May 31 to June 4, 2009, Israel staged its largest country-wide civil defense drill, which simulated widespread missile attacks. In late June, an Israeli //Dolphin// -class submarine transited the Suez Canal for the first time to deploy in the Red Sea, and two Israeli //Saar// -class warships followed in July. An Israeli official warned that if Iran failed to halt its nuclear program, "These maneuvers are a message to Iran that Israel will follow up on its threats." [|[4]] The high-profile transits of the canal also signaled that Egypt, which shares Israeli concerns about the threats posed by Iran, particularly after the discov­ery of a large Hezbollah cell operating in Egypt, is willing to cooperate with Israel to defend against threats posed by Iran. The head of Israel's Mossad intelligence agency reportedly has met with Saudi officials and assured Prime Minister Netanyahu that Saudi Arabia would turn a blind eye to Israeli warplanes passing through Saudi air space to strike Iranian targets in a possible future air raid. [|[5]] An Israeli strike against Iran's nuclear facilities would not be unprecedented. Israel has launched preventive air strikes at nuclear facilities developed by hostile states in the past. In June 1981, Israel launched a successful air strike against Iraq's Osiraq reactor and inflicted a major setback on the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. [|[6]] In September 2007, Israel launched an air strike against a nuclear facility in Syria that was being built with North Korean assistance. The Israeli warplanes penetrated Syrian air defenses--which were more formidable than the air defense systems currently protecting Iranian nuclear sites--with little apparent problem. [|__[7__]]

6. Israeli Strikes on Iran would lead to Global Nuclear War Gil Ronen, Staff Writer, 04/13/ 10,  (“Medvedev: Israel Strike on Iran Could Mean Nuclear War, Refugees”, Arutz Shreva,  []  ) Meanwhile, Dmitri Medvedev, President of Russia, said in an ABC interview that the situation with Iran is 'tragic' and speculated that an Israeli strike on Tehran could lead to nuclear w ar and a stream of refugees from Iran. Speaking with George Stephanopoulos on 'Good Morning America', Medvedev said: “I don't know what Iran wants... Are they pursuing the nuclear weapon or not? I don't know. But we should carefully monitor it. These steps to enrich by 20 percent in their own sites, despite that we offered to do it in Russia, France and Turkey. This could be considered as at least the desire to enter into conflict with the world community.” 'Very tragic' When Stephanopoulos noted that Iran is unveiling new centrifuges, Medvedev admitted: “In any case our attempts didn't bring success and this is tragic, especially that there were so many chances. We do have our own relationship with Iran, a very close one. We do have significant trade, we do work with Iran on energy, and we do deliver equipment to Iran. But we cannot watch without any concern how they develop their nuclear program.” “Sanctions should be effective and they should be smart,” he said. They should force or obligate the Iranian leadership to think about what's next. What could sanctions be? It could be trade, arms trade. It could be other sanctions... Sanctions should not be paralyzing. They should not cause suffering. Aren't we in the 21st century?” Nuclear war and refugees Regarding the possibility that Israel would strike Iran, Medvedev said: “ It would be the worst possible scenario. Because any war means lives lost. Secondly, what does a war in the Middle East mean? Everyone is so close over there that nobody would be unaffected. And if conflict of that kind happens, and a strike is performed, then you can expect anything, including use of nuclear weapons. And nuclear strikes in the Middle East, this means a global catastrophe. Many deaths.” 7. Declining US-Iran relations has increased the pace of Iranian development of Nuclear Weapons Alon **Ben-Meir,** Professor of International Relations and Middle Eastern Studies at The New School and New York University, **2/17/09**, (“Nuclear Iran is Not an Option, A New Negotiating Strategy”, []) The negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 [|1] over Tehran’s nuclear enrichment activities have not only failed to reach an agreement but have brought Iran much closer to the threshold of mastering the technology to produce nuclear weapons. There are many factors that precipitated this breakdown, including the West’s inability to understand and deal with the Iran ian psychological disposition, the failure to present to Iran the severity of the punitive measures that could be inflicted as a consequence of its defiance, and the U.S. administration’s misleading policy that gave Iran the room to maneuver. There is an urgent need to adopt a distinctively new strategy toward Iran consisting of three tracks of separate but interconnected negotiations: The first should focus on the current negotiations on Iran’s enrichment program and the economic incentive package; the second should concentrate on regional security and the consequences of continued Iranian defiance; and the third track should address Iran’s and the United States’ grievances against each other. The United States must initiate all three tracks, without which future talks will be as elusive as the previous negotiations, except this time the West and Israel will be facing the unsettling prospect of a nuclear Iran. The Nature of U.S.-Iran Relations The relationship between the United States and Iran has increasingly been deteriorating, especially since Tehran began to flex its muscles following the Iraq war in 2003 and continuing with its insistence on maintaining its uranium enrichment program. Both sides have grievances against each other that date back to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and beyond. The American lack of understanding of the Iranian national psyche, history, religion, culture, and strategic interests and Iran’s display of the same attitude toward the United States has compounded the problems and hampered any tangible progress. The Bush administration’s refusal to negotiate directly with Tehran and its preoccupation in Iraq has played to the advantage of the clergy, allowing them time for nuclear advancement with impunity. From the Iranian perspective, decades of being abused by Western powers – especially the United States – came to an end with the Islamic revolution. Ironically, the Bush administration’s decision to topple Saddam Hussein has, in effect, ended America’s dual containment policy of Iraq and Iran, leaving Tehran to claim the spoils of the Iraq war. Iranians moved swiftly to take advantage of the chaotic war conditions, exploiting their close ties to the Iraqi leaders, entrenching themselves in most of Iraq’s social, economic, and political arena. [continued] [continued] Although many Iranians feel stifled and isolated by their government, they still view the Islamic revolution as something that has freed them from Western bondage and set them on a historical journey to greatness. The Iranian leaders are determined to assert themselves regionally, especially now that their country has become a substantial player in the oil market. The pursuit of a nuclear program is a symbol of the government’s newly found power and a means by which it can enhance its regional leadership role, if not the country’s hegemony. The government feels confident it can continue to do so in defiance of the international community without paying an unacceptable price. As a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) [|2], Iran has the right to enrich uranium to generate energy for peaceful purposes under strict guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran, however, has failed to fully comply with the NPT provisions and has been unwilling to agree with efforts to settle the impasse over its nuclear program. [|3] Iran has for more than 18 years concealed its nuclear program, expanded its nuclear facilities – some of which remain unknown to the IAEA – and resisted unannounced inspections. Iran also appears to be seeking industrial enrichment of higher-grade uranium, has failed to answer many questions regarding its ongoing nuclear activity, and continues to threaten Israel existentially. Iran’s behavior in this regard has eroded its international credibility and raised serious questions about its ultimate intentions. This is the Iran that the Obama administration will face, proud and resolute, with some self-conceit, willing to take risks, albeit carefully calibrated. Iran’s confidence in itself, however exaggerated, is due in part to the West, especially American policy makers – aided by many political intellectuals who have postulated that the global economy cannot do without Iranian oil. The West’s concerns over any interruption in the delivery of oil (25% of global oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz [|4] ) resulting from the destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities has, for all intents and purposes, removed that option from the table. As a result, the Iranians demonstrate a lack of appreciation about the consequences of their defiance, although they remain terrified of American naval and air force presence in the neighborhood. In addition, as the Iranian leaders have managed to play successfully for time, they feel that they may be able to stall long enough to produce nuclear weapon technology before the next American administration gets its bearing. 8. US Diplomacy is Key to Prevent Iran’s Nuclear Proliferation US Department of Defense, April 20, 20 10 , (“Mullen: Diplomacy Best Approach to End Iran’s Nuclear Proliferation”, Nuclear Weapons News, http://www.defencetalk.com/mullen-diplomacy-best-approach-to-end-irans-nuclear-proliferation-25831/) Although a U.S. military approach in Iran would hinder Iranian nuclear proliferation, __military might isn’t necessarily the best solution__, Navy Adm. Mike Mullen said today. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed that diplomatic means would garner a longer-term effect in reaching agreements with Iran , Mullen told reporters following remarks to students, veterans and faculty at Columbia University here. “Military options have been on the table and remain on the table, __but the engagements, the diplomatic, the sanctions, the finance; all of that needs to continue to lead the effort__,” Mullen said. The White House and Defense Department are confident in the U.S. military despite the past decade of stress on the force in Iraq and Afghanistan, he said. But __launching a military strike doesn’t mean Iran will stop its nuclear programs__, he added. “The [military] options would cause a delay, and that would be very clear, but that doesn’t mean the problem’s going to go away, and it could be a continuing problem,” he said. “ __Iran’s capability to defend its__ __ [|__nuclear program__] __ __and its military all would have to be taken into consideration.__ " Mullen said a __military strike on Iran would be the last option for the United States.__ Letting Iran obtain nuclear weapons as well as engaging the Islamic state in military action are both conclusions U.S. officials want to avoid. “From my perspective that’s the last option,” he said. __“... because both outcomes, having weapons and striking, have unintended consequences that are difficult to predict.__” The admiral said developing policy and trying to determine solutions for Iranian nuclear proliferation has been among the White House and Defense Department’s top three priorities for years. One of Mullen’s personal priorities since becoming chairman is the broader Middle East, trying to focus efforts, because he believes it is the most unstable and potentially destabilizing part of the world. In order to bring peace and provide a better future for the next generation, security there must be established, he said. “I worry about Iran achieving nuclear capabilities,” he said. “Dealing with it has unintended consequences that I don’t think we’ve all thought through. I know that other countries in the region will seek nuclear weapons as well, and that spiral heading in that direction is a very bad outcome. __The diplomatic__, the engagement piece, the sanction piece __needs to be addressed to possibly have Iran change its mind about where it’s headed.”__

Contention Four is Solvency B61 bombs are useless- Turkey will rely on NATO and nuclear umbrella for protection Alexandra __Bell and__ Benjamin __Loehrke__, Staff Writers, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 11/23 /__09__, (“The Status of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey”, The Bulletin, [] ) For more than 40 years, Turkey has been a quiet custodian of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. During the Cold War, Washington positioned intermediate-range nuclear missiles and bombers there to serve as a bulwark against the Soviet Union (i.e., to defend the region against Soviet attack and to influence Soviet strategic calculations). In the event of a Soviet assault on Europe, the weapons were to be fired as one of the first retaliatory shots. But as the Cold War waned, so, too, did the weapons' strategic value. Thus, over the last few decades, the United States has removed all of its intermediate-range missiles from Turkey and reduced its other nuclear weapons there through gradual redeployments and arms control agreements. Today, Turkey hosts an estimated 90 B61 gravity bombs at Incirlik Air Base. Fifty of these bombs are reportedly assigned for delivery by U.S. pilots, and forty are assigned for delivery by the Turkish Air Force. However, no permanent nuclear-capable U.S. fighter wing is based at Incirlik, and the Turkish Air Force is reportedly PDF not certified for NATO nuclear missions, meaning nuclear-capable F-16s from other U.S. bases would need to be brought in if Turkey's bombs were ever needed. Such a relaxed posture makes clear just how little NATO relies on tactical nuclear weapons for its defense anymore. In fact, the readiness of NATO's nuclear forces now is measured in months as opposed to hours or days. Supposedly, the weapons are still deployed as a matter of deterrence, but the crux of deterrence is sustaining an aggressor's perception of guaranteed rapid reprisal--a perception the nuclear bombs deployed in Turkey cannot significantly add to because they are unable to be rapidly launched. Aggressors are more likely to be deterred by NATO's conventional power or the larger strategic forces supporting its nuclear umbrella. National security remains even with absence of nuclear weapons [|Mustafa] [|Kibaroglu], Professor,Vice Chair International Relations Dept., Bilkent U., Ankara, Turkey, June 20 10 , Arms Control Today, print pg 12-13 Turkey clearly has to tread carefully, but the risks should not be overstated. One concern might be the contingencies in which the security situation in Turkey’s neighborhood deteriorates, thereby necessitating the active presence of an effective deterrent against the aggressor(s). Yet, given the elaborate capabilities that exist within the alliance and the solidarity principle so far effectively upheld by the allies, extending deterrence against Turkey’s rivals should not be a problem. Turkey would continue to be protected against potential aggressors by the nuclear guarantees of its allies France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the three NATO nuclear-weapon states. Turkey’s reliance on such a “credible” deterrent, which will not be permanently stationed on Turkish territory, is less likely to be criticized by its Middle Eastern neighbors [ [|27] ] and should not engender a burden-sharing controversy with its European allies. One cannot argue that once U.S. nuclear weapons that are stationed in Turkish territory are sent back, the nuclear deterrent of the alliance extended to Turkey will be lost forever. Currently, three NATO members are nuclear-weapon states. Of the NATO non-nuclear-weapon states, only five, as mentioned above, are known to host U.S. nuclear weapons. The remaining 20 members have no nuclear weapons on their territories. Yet, these members enjoy the credible nuclear deterrent of NATO, which remains the most powerful military organization in the world. Hence, the simple outcome of this analysis is that, for NATO members to feel confident against the threats posed to their national security, they do not have to deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on their territory.[ [|__28__] ] Turkey need not be an exception to this rule.