2010%20KL%20Turkey%20TNW%201NC



Iran Proliferation Frontline 1. Removing TNWs without Turkish consent destroys relations with NATO and the US - Turkey’s relationship is key to non-proliferation efforts in the East Richard **__Weitz__,** Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis, the Hudson Institute, 4/12**/__10__** (“The Future of NATO’s Nuclear Weapons on Turkish Soil”, Turkey Analyst, Volume 3 No. 7, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, [|**http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2010/100412A.html**] **)** The Obama administration’s decision to deploy U.S. missile defenses more closely to Turkey—and thereby ensure its protection from an Iranian nuclear attack—should help assuage Turkish concerns. But the most profitable non-proliferation tool in Turkey’s case would be to assure Turks that they will play an essential role in NATO’s security policies and that their preferences will have a major impact in shaping the alliance’s nuclear policies. Insofar as some members of Turkey’s security community are still concerned by Russia’s nearby nuclear and conventional security force  s, then NATO initiatives aimed at linking any withdrawal of U.S. TNW from Turkey would presumably be welcome in Ankara. The recently concluded New START Treaty does not address TNWs, but negotiations between Russia and NATO might be warranted, with some level of Turkish participation. Above all, the allies will need to avoid the appearance of sacrificing Turkish security interests in order to achieve a nuclear deal with Iran. In 1962, the United States might have been able to agree to remove the U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey in return for securing Moscow’s consent to withdraw its nuclear weapons from Cuba without seeking Ankara’s approval. In today’s climate, when Ankara’s security relations with the West are already under great strain, such a deal could well precipitate an enduring break in Turkey’s security ties with NATO. If Turkish policy makers decide to seek elimination of all U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil, in return for some kind of deal with Iran or for other reasons, then that decision should be respected. But the NATO allies should not compel the Turks to keep or remove the weapons without their consent. Iran Relations Frontline 1. Turkey is on the brink of breaking off its ties with the West and becoming a regional Islamist Power of the Middle East; dooming US foreign policy objectives and cooperation in the Middle East Mike Brownfield, lawyer and writer for Heritage Foundation, 6/20 10 (“Turkey’s Dangerous Turn Against the West”, The Heritage Foundation, June, 2010, http://blog.heritage.org/2010/06/08/turkeys-dangerous-turn-against-the-west/) This is not a new concern. In April 2009, President Barack Obama traveled to Turkey and highlighted the country as a Muslim nation that respects democracy and the rule of law, but as The Heritage Foundation’s [|Ariel Cohen wrote at the time], the president’s remarks may have been an overstatement. Cohen noted that the ruling Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) had a [|__stranglehold on power__] and “appears to be moving Turkey away from its pro-Western and pro-American orientation to a more Middle Eastern and Islamist one .” Cohen wrote that Turkey in 2006 became the first NATO member to host the leader of Hamas (a terrorist organization, according to the United States and the EU) and [|__“enthusiastically” hosted Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad__] and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir. Turkey also temporarily blocked U.S. warships from delivering humanitarian aid to Georgia, was cool to the U.S. withdrawing forced from Iraq through Turkey, and made moves to strengthen its relationship with Russia. Then there’s Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has developed close ties with Ahmadinejad and [|openly attacked Israeli President Shimon Peres], while AKP and other Islamists “sponsored a flood of anti-Israel demonstrations, billboards and anti-Semetic rhetoric.” Erdogan also questioned calls for Iran not to produce nuclear weapons and, together with Brazil, Turkey [|__attempted to derail__] U.S.-led UN sanctions against Iran. Most recently, it has been reported that Erdogan is [|“a hero to Palestinians for his vociferous verbal attacks on Israel”] and has [|criticized western nations] for not dealing with Hamas. Turkey’s involvement in the flotilla incident jives with the country’s alarming turn away from the West. The Heritage Foundation’s [|James Carafano writes] : Turkey not only knowing allowed the confrontation to be organized from Turkish soil, it did everything possible to exploit the incident. The Turkish Foreign Minister declared, “this attack is like 9/11 for Turkey.” This is the same government that has turned a blind eye to the crushing of independent voices in Iran and has moved to block sanctions intended to deter Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. And as [|Carafano notes], that provokes the questions “ Why are we are losing Turkey ?” and “What will happen if Turkey is lost?”: The consequences of that are pretty not pretty. Phased and adaptive missile defense will be less of both without Turkish cooperation. Iran will be more unbound. Israel will feel more isolated. NATO will be further weakened. The Washington Post explains Turkey’s turn in foreign policy as [|__rooted in a desire to expand business ties and become a regional player__]. It underemphasizes, though, the geopolitical and extremist religious roots of Turkey’s massive shift in foreign policy — the neo-Ottoman attempts to recreate a Turkish sphere of influence in the Middle East, and the AKP Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy to build an Islamic state. Whatever the cause of Turkey’s turn away from the West, it comes at the expense of U.S. interests and reveals weaknesses – if not a failure – in Washington’s Middle East policy. Iran Relations Frontline 2. Removal of TNWs moves Turkey closer to its new Middle East allies while alienating the West (Mustafa **Kibaroglu** teaches courses on arms control and disarmament in the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey. He has held fellowships at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. June **2010** []) A key question for NATO’s new Strategic Concept is whether burden sharing will continue to be construed as it has had for many decades, as suggested by Turkey, or whether it will be altered in response to the combined negative stance of some western European allies regarding the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons. This situation could lead to a divisive and unnecessary controversy between Turkey and its long-standing allies in the West. By insisting that the weapons remain on European territory, Turkey would not only alienate some of its Western allies that truly want to move the weapons out of their territories, but also create tension in its relations with its neighbors and newly emerging partners in the Middle East. On May 17, Turkey signed a joint declaration with Brazil and Iran, providing for the safe storage of Iran’s 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium fuel in Turkey in return for the delivery by France, Russia, the United States, and the International Atomic Energy Agency of 120 kilograms of fuel needed for the Tehran Research Reactor.[ [|26] ] This “nuclear fuel swap” is potentially a breakthrough in the long-standing deadlock in Iran’s relations with the West over Tehran’s nuclear program. There is no question that the degree of trust that Turkey has built with Iran, especially over the last several years with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, had a significant impact on getting this result. Iran has so far adamantly refused all other offers. Hence, the Iranian political and security elites who have been closely interacting with their Turkish counterparts at every level over the past several months and years prior to the fuel swap announcement may raise their expectations in turn. They may press for withdrawal from Turkey of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, which they fear may be used against them, as a way for Turkey to prove its sincerity regarding its stance toward Iran and, more broadly, its commitment to creating a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East. Turkey clearly has to tread carefully, but the risks should not be overstated. One concern might be the contingencies in which the security situation in Turkey’s neighborhood deteriorates, thereby necessitating the active presence of an effective deterrent against the aggressor(s). Yet, given the elaborate capabilities that exist within the alliance and the solidarity principle so far effectively upheld by the allies, extending deterrence against Turkey’s rivals should not be a problem. Turkey would continue to be protected against potential aggressors by the nuclear guarantees of its allies France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the three NATO nuclear-weapon states. Turkey’s reliance on such a “credible” deterrent, which will not be permanently stationed on Turkish territory, is less likely to be criticized by its Middle Eastern neighbors[ [|__27__] ] and should not engender a burden-sharing controversy with its European allies. Iran Relations Frontline 4. US-Turkish relations key to leadership—necessary to prevent Russia/China counterbalancing. Mustafa Malik, 5/15/19 97 , Senior associate at The Strategy Group, an international foreign policy research entity in Washington. “TURKEY REMAINS STRONG U.S. ALLY, WHY NOT FOR EU?” Chicago Tribune, NewsBank, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1997-05-15/news/9705150295_1_muslim-turkey-us-turkish-relations-islamist-refah // vkoneru That trepidation has eased now. Erbakan has agreed, though grudgingly, to retain Turkey's ties to Europe, the United States and Israel, and committed himself to working within the secular Turkish constitution. But American interest in Turkey has actually been heightened by a string of other events affecting U.S. strategic interests. China's economic and military resurgence is causing unease in Washington. Beijing appears to aspire for the status of a second superpower. And the Russian announcement of a new military doctrine stipulating the first use of nuclear weapons in a desperate conflict was a reminder that the honeymoon with the Russians is over. Even though President Boris Yelstin has swallowed the NATO expansion plans, the Russian parliament could hold off on ratifying the second strategic arms reduction treaty requiring Moscow to dismantle thousands of nuclear warheads. And Yeltsin recently joined Chinese President Jiang Zemin in a statement criticizing the U.S. domination of world affairs and calling for a "multipolar world." A multipolar, bi-polar world may not be around the corner, but the United States needs allies in the periphery of the world's second- and third-largest military powers that are resentful of its superpower status. Turkey is its only ally in the periphery of both. Turkish politics, however, remain extremely fluid and Islamic revivalism is far from over. The best way to promote stability and secularism in Turkey, its secular politicians and diplomats have been telling the West, is to integrate it with Western Europe politically and economically. Talbott's impassioned plea to the EU indicates that Washington is listening. Recently, a Turkish diplomat in Washington acknowledged that "the United States, happily , is showing a greater appreciation" of his country "during the last two, three months." He was quick to point out, though, that "the helicopters and frigates issue" remained unresolved. U.S.-Turkish relations have never been smooth. Under pressures from the Greek lobby, Congress has held up the delivery of 10 Super Cobra helicopters and three guided-missile frigates to Turkey. Besides, Yet (Turkish government., ) influential groups are sounding the alarm bell about the Islamists in the Turkey is likely to remain strategically important to Americans as long as they have stakes in its neighborhood. 5. Nuclear war Zalmay Khalizhad, RAND Analyst, 19 95 , "Losing the Moment?”, Washington Quarterly, spring, ln. Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the U  nited  S  tates  exercises leadership  would have tremendous advantages . First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world  would have a better chance of dealing  cooperatively  with  the world's major problems, such as  nuclear proliferation  , threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally,  U.S. leadership would  help  p reclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the U   nited  S  tates and the world  to avoid  another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including  a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system. T – Presence ≠ Weapons Systems 1. Definition - Presence consists of infrastructure, troops and agreements and exercises conducted with the host country but excludes weapons systems J.E. Peterson, Ph.D. Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Middle East Institute, an Adjunct Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, worked at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, and more. 20 08 . “Foreign Military Presence and its Role in Reinforcing Regional Security: A Double-Edged Sword.” //Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research//. pp. 183-205.  Table 7.2 Levels of Foreign Military Presence o : present in the Gulf x : not present in the Gulf ? : uncertain if present in the Gulf 1. intervention and occupation  "  2. proximate expeditionary force in region  - power projection   3. bases and other permanent  installations  (ranging from full bases, with the FMP enjoying internal sovereignty, to small support functions, such as naval replenishment or technical facilities)  4. non-permanent deployed units  5. joint or multilateral  exercises   6.  pre- positioning and access  agreements   7. offshore naval presence  8. " offshore" ready deployment capability (e.g. from neighboring countries or regions)  9. mutual or multilateral security treaties or agreements (CENTO, NATO, SEATO)  10. arms and equipment transfers  11. "  technical" facilities  (intelligence, space, communications)  12. aircraft over-flights (generally unseen and uncontroversial but reverses on occasion of aircraft trouble or in time of conflict or crisis)  13. surrogate forces (support for revolutionary or irredentist movements; Cuba in Africa 2. Violation- The aff only removes a weapon system 3. Standards a. Limits - The aff justifies squirrely weapon of the week affs which are unpredictable and unlimiting because the United States uses thousands of different guns, tanks, planes, and other weapons systems that could possibly be removed. They also justify removing weapon systems that aren’t explicitly within the topic countries but could be utilized within these countries like the drones in Pakistan or tomahawk missiles positioned on carriers b. Ground - They destroy key neg ground, like the redeployment and deterrence disad. Changing the troop’s tactics and weapons are key cps to test the desirability of actually removing presence 4. Topicality is a voting issue for reasons of fairness and education Iran Relations - ADV CP
 * CP: The United States federal government deliver the One-Hundred-Twenty kilograms of fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor in accordance with Turkey’s joint declaration with Brazil and Iran.**

Mustafa **__Kibaroglu__,** Teacher at Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara, Turkey, Fellow at Harvard University, Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of Internation Studies, International Atomic Energy Agency, and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, June **__10,__ “** Reassessing the Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Turkey”, Arms Control Association, [] ]) On May 17, Turkey signed a joint declaration with Brazil and Iran, **providing for the safe storage of Iran’s 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium fuel in Turkey in return for the delivery by France, Russia, the United States, and the International Atomic Energy Agency of 120 kilograms of fuel needed for the Tehran Research Reactor** . **This “nuclear fuel swap” is potentially a breakthrough in the long-standing deadlock in Iran’s relations with the West** over Tehran’s nuclear program. There is no question that the degree of trust that Turkey has built with Iran __,__ especially over the last several years with the coming to power of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey, had a significant impact on getting this result. Iran has so far adamantly refused all other offers. Hence, the Iranian political and security elites who have been closely interacting with their Turkish counterparts at every level over the past several months and years prior to the fuel swap announcement may raise their expectations in turn. They may press for withdrawal from Turkey of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, which they fear may be used against them, as a way for Turkey to prove its sincerity regarding its stance toward Iran and, more broadly, its commitment to creating a nuclear-weapon-free Middle East. Turkey clearly has to tread carefully, but the risks should not be overstated. One concern might be the contingencies in which the security situation in Turkey’s neighborhood deteriorates, thereby necessitating the active presence of an effective deterrent against the aggressor(s). Yet, given the elaborate capabilities that exist within the alliance and the solidarity principle so far effectively upheld by the allies, extending deterrence against Turkey’s rivals should not be a problem. Turkey would continue to be protected against potential aggressors by the nuclear guarantees of its allies France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the three NATO nuclear-weapon states. **Turkey’s reliance on such a “credible” deterrent, which will not be permanently stationed on Turkish territory, is less likely to be criticized by its Middle Eastern neighbors** and should not engender a burden-sharing controversy with its European allies. Turkey Prolif 1NC Turkey’s committed to nonproliferation now—strong NATO nuclear commitment is key. Tarik Oguzlu, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of International Relations, Bilkent University, July 200 9. [SETA Foundation for Political Economic and Social Research Policy Brief No. 33, Turkey and the Transformation of NATO, http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/news-182507-159-turkey-and-the-transformation-of-nato.html] Today, there is an intra-alliance consensus that contemporary threats concern transnational terrorism, the proliferation of w eapons of m ass d estruction, drug trafficking, organized crime, cyber-terrorism, the spreading of epidemics, piracy, environmental pollution, and the lack of good governance in failed or weak states. From the contemporary perspective, the maintenance of standing mass armies in anticipation of conventional territorial attacks no longer serves to address today’s global and soft security challenges. The old strategies of deterrence and containment do not suffice in dealing with the asymmetrical threats posed by non-state actors. This consensus, however, does not relieve Turkey of anxiety regarding the question of whether NATO’s transformation will erode its traditional territorial/ nuclear security commitments. Two occasions in the recent past appear to have led Turkish decision-makers to doubt whether the European members of the alliance continue to view Turkey’s territorial defense as part of their responsibilities. Both took place in the context of Turkey’s proximity to Iraq. First, although in 1991 and 2003 Turkey asked NATO to deploy early warning systems and Patriot missiles to Turkish territory against the possibility of an Iraqi attack, some European members of the alliance initially hesitated to respond to Turkey’s demands positively. Second, the reluctance of some western European members of the alliance to recognize the PKK as a terrorist organization or to commit to ending the PKK’s activities in their territories has worried Turkey. As long as Turkish public opinion remains convinced that the PKK owes its existence, at least in part, to support coming from European countries, Turkey’s commitment to NATO will be bound to decrease in the years to come .4 Turkey has signed on to the N uclear Non- P roliferation T reaty and has thus far adopted a position of non-nuclearization in its foreign policy. However, the changing nature of regional politics in the Middle East in the wake of the latest war in Iraq might pose challenges in this regard. For example, Iran’s nuclear ambitions raise strong concerns that it may acquire the technology to produce nuclear weapons. It is no secret that other countries in the region might then follow suit. Turkish decision-makers will find it hard to resist domestic calls for nuclearization if NATO prevaricates in offering a full nuclear commitment to Turkey.
 * Their own 1AC evidence concedes that the nuclear fuel swap is key for US-Iran relations and more important that removing TNWs**

Turkish TNWs are key to protect from the Iranian threat – removal of TNWs would infuriate Turkey and spur proliferation Alexandra Bell, Project Manager at the Ploughshares Fund and a Truman National Security Fellow, 8/25/ 09 (“Turkey’s Nuclear Crossroads,” August 25) The Turks look around them and see conflicts and threats in most directions. I was interested in what the Turks saw when they looked towards Tehran. Specifically, I asked about the threat, perceived or real, from the Iranian nuclear program. The answers varied sharply. Some dismissed the threat, noting that the Turks and the Persians had not been in conflict for 500 years. Others shuddered at the mention of a nuclear Iran. But regardless of the official line that Iran is an important trading partner and a regional ally, I think the Turks would not abide a nuclear Iran. In fact, when asked directly about the response to Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon, a high-ranking official from the Foreign Ministry said that Turkey would follow suit—immediately. I took this as a confirmation of the oft-repeated theory that if Iran attains a nuclear weapon, surrounding nations will acquire them too, resulting in a “cascade of proliferation.” Throwing multiple nuclear arsenals into a region with many long-standing tensions, disputed borders, and conflicting ethno-religious sects is a recipe for catastrophe. Turkey has a vastly superior military force and would not be directly threatened by Iran (a few people I spoke to flippantly noted that it was Israel who would be in trouble). Nevertheless, nations acquire nuclear weapons not only for security, but also for pride and prestige. Having a nuclear capability elevates a nation into an elite, if dubious, club. At the moment, Turkey seems alright with the status quo. It does not have a nuclear adversary, and in addition to being covered by NATO’s strategic security umbrella, it also houses an estimated 50 to 90 tactical nuclear weapons. Turkish officials were cagey about discussing these weapons. A former Air Force general, following what seemed to be the official line, denied that there were nuclear weapons in Turkey, saying they were removed at the end of the Cold War. This differed from the other officials I met, whose wink-wink references basically confirmed the presence of the nukes. They also hinted that the weapons would be critically important if a certain neighbor got the bomb. Turkey Prolif 1NC Turkish proliferation would snowball in the middle east leading to Nuclear War and Terror Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, 6-14- 07 , “The EU Facing Nuclear Weapons Challenges” http://www.npolicy.org/files/20070616-Sokolski-Talk-AixEnProvence-Conference.pdf One country that might disagree with this view, though, is Turkey. It is trying to figure out how to live with a nuclear weapons armed neighbor, Iran; is disappointed by its inability to be fully integrated into the EU; and is toying with getting its own nuclear capabilities. Whether or not Turkey does choose to go its own way and acquire a nuclear weapons-option of its own will depend on several factors, including Ankara’s relations with Washington, Brussels, and Tehran. To a very significant degree, though, it also will depend on whether or not the EU Members States are serious about letting Turkey join the EU. The dimmer these prospects look, the greater is the likelihood of that Turkey will chose to hedge its political, economic, and security bets by seeking a nuclear weapons-option of its own. This poses a difficult choice for the EU. Many key members are opposed to letting Turkey join the EU. There are arguments to favor this position. Yet, if Turkey should conclude that its interests are best served by pursuing such a nuclear weapons-option, it is almost certain to fortify the conviction of Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia to do the same. This will result in the building up a nuclear powder keg on Europe’s doorstep and significantly increase the prospect for nuclear terrorism and war.

START 1NC START will pass, but Obama’s capital is key The Hill, 7-23 -10, http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/110549-kerry-confident-senate-will-ratify-start-this-year The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee expressed confidence Friday that the upper chamber will ratify a key nuclear arms treaty with Russia before the year is up. Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) acknowledged Republicans concerns over the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) that the Obama administration hoped would pass quickly after it was signed three months ago. But Kerry assured that it would pass before the new year. In an interview with Bloomberg News to air this weekend, the Massachusetts senator was asked if the Senate could ratify the treaty before the November midterm elections. "I don’t want to get into the odds-making on it," he replied. "What is important is the Senate will pass it." Pressed on whether the Senate would vote this year, Kerry replied, "I believe we will pass it this year." START has been put on the backburner in the midst of a hectic Senate schedule as the August recess approaches and with election-year politics at play. But President Obama has **made it clear that passing the treaty is a priority**, especially in light of his effort to "reset" the U.S.'s diplomatic relationship with Russia. The vote, however, appears to be a **heavy lift**. It takes 67 senators to ratify a treaty, meaning that all Democrats plus eight Republicans would need to support it. But aside from Foreign Relations Committee ranking member Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), no other GOP senators back the treaty. Bipartisan Congressional opposition to TNW withdrawal – they’re committed to extended deterrence Sokov 2009 [Nikolai, PhD, senior research assoc. @ James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, German Leadership 6, Issue 4 http://cns.miis.edu/opapers/090717_german_leadership/german_leadership_6_issue_4.pdf] If some in the Obama administration support withdrawal of the weapons once the arms control agenda allows the issue to come forward, some politically powerful figures outside the administration are taking the opposite point of view. The bipartisan congressional commission on the U.S. strategic posture in its report referenced above stressed the value of “extended deterrence” and said that this mission could force the U nited S tates to retain weapons it does not need for its own security. The report gave considerable weight to the opinion of those allies in Europe who consider these weapons essential to prevent coercion by Russia and Iran. It should be noted that recent studies and interviews with representatives of these countries challenge the accuracy of this representation of their countries’ views by the commission. 35 The strong emphasis on the argument that some European countries are staunchly opposed to the withdrawal of TNW is widely attributed to commission co-chairman James Schlesinger, who has been championing this theme of late.36 Still, the political salience of this message, particularly among congressional Republicans is undeniable. Pushing controversial issues drains Obama’s capital Mark **Seidenfeld**, Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law, Iowa Law Review, October 19 **94** In addition, the propensity of congressional committees to engage in special-interest-oriented oversight might seriously undercut presidential efforts to implement regulatory reform through legislation. n198 On any proposed regulatory measure, the President could face opposition from powerful committee members whose ability to modify and kill legislation is well-documented. n199 This is not meant to deny that the President has significant power that he can use to bring aspects of his legislative agenda to fruition. The President's ability to focus media attention on an issue, his power to bestow benefits on the constituents of members of Congress who support his agenda, and his potential to deliver votes in congressional elections increase the likelihood of legislative success for particular programs. n200 Repeated use of such tactics, however, will impose economic costs on society and concomitantly consume the President's political capital. n201 At some point the price to the President for pushing legislation through Congress exceeds the benefit he derives from doing so. Thus, a President would be unwise to rely too heavily on legislative changes to implement his policy vision.

START 1NC START key to prevent nuclear war Blanchfield 9 Mike Blanchfield, staff writer, 7-4-2009. [Montreal Gazette, “Duck and cover or a world without nukes?” http://www.montrealgazette.com/story_print.html?id=1759991&sponsor=] Still, Blair and many others say t he need for the U.S. and Russia to show leadership is even more pressing, to remove not only the **ever-present** Cold War possibility of a world-ending nuclear accident, but the 21st-century threat of nukes falling into terrorist hands. Much has been made of the need to press the "reset" button on the strained relations of late between the White House and the Kremlin. Medvedev struck a conciliatory note this week when he called for a new era in relations with Washington, based on a "purely pragmatic" agenda. Thomas Graham, a retired U.S. diplomat and Clinton-era arms-control ambassador, said Russian and U.S. co-operation on arms control, including a new START treaty, would pay dividends in a much broader sense. " For too long in this post-Cold War world, the two former Cold War adversaries have remained in a semi-hostile relationship ," Graham said. " There could be a serious threat of broader nuclear-weapon proliferation . Many people are concerned about the Iranian nuclear program. ... This administration, I believe, correctly understands that we cannot effectively deal with either of those issues, and many others as well, without close co-operation with the Russian Federation." Officials from both countries are already hammering out the details of an agreement that would replace the START 1 treaty, which expires Dec. 5. Though the Moscow-Washington relationship is tangled in a web of tension over the U.S. missile-defence-shield plans for Europe, and NATO's eastward expansion, positive signals emerged from the Kremlin yesterday on one front: Medvedev's spokesman said he and Obama would sign a side deal that would allow the U.S. military transit of goods through Russian territory to Afghanistan. The main goal would be a new START framework that would essentially see both sides slashing their nuclear-warhead stockpiles by one-quarter, down to about 1,500 warheads each. Despite the spread of nuclear-weapons arsenals to such countries as China, Pakistan, India and elsewhere, nine out of every 10 nuclear bombs on the planet are under the control of the White House and the Kremlin. Lilia Shevtsova, of the Moscow office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggests that a renewed version of START will not necessarily make the world a safer place. "When you start counting nukes, you start talking disarmament and verification procedure. It's a sign not of mutual trust - it's rather a sign of lack, an absence of mutual trust," Shevtsova said. Charles Ferguson, a senior fellow with the Council on Foreign Relations, says if Russia and the U.S. were to go so far as to cut their arsenals down to 1,000 each, other nuclear countries could begin to compete with them. For Blair, it's well past the time to abandon long-held suspicions and animosities. After walking his Ottawa luncheon crowd through his Paris doomsday vision, Blair piles on more scenarios. If there were an accidental launch of weapons that triggered all-out nuclear war between Russia and the U.S., 119 million people in each country would die in the initial exchange. That would include 15 million around the Kremlin in Moscow. A city like Chicago or Ottawa would be gone within the hour. " We've pushed our luck as far as we can ; now we need a policy. So to put it bluntly, there are two paths that stretch before us: We either bury our weapons or we're buried by them," Blair said. Turkey Politics 1NC (1/2) If the elections happened today, Erdogan would lose. Gil Ronen, IsraelNationalNews staff writer, Last Updated , 6/6 /2010, “Erdogan Poised to Lose Next Election, Expert Says,” http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/news.aspx/137906 // vkoneru Turkey's foreign policy shift away from friendship with Israel and the West may be a ploy by the country's  p  rime  m  inister to gain popularity for his party, which  stands to lose the next election in July 2011, says a top expert  on the region. The hostile stance taken by Turkey towards Israel is part of a major transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy, according to Begin-Sadat Center Director Prof. Efraim Inbar. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is turning away from the West , he explained,  and  moving  closer to  countries such as Sudan, Syria and  Iran. However, “it is not a foregone conclusion that Turkey will persist in this direction,” Inbar said in a position paper: “Among Turkish society many still support the secular parties, which are far from pleased with the rush towards the Muslim world. Even among moderate Muslim quarters there is a sense of unease regarding the government’s polic y pushing Turkey to join radical Islamic elements  such as Hamas and Iran. One should also recall that Shiite Iran was an historic rival of the Sunni Turks.” (For an article on Turkey under Erdogan written by an Iranian freedom activist, click here.) ** Public support for the ruling Islamic party is in decline  ** , the expert added, mostly due to corruption and abuse of civil rights. “Were elections held last week, the Islamist party would lose many seats, and two secular parties would possibly have made up the coalition. ** If current public opinion is held till the next elections **, scheduled for July 2011,  ** it is likely that Turkey will emerge with a new prime minister **. It is possible that precisely due to his domestic situation as reflected in the polls, Erdogan has decided to exacerbate his relations with Israel in order to gain public support.” Prof. Inbar concludes that Israel “should stand its ground on Israeli vital interests” vis-a-vis Turkey. “Moreover, Israel should not tolerate insults. This will only be perceived as a weakness. Israel should distinguish between the Turkish state and society, and the current government that deserves a strong riposte. Firm, level-headed responses will be of assistance to pro-Western Turks in their domestic debate.” TNWs and staging posts unpopular with the public – 72% against US presence Claudine Lamond and Paul Ingram, British American Security Information Council, January 23, 20 09 , “Politics around US tactical nuclear weapons in European host states,” BASIC Getting to Zero Paper, www.atlanticcommunity.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/CLamondTNWinNATO.pdf // vkoneru There is a rising sentiment amongst the population for the removal of US nuc lear weapon  s from  Turkish territory. In a recent survey,[20] more than half the respondents stated that they are against nuclear weapons being stationed in Turkey. Almost 60%  of the Turkish population  would support a government request to remove the nuclear weapons  from their country,  and 72%  said they  would support an initiative to make Tur key a nuclear-free zone.[   21] There may be several causes behind this sentiment, including the  Iraq  War, Turkish  relations with neighboring states, budget expenditure  and  the moral concern  over nuclear weapons. The historic precedence of Greece , a NATO member and Turkey's historic rival , ending its commitment to nuclear sharing in NATO  may have further strengthened this tendency. There have been ** public expressions of resentment towards the US military presence ** in Turkey ever since the lead up to  the US war with Iraq. The United States insisted on the government allowing American troops to use Turkey as a  staging post, ** despite overwhelmingly antiwar Turkish public and political opinion **. Limited permission was granted after heavy debates and delay in the Turkish parliament. Erdogan will get credit for the plan Lale Kemal, staff writer and columnist for today’s zaman, 6/20 /2010, “What will Erdoğan do over nukes at the İncirlik base?,” http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/columnists-207467-what-will-erdogan-do-over-nukes-at-the-incirlik-base.html // vkoneru Erdoğan urged, once again, during a speech in Washington on Monday  that a nuclear-free zone be established in  Turkey's region, i.e.,  the Middle East,  which in particular will include Israel. Erdoğan also said tha t Turkey does not want Iran or any other nation to have nuclear weapons. Turkey Politics 1NC (2/2) CHP win key to EU accession The Jerusalem Post, May 31, 20 10 , “Turkey’s game changer?,” lexis The CHP has failed to come up with its version of moving Turkey forward, instead merely opposing the AKP. Subsequently, and ironically for a leftist party, the CHP has become the party opposing change - the party of "no." The implications of the dirty tactics against Baykal aside, the shake-up in the CHP's leadership presents the party with an unprecedented opportunity - Turkish leaders do not quit politics until they die - to introduce New Kemalism, a forward vision for a European Turkey. Kilicdaroglu has already voiced  support for EU accession,  and the talk in Ankara is that  he is wooing prominent liberal, pro-EU Turkish diplomats who feel disgruntled with the AKP's foreign policy to join the CHP. If the CHP becomes the party of change, it can even mold Turkey in the image of leftist parties that took Portugal and  Spain into the E  uropean  U  nion while transforming and liberalizing their societies. New Kemalism's aim would be to boost traditional Kemalism's commitment to Turkey's European vocation while reguiding it toward more liberal values. In the early 20th century, Kemal Ataturk wanted Turkey to go West, and that remains Kemalism's goal. Europe, however, has moved even further West since then. Joining this new Europe, the EU of liberal values, has to be New Kemalism's driving mantra. Turkey’s accession into the EU is key to peace and stability in Cyprus Stefan Nicola, Staff writer for United Press International, June 13, 20 05 , United Press International, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Cyprus backs Turkey’s EU bid,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=109941&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=132754 // vkoneru The accession of Turkey into the E uropean  U  nion  is essential to solve the Cyprus problem , a senior Cypriot diplomat in Washington said Monday. "We are in favor of Turkey joining the EU," said  Euripides Evriviades,  ambassador of  the Republic of  Cyprus , at a luncheon hosted by the Nixon Center, a Washington-based think tank. "The EU solves problems by embracing them," he said, "it has managed to reunify the French and the Germans, and i t will do it for Cyprus   ...  Turkey joining the Union is fundamental for peace and stability and long-term prosperity in the region." A former British colony, Cyprus has been divided into the Republic of Cyprus -- the Greek Cypriot south -- and a Turkish-occupied north since Turkey invaded the Mediterranean island in 1974. Although only the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on May 1, 2004, every Cypriot carrying a passport has the status of a European citizen. EU laws, however, do not apply to the north, which has so far been recognized by Turkey alone. Evriviades said he hopes the rejection of the EU constitution in France and the Netherlands does not influence the timetable of the EU-accession talks with Ankara, which are scheduled to start Oct. 3. EU foreign ministers also approved an agreement on Monday adapting its customs union with Turkey to the 10 new EU member states, including Cyprus, bringing accession talks with Ankara a big step closer. Once Turkey signs the document, it will have met all the conditions to start the talks. In those talks, Cyprus hopes it will not get overlooked, as the issue is one that EU leaders have repeatedly stated they would like to be solved if Turkey wants to join the Brussels-based club. But the strategic interest of the United States in Turkey, a country that borders Iran and Iraq, might be disadvantageous to such a small country as Cyprus, the ambassador said. Evriviades criticized U.S.-lawmakers for what he felt would be an unjust foreign policy towards Nicosia: The ambassador said that in a Congress hearing earlier this year, it was said that "one politically risk-free option...for the United States to improve its relations with Turkey, is for the U.S. basically to deliver Cyprus." "How do you think I feel as a Cypriot," Evriviades asked, "if my own country is being used as an extension and a trump card for somebody else's foreign policy?" The Cypriot issue, which  has seen repeated sparks of violent outbreaks  over the last four decades, is also on the to-solve list of the United Nations. A U.N.-endorsed reunification plan facilitated direct talks between the leaders of both parties that culminated in a referendum last April. But while the Turkish north backed the plan, Greek Cypriotes overwhelmingly rejected the proposal. Cyprus instability escalates to nuclear war Tony Barber, Independent Staff Writer, 1/23/19 97 “Europe's coming war over Cyprus: After 22 years of diplomatic stalemate, the world's most densely militarised confrontation zone may be about to explode, writes Tony Barber,” http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/europes-coming-war-over-cyprus-1284661.html // vkoneru Just as EU foreign ministers sit down over lunch in Brussels to thrash out what to do, word arrives that four Greek Cypriots have been killed along the Green Line dividing government-held southern Cyprus from the Turkish-occupied north. The government, backed by Greece, retaliates by vowing to take delivery within a week of a batch of Russian S-300 anti- aircraft missiles ordered in January 1997. As a Russian-Greek naval convoy carrying the warheads and launchers edges towards the eastern Mediterranean, the Turkish armed forces swing into action. Troop reinforcements pour into northern Cyprus. Planes raid the Greek-built missile base near Paphos in south-western Cyprus. The Turkish navy prepares to blockade the island. Greece declares Turkey's actions a cause for war and, angry at lukewarm EU support, invokes the secret defence clause of a recently signed treaty with Russia. Fighting on Cyprus spreads to disputed Aegean islands on Turkey's coastline. The U nited S tates warns Russia not to get involved. President Alexander Lebed, with Chinese support, tells the US to mind its own business. All three powers go on nuclear alert. Like Cuba, another island involved in a missile dispute 36 years before, Cyprus has brought the world to nuclear confrontation.