KL%202010%20Iraq%20SOFA%201AC



1AC Contention One is Inherency - United States troop interactions in Iraq are due to stay past the deadline of the SOFA agreement [|MARTIN] [| Chulov], The Guardian's Iraq correspondent, Middle East reporter since 2005, Wednesday 12 May 20 10 , ([], Iraq violence set to delay US troop withdrawal The White House is likely to delay the withdrawal sof the first large phase of combat troops from [|Iraq] for at least a month after escalating bloodshed and political instability in the country .General Ray Odierno, the US commander, had been due to give the order within 60 days of the general election held in Iraq on 7 March, when the cross-sectarian candidate Ayad Allawi edged out the incumbent leader, Nouri al-Maliki.American officials had been prepared for delays in negotiations to form a government, but now appear to have balked after Maliki's coalition aligned itself with the theocratic Shia bloc to the exclusion of Allawi, who attracted the bulk of the minority Sunni vote. There is also concern over interference from Iraq's neighbours, Iran, Turkey and Syria. Late tonight seven people were killed and 22 wounded when a car bomb planted outside a cafe exploded in Baghdad's Sadr City, a Shia area, police and a source at the Iraqi interior ministry said. The latest bomb highlights how sectarian tensions are rising, as al-Qaida fighters in Iraq and affiliated Sunni extremists have mounted bombing campaigns and assassinations around the country. The violence is seen as an attempt to intimidate all sides of the political spectrum and press home the message to the departing US forces that militancy remains a formidable foe. Odierno has kept a low profile since announcing the deaths of al-Qaida's two leaders in Iraq, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayub al-Masri, who were killed in a combined Iraqi-US raid on 18 April. The operation was hailed then as a near fatal blow against al-Qaida, but violence has intensified ever since. All US combat forces are due to leave Iraq by 31 August, a date the Obama administration is keen to observe as the president sends greater reinforcements to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan – a campaign he has set apart from the Iraq war, by describing it as "just". Iraqi leaders remain adamant that combat troops should leave by the deadline. But they face the problem of not having enough troops to secure the country if the rejuvenated insurgency succeeds in sparking another lethal round of sectarian conflict. " The presence of foreign forces sent shock waves through Iraqis," said Hoshyar Zebari, the foreign minister. "And at the beginning it was a terrifying message that they didn't dare challeng e. But then they got emboldened through terrorism and acts of resistance. And as the Americans are leaving, we are seeing more of it." Zebari said Iraq's neighbours were taking full advantage of the political stalemate. He also hinted that they may be directly backing the violence. "They too have been emboldened, because we haven't been able to establish a viable unified government that others can respect," he said. "In one way or another, Iran, Turkey and Syria are interfering in the formation of this government. " There is a lingering fear [among some neighbouring states] that Iraq should not reach a level of stability. The competition over the future of Iraq is being played out mostly between Turkey and Iran. They both believe they have a vested interest here." The withdrawal order is eagerly awaited by the 92,000 US troops still in Iraq – they mostly remain confined to their bases. This month Odierno was supposed to have ordered the pullout of 12,500, a figure that was meant to escalate every week between now and 31 August, when only 50,000 US troops are set to remain – all of them non-combat forces. US patrols are now seldom seen on the streets of Baghdad, where the terms of a security agreement between Baghdad and Washington are being followed strictly: this relegates them to secondary partners and means US troops cannot leave their bases without Iraqi permission. US commanders have grown accustomed to being masters of the land no longer, but they have recently grown increasingly concerned about what they will leave behind. Zebari said: "The mother of all mistakes that they made was changing their mission from liberation to occupation and then legalising that through a security council resolution." Earlier this week, Allawi warned that the departing US troops had an obligation enshrined in the security agreement and at the United Nations security council to safeguard Iraq's democratic process. He warned of catastrophic consequences if the occupation ended with Iraq still politically unstable. US will not withdraw because it has no interest in losing power over oil lands or global business (Tom Engelhardt, co-founded American Empire Project, Middle East Online, 4/26/ 10 , “Why We Won’t Leave Afghanistan or Iraq”, http://aljazeera.com/news/articles/39/Why-we-wont-leave-Afghanistan-or-Iraq.html) All evidence indicates that Washington doesn’t want to withdraw -- not really, not from either region. It has no interest in divesting itself of the global control-and-influence business, or of the military-power racket. That’s hardly surprising since we’re talking about a great imperial power and control (or at least imagined control) over the planet’s strategic oil lands. And then there’s another factor to consider: habit. Over the decades, Washington has gotten used to staying. The U.S. has long been big on arriving, but not much for departure. After all, 65 years later, striking numbers of American forces are still garrisoning the two major defeated nations of World War II, Germany and Japan. We still have about three dozen military bases on the modest-sized Japanese island of Okinawa, and are at this very moment fighting tooth and nail, diplomatically speaking, not to be forced to abandon one of them. The Korean War was suspended in an armistice 57 years ago and, again, striking numbers of American troops still garrison South Korea. Similarly, to skip a few decades, after the Serbian air campaign of the late 1990s, the U.S. built-up the enormous Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo with its seven-mile perimeter, and we’re still there. After Gulf War I, the US either built or built up military bases and other facilities in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, and Bahrain in the Persian Gulf, as well as the British island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. And it’s never stopped building up its facilities throughout the Gulf region. In this sense, leaving Iraq, to the extent we do, is not quite as significant a matter as sometimes imagined, strategically speaking. It’s not as if the US military were taking off for Dubuque. A history of American withdrawal would prove a brief book indeed. Other than Vietnam, the U.S. military withdrew from the Philippines under the pressure of “people power” (and a local volcano) in the early 1990s, and from Saudi Arabia, in part under the pressure of Osama bin Laden. In both countries, however, it has retained or regained a foothold in recent years. President Ronald Reagan pulled American troops out of Lebanon after a devastating 1983 suicide truck bombing of a Marines barracks there, and the president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, functionally expelled the U.S. from Manta Air Base in 2008 when he refused to renew its lease. ("We'll renew the base on one condition: that they let us put a base in Miami -- an Ecuadorian base," he said slyly.) And there were a few places like the island of Grenada, invaded in 1983, that simply mattered too little to Washington to stay. Unfortunately, whatever the administration, the urge to stay has seemed a constant. It’s evidently written into Washington’s DNA and embedded deep in domestic politics where sure-to-come "cut and run" charges and blame for "losing" Iraq or Afghanistan would cow any administration. Not surprisingly, when you look behind the main news stories in both Iraq and Afghanistan, you can see signs of the urge to stay everywhere. In Iraq, while President Obama has committed himself to the withdrawal of American troops by the end of 2011, plenty of wiggle room remains. Already, the New York Times reports, General Ray Odierno, commander of U.S. forces in that country, is lobbying Washington to establish “an Office of Military Cooperation within the American Embassy in Baghdad to sustain the relationship after... Dec. 31, 2011.” (“We have to stay committed to this past 2011,” Odierno is quoted as saying . “I believe the administration knows that. I believe that they have to do that in order to see this through to the end. It’s important to recognize that just because US soldiers leave, Iraq is not finished .”) If you want a true gauge of American withdrawal, keep your eye on the mega-bases the Pentagon has built in Iraq since 2003, especially gigantic Balad Air Base (since the Iraqis will not, by the end of 2011, have a real air force of their own), and perhaps Camp Victory, the vast, ill-named U.S. base and command center abutting Baghdad International Airport on the outskirts of the capital. Keep an eye as well on the 104-acre US embassy built along the Tigris River in downtown Baghdad. At present, it’s the largest “embassy” on the planet and represents something new in “diplomacy,” being essentially a military-base-cum-command-and-control-center for the region. It is clearly going nowhere, withdrawal or not. In fact, recent reports indicate that in the near future “embassy” personnel, including police trainers, military officials connected to that Office of Coordination, spies, U.S. advisors attached to various Iraqi ministries, and the like, may be more than doubled from the present staggering staff level of 1,400 to 3,000 or above. (The embassy, by the way, has requested $1,875 billion for its operations in fiscal year 2011, and that was assuming a staffing level of only 1,400.) Realistically, as long as such an embassy remains at Ground Zero Iraq, we will not have withdrawn from that country. Similarly, we have a giant U.S. embassy in Kabul (being expanded) and another mega-embassy being built in the Pakistani capital Islamabad. These are not, rest assured, signs of departure Contention 2 is Iraqi Stability The ISF is strong enough to maintain internal Iraqi stability, staying any longer only serves to risk a step backward Timothy R. Reese, US Army Colonel on the Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team, 7-31- 09 , “Text of Colonel Reese’s Memo” NYT, [] As the old saying goes, “guests, like fish, begin to smell after three days.” Since the signing of the 2009 Security Agreement, we are guests in Iraq, and after six years in Iraq, we now smell bad to the Iraqi nose. Today the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are good enough to keep the Government of Iraq (GOI) from being overthrown by the actions of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Baathists, and the Shia violent extremists that might have toppled it a year or two ago. Iraq may well collapse into chaos of other causes, but we have made the ISF strong enough for the internal security mission. Perhaps it is one of those infamous paradoxes of counterinsurgency that while the ISF is not good in any objective sense, it is good enough for Iraq in 2009. Despite this foreboding disclaimer about an unstable future for Iraq, the United States has achieved our objectives in Iraq. Prime Minister (PM) Maliki hailed June 30th as a “great victory,” implying the victory was over the US. Leaving aside his childish chest pounding, he was more right than he knew. We too ought to declare victory and bring our combat forces home. Due to our tendency to look after the tactical details and miss the proverbial forest for the trees, this critically important strategic realization is in danger of being missed. Equally important to realize is that we aren’t making the GOI and the ISF better in any significant ways with our current approach. Remaining in Iraq through the end of December 2011 will yield little in the way of improving the abilities of the ISF or the functioning of the GOI. Furthermore, in light of the GOI’s current interpretation of the limitations imposed by the 30 June milestones of the 2008 Security Agreement, the security of US forces are at risk. Iraq is not a country with a history of treating even its welcomed guests well. This is not to say we can be defeated, only that the danger of a violent incident that will rupture the current partnership has greatly increased since 30 June. Such a rupture would force an unplanned early departure that would harm our long term interests in Iraq and potentially unraveling the great good that has been done since 2003. The use of the military instrument of national power in its current form has accomplished all that can be expected. In the next section I will present and admittedly one sided view of the evidence in support of this view. This information is drawn solely from the MND-B area of operations in Baghdad Province. My reading of reports from the other provinces suggests the same situation exists there. Withdrawal increases Middle Eastern cooperation – no risk of U.S. invasion post-withdrawal Christopher Fettweis, Ph.D., assistant professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College, December 20 07 .Survival 49.4, On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq, p. 83—98 The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq's neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their co religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United State s, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so? 17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is far more likely than outright warfare The Iraqi Security Forces have learned all they can from the US and are capable of securing Iraq, maintaining our presence only risks destabilization Timothy R. Reese, US Army Colonel on the Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team, 7-31- 09 , “Text of Colonel Reese’s Memo” NYT, [] The rate of improvement of the ISF is far slower than it should be given the amount of effort and resources being provided by the US. The US has made tremendous progress in building the ISF. Our initial efforts in 2003 to mid-2004 were only marginally successful. From 2004 to 2006 the US built the ISF into a fighting force. Since the start of the surge in 2007 we have again expanded and improved the ISF. They are now at the point where they have defeated the organized insurgency against the GOI and are marginally self-sustaining. This is a remarkable tale for which many can be justifiably proud. We have reached the point of diminishing returns, however, and need to find a new set of tools. The massive partnering efforts of US combat forces with ISF isn’t yielding benefits commensurate with the effort and is now generating its own opposition. Again, some touch points for this assessment are: 1. If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. US combat forces will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it. 2. The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in the current environment. a) Corruption among officers is widespread b) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system e) Laziness is endemic f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm g) Lack of initiative is legion h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams. 3. For all the fawning praise we bestow on the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) and Ministry of Defense (MoD) leadership for their effectiveness since the start of the surge, they are flawed in serious ways. Below are some salient examples: a) They are unable to plan ahead, unable to secure the PM’s approval for their actions b) They are unable to stand up to Shiite political parties c) They were and are unable to conduct an public relations effort in support of the SA and now they are afraid of the ignorant masses as a result d) They unable to instill discipline among their officers and units for the most basic military standards e) They are unable to stop the nepotism and cronyism f) They are unable to take basic steps to manage the force development process g) They are unable to stick to their deals with US leaders It is clear that the 30 Jun milestone does not represent one small step in a long series of gradual steps on the path the US withdrawal, but as Maliki has termed it, a “great victory” over the Americans and fundamental change in our relationship. The recent impact of this mentality on military operations is evident: 1. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) unilateral restrictions on US forces that violate the most basic aspects of the SA 2. BOC unilateral restrictions that violate the most basic aspects of the SA 3. International Zone incidents in the last week where ISF forces have resorted to shows of force to get their way at Entry Control Points (ECP) including the forcible takeover of ECP 1 on 4 July 4. Sudden coolness to advisors and CDRs, lack of invitations to meetings, 5. Widespread partnership problems reported in other areas such as ISF confronting US forces at TCPs in the city of Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq. 6. ISF units are far less likely to want to conduct combined combat operations with US forces, to go after targets the US considers high value, etc. 7. The Iraqi legal system in the Rusafa side of Baghdad has demonstrated a recent willingness to release individuals originally detained by the US for attacks on the US.Yet despite all their grievous shortcomings noted above, ISF military capability is sufficient to handle the current level of threats from Sunni and Shiite violent groups. Our combat forces’ presence here on the streets and in the rural areas adds only marginally to their capability while exposing us to attacks to which we cannot effectively respond. The GOI and the ISF will not be toppled by the violence as they might have been between 2006 and 2008. Though two weeks does not make a trend, the near cessation of attacks since 30 June speaks volumes about how easily Shiite violence can be controlled and speaks to the utter weakness of AQI. The extent of AQ influence in Iraq is so limited as to be insignificant, only when they get lucky with a mass casualty attack are they relevant. Shiite groups are working with the PM and his political allies, or plotting to work against him in the upcoming elections. We are merely convenient targets for delivering a message against Maliki by certain groups, and perhaps by Maliki when he wants us to be targeted. Extremist violence from all groups is directed towards affecting their political standing within the existing power structures of Iraq. There is no longer any coherent insurgency or serious threat to the stability of the GOI posed by violent groups US presence in Iraq is generating its own opposition staying longer risks increasingly likely conflict Timothy R. Reese, US Army Colonel on the Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team, 7-31- 09 , “Text of Colonel Reese’s Memo” NYT, [] Our combat operations are currently the victim of circular logic. We conduct operations to kill or capture violent extremists of all types to protect the Iraqi people and support the GOI. The violent extremists attack us because we are still here conducting military operations. Furthermore, their attacks on us are no longer an organized campaign to defeat our will to stay ; the attacks which kill and maim US combat troops are signals or messages sent by various groups as part of the political struggle for power in Iraq. The exception to this is AQI which continues is globalist terror campaign. Our operations are in support of an Iraqi government that no longer relishes our help while at the same time our operations generate the extremist opposition to us as various groups jockey for power in post-occupation Iraq. The GOI and ISF will continue to squeeze the US for all the “goodies” that we can provide between now and December 2011, while eliminating our role in providing security and resisting our efforts to change the institutional problems prevent the ISF from getting better. They will tolerate us as long as they can suckle at Uncle Sam’s bounteous mammary glands. Meanwhile the level of resistance to US freedom of movement and operations will grow. The potential for Iraqi on US violence is high now and will grow by the day. Resentment on both sides will build and reinforce itself until a violent incident break outs into the open. If that were to happen the violence will remain tactically isolated, but it will wreck our strategic relationships and force our withdrawal under very unfavorable circumstances. For a long time the preferred US approach has been to “work it at the lowest level of partnership” as a means to stay out of the political fray and with the hope that good work at the tactical level will compensate for and slowly improve the strategic picture. From platoon to brigade, US Soldiers and Marines continue to work incredibly hard and in almost all cases they achieve positive results. This approach has achieved impressive results in the past, but today it is failing. The strategic dysfunctions of the GOI and ISF have now reached down to the tactical level degrading good work there and sundering hitherto strong partnerships. As one astute political observer has stated “We have lost all strategic influence with the GoI and trying to influence events and people from the tactical/operational level is courting disaster, wasting lives, and merely postponing the inevitable. ” The U.S. must maintain its withdrawal timeline – extending troop deployments destroys Iraqi stability by incentivizing insurgent violence Raed Jarrar political consultant for the American Friends Service Committee, and a senior fellow at Peace Action 5/27/ 2010 “Don't reward violence in Iraq by extending US troop withdrawal deadline,” Juneau Empire, http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/052710/opi_645328218.shtml) President Obama should not bow to the Beltway voices urging him to keep U.S. troops longer in Iraq. At a speech at West Point on Saturday, Obama said: "We are poised to end our combat mission in Iraq this summer." His statement, which the cadets greeted with applause, is a reaffirmation of his pledge to have all U.S. combat forces leave Iraq by Aug. 31. Any remaining armed forces are required to leave Iraq by the end of 2011 in accordance with the binding bilateral Security Agreement, also referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement. But Washington pundits are still pushing Obama to delay or cancel the U.S. disengagement, calling on him to be "flexible" and take into consideration the recent spike of violence in Iraq. Hundreds of Iraqis have been killed and injured during the last few months in what seems to be an organized campaign to challenge U.S. plans. While most Iraqis would agree that Iraq is still broken, delaying or canceling the U.S. troop removal will definitely not be seen as "flexibility," but rather as a betrayal of promises. Iraqis believe that prolonging the military occupation will not fix what the occupation has damaged, and they don't think that extending the U.S. intervention will protect them from other interventions. The vast majority of Iraqis see the U.S. military presence as a part of the problem, not the solution. Linking the U.S. withdrawal to conditions on the ground creates an equation by which further deterioration in Iraq will automatically lead to prolonging the U.S. military presence. Some of the current Iraqi ruling parties want the U.S. occupation to continue because they have been benefiting from it. Some regional players, including the Iranian government, do not want an independent and strong Iraq to re-emerge. And other groups, including al-Qaeda, would gladly see the United States stuck in the current quagmire, losing its blood, treasure and reputation. Connecting the pullout to the prevalent situation would be an open invitation to those who seek an endless war to sabotage Iraq even further, and delaying it will send the wrong message to them. By contrast, adhering to the current time-based plan would pull the rug from under their feet and allow Iraqis to stabilize their nation, a process that may take many years but that cannot begin as long as Iraq's sovereignty is breached by foreign interventions. If the Obama administration reneges on its plans, it will effectively reward those responsible for the bloodshed and further embolden them. Such a decision would most likely have serious ramifications for the security of U.S. troops in Iraq, and will impede the security and political progress in the country. And delaying the U.S. pullout will not only harm the U.S. image around the world, which Obama has been trying hard to improve, but it will also be the final blow to U.S. credibility in Iraq. The mere promise of a complete withdrawal has boosted Iraqi domestic politics and enhanced the U.S. perception in the country. Unless Obama delivers on his promises, many of these achievements will be lost, and Iraq will be sent back to square one. An Iraqi civil war will escalate to middle-east conflict [|Derrick V.] [|Frazier], Assistant Professor, Political Science; and Robert Stewart-Ingersoll , Assistant Professor, Grand Valley State University, 5-2- 08 , “Another Inconvenient Truth: Why a U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq Would Be a Mistake,” [] To these strategic regional considerations, we should also consider what would happen if a full scale civil war were to break out. Civil wars tend to spread in disease-like fashion to surrounding countries, particularly if these countries possess similar dynamics of ethnic unrest. Unfortunately, in the Middle East countries surrounding Iraq do exhibit characteristics that make them susceptible to civil conflicts. These characteristics include persistent economic, political, and social grievances that seem to correlate highly with ethnic identities and repressive police states that lack popular legitimacy or peaceful means through which to resolve these grievances. Thus, we would expect that escalated conflict in Iraq will lead to outright conflict in these countries or widespread destabilization. Into this dangerous mix of conditions, several important spillover effects tend to occur. First, masses of refugees flow into neighboring countries. This is already occurring in the case of Iraq but would certainly increase if hostilities escalated. These mass flows lead to two further spillover effects: a straining of the host’s resources and a potential radicalization of neighboring populations through the dissemination of information regarding grievances and tales of brutality. Both increase the likelihood of destabilization in the host country and may lead to calls for the host government to intervene, a scenario likely to create further conflict with little political change. Finally, such conditions also lead to a fourth spillover effect, increased activity of terrorist groups that organize, identify, and fight across borders. Thus, while it may seem like an impossible mission, the U.S. seemingly must remain in Iraq to limit the possibility of such events taking place as there seems to be little else in the way of preventing such disasters. Allowing Iraq and perhaps the region to descend into a broader war would be anathema to the U.S. and global interests. First, the U.S. would have to recognize that it was its own 2003 invasion of Iraq that triggered such a humanitarian and strategic nightmare. Aside from this, the economic implications of such an expanded conflict would be enormous. A potential collapse of the provision of oil from the Middle East would be devastating to the global economy, something that the U.S. and other world powers would not tolerate. Regional conflict then would not only be tragic in its own right, but likely invite interventions from larger outside powers. The impact is extinction Yonah Alexander, professor and director of the Inter-University for Terrorism Studies, 8/28/ 2003 , Washington Times Last week's brutal suicide bombings in Baghdad and Jerusalem have once again illustrated dramatically that the international community failed, thus far at least, to understand the magnitude and implications of the terrorist threats to the very survival of civilization itself .Even the U nited S tates and Israel have for decades tended to regard terrorism as a mere tactical nuisance or irritant rather than a critical strategic challenge to their national security concerns.It is not surprising, therefore, that on September 11, 2001, Americans were stunned by the unprecedented tragedy of 19 al Qaeda terrorists striking a devastating blow at the center of the nation's commercial and military powers.Likewise, Israel and its citizens, despite the collapse of the Oslo Agreements of 1993 and numerous acts of terrorism triggered by the second intifada that began almost three years ago, are still "shocked" by each suicide attack at a time of intensive diplomatic efforts to revive the moribund peace process through the now revoked cease-fire arrangements [hudna]. Why are the United States and Israel, as well as scores of other countries affected by the universal nightmare of modern terrorism surprised by new terrorist "surprises"?There are many reasons, including misunderstanding of the manifold specific factors that contribute to terrorism's expansion, such as lack of a universal definition of terrorism, the religionization of politics, double standards of morality, weak punishment of terrorists, and the exploitation of the media by terrorist propaganda and psychological warfare.Unlike their historical counterparts, contemporary terrorists have introduced a new scale of violence in terms of conventional and unconventional threats and impact.The internationalization and brutalization of current and future terrorism make it clear we have entered an Age of Super Terrorism [e.g. biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear and cyber] with its serious implications concerning national, regional and global security concerns.[continues]Thus, it behooves those countries victimized by terrorism to understand a cardinal message communicated by Winston Churchill to the House of Commons on May 13, 1940: "Victory at all costs, victory in spite of terror, victory however long and hard the road may be: For without victory, there is no survival." Contention 3 is international leadership credibility- Staying in Iraq decimates US Credibility – US soft power will suffer. Raed Jarrar Political Analyst 2010 The progressive []) At a speech at West Point on Saturday, May 22, Obama said: “We are poised to end our combat mission in Iraq this summer.” His statement, which the cadets greeted with applause, is a reaffirmation of his pledge to have all U.S. combat forces leave Iraq by Aug. 31. Any remaining armed forces are required to leave Iraq by the end of 2011 in accordance with the binding bilateral Security Agreement, also referred to as the Status of Forces Agreement. But Washington pundits are still pushing Obama to delay or cancel the U.S. disengagement, calling on him to be “flexible” and take into consideration the recent spike of violence in Iraq. Hundreds of Iraqis have been killed and injured during the last few months in what seems to be an organized campaign to challenge U.S. plans. While most Iraqis would agree that Iraq is still broken, delaying or canceling the U.S. troop removal will definitely not be seen as “flexibility,” but rather as a betrayal of promises. Iraqis believe that prolonging the military occupation will not fix what the occupation has damaged, and they don’t think that extending the U.S. intervention will protect them from other interventions. The vast majority of Iraqis see the U.S. military presence as a part of the problem, not the solution. Linking the U.S. withdrawal to conditions on the ground creates an equation by which further deterioration in Iraq will automatically lead to prolonging the U.S. military presence. Some of the current Iraqi ruling parties want the U.S. occupation to continue because they have been benefiting from it. Some regional players, including the Iranian government, do not want an independent and strong Iraq to re-emerge. And other groups, including Al Qaeda, would gladly see the United States stuck in the current quagmire, losing its blood, treasure and reputation. Connecting the pullout to the prevalent situation would be an open invitation to those who seek an endless war to sabotage Iraq even further, and delaying it will send the wrong message to them. By contrast, adhering to the current time-based plan would pull the rug from under their feet and allow Iraqis to stabilize their nation, a process that may take many years but that cannot begin as long as Iraq’s sovereignty is breached by foreign interventions. If the Obama administration reneges on its plans, it will effectively reward those responsible for the bloodshed and further embolden them. Such a decision would most likely have serious ramifications for the security of U.S. troops in Iraq, and will impede the security and political progress in the country. And delaying the U.S. pullout will not only harm the U.S. image around the world, which Obama has been trying hard to improve , but it will also be the final blow to U.S. credibility in Iraq. The mere promise of a complete withdrawal has boosted Iraqi domestic politics and enhanced the U.S. perception in the country. Unless Obama delivers on his promises, many of these achievements will be lost, and Iraq will be sent back to square one. Military Presence in Iraq hurts soft power. (Joseph Nye, Sultan of Oman Professor of International Relations and served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Political Science Quarterly 200 4 , 119(2), p. 255) Human rights violations in Iraq destroy US soft power Raed Jarrar Poltiical consultant – American friends Service Committee, Foreign Policy in Focus 4/13/ 10 In the last seven years, one million Iraqis have been killed and millions more injured and displaced from their homes. The country's infrastructure was destroyed and Iraq's civil society has been severely damaged. A video posted this week by WikiLeaks is not an exception to how the US occupation operated in Iraq all along, but rather an example of it. While the video is shocking and disturbing to the US public, from an Iraqi perspective it just tells a story of an average day under the occupatio n. But even from the Pentagon's perspective, that attack was nothing exceptional. Reuters demanded an investigation into this particular attack because two of its employees were killed in it, and the Pentagon has already conducted an investigation that cleared all soldiers who took part of the attack of any wrongdoing. The video does not show an operation that went wrong, or where "rules of engagement" were not followed. It is simply how the US military has been doing business in Iraq for seven years now. What is equally disturbing is the mainstream media coverage of the event. For example, in a piece published the day of the attack, The New York Times reported that two Iraqi Journalists were killed "as US forces clash with Militias." The New York Times' piece confirmed "American forces battled insurgents in the area" and covered the following statement from the US military: The American military said in a statement late Thursday that 11 people had been killed: nine insurgents and two civilians. According to the statement, American troops were conducting a raid when they were hit by small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades. The American troops called in reinforcements and attack helicopters. In the ensuing fight, the statement said, the two Reuters employees and nine insurgents were killed. There is no question that coalition forces were clearly engaged in combat operations against a hostile force, said Lt. Col. Scott Bleichwehl, a spokesman for the multinational forces in Baghdad. Now, after the video was leaked, we know that none of this is true. Iraqis killed in the attack were not "insurgents." US troops were not "hit by small-arms fire and rocket-propelled grenades," the attack helicopters were not "called in" in response to hostilities and there was no "ensuing fight" that caused the massacre. In fact, after watching the video, there is no question that the US forces were clearly NOT engaged in combat operations against a hostile force. In addition to making the entire story up, the Pentagon has very conveniently omitted the part about the two children being injured. This story is similar to hundreds of other stories printed by The New York Times and other mainstream media during the last seven years. Imagine how many tens of thousands of Iraqis who were labeled as "insurgents" and "militias" were killed and injured the same way. Imagine how many Iraqi children were killed and injured without a mention by the Pentagon or mainstream media. A number of international organizations, including Amnesty International, are now calling for an independent and impartial investigation into the July 12, 2007, helicopter attack shown in the leaked video. But I think this leaked video tells a bigger story than the attack itself. It tells a story of systemic, cold-blooded murder, and the shameful cover up by mainstream media and silence by international organizations. Remembering the last seven years and conducting investigations is important, but what is more important and urgent is to end this occupation. This month marks both the seventh year of occupation and the beginning of the combat forces withdrawal in accordance with President Obama's plan. The current plan for US withdrawal is based on two sets of time-based deadlines. Obama's own plan to withdraw combat forces between April and August 31, 2010, and the bilateral security agreement's deadline for the withdrawal of all troops and contractors and shutting down all US bases by December 31, 2011. While the Bush administration adopted a conditions-based withdrawal plan based on the mantra "as Iraqis stand up, we will stand down," the withdrawal doctrine under Obama has been time-based, not linked to conditions on the ground. The main problem with a condition-based withdrawal plans is that it creates an equation where deteriorating conditions lead to an extension of the military occupation. Unfortunately, many groups would like to see the US occupation of Iraq continue. Some groups, such as the Iraqi ruling parties or the military industrial complex in the United States, believe the occupation is in their self-interest. Others, such as al-Qaeda, hope to cripple the United States by keeping it engaged in a conflict that is taking an enormous toll on human lives, money and global reputation. And still others, such as Iran and other regional players, fear the re-emergence of a strong independent and united Iraq that would change the power balance in the Middle East. The conditions on the ground are rapidly deteriorating in Iraq. After last month's general election, there is a dramatic spike in violence and growing threats to the security and political stability of the country. This week alone, hundreds of Iraqis were killed and injured because of car bombs, assassinations, and other armed attacks. Meanwhile, the Iraqi political establishment is struggling to form the new government. The US war machine is already trying to use this deterioration as an excuse to delay or cancel the withdrawal plan, or at least link it to conditions on the ground. Going back to a condition-based plan will cost the US hundreds of billions more, will result in the deaths of countless more US soldiers and Iraqi civilians and, most importantly, will not bring Iraq closer to being a stable and prosperous country. The US occupation has never been a part of the solution and it will never be. Delaying or canceling the US withdrawal will only diminish what's left of US credibility and will add another layer of complications to the war-torn country. We’ll isolate several scenarios of soft power- American soft power is key to democracy promotion Joshua Muravchik, Ph.D. in IR. Scholar formerly at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research and now a fellow at the School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University. 1996 . //The imperative of American leadership: a challenge to neo-isolationism.// Today, America can and should continue to be an engine of democracy. Although we had success at imposing democracy through military occupations, we cannot, as I have argued in the previous chapter, seek to spread democracy by the sword. If, however, we are drawn into occupying a country by dint of ill own aggression, as was the case with Iraq, we would be wise to try to democratize it. The late Turgut Ozal, former president of Turkey, said that he had urged the United States to do just that in 1991 but was told by Secretary of Stare Baker that Iraq was incapable of democracy. Ozal, who knew Iraq far better then Baker did, disagreed with that judgment. ' The United States could have ousted Saddam, pulled together an interim governing coalition of Iraqi dissidents, supervised an open election, and Still withdrawn within a year. Even if democracy had not taken hold firmly, there are degrees of democracy and undemocracy (as we see, for example, in the former Soviet republics), and the result might have been something imperfect but considerably more palatable than Saddam's continued rule. Nonetheless, this situation was rare. and the main work of promoting democracy is peaceful. It consists of private and public diplomacy, overseas broadcasting, education and mining, assistance to democratic forces. and other forms of material aid. Diplomacy. Although external forces can succeed at promoting democracy, ultimately of course, it is indigenous people who must create and sustain it. The role of outsiders is to support and assist democrats and to swell their numbers. Sometimes it is also to persuade existing rulers to yield or relax power. The United States is by far the most influential country in the world. When our leaders speak our about the virtues of democracy and when we demonstrate our earnestness by calibrating democracy into the degree of friendliness we show to regimes and by embracing worthy dissidents, we strengthen those working to democratize their countries. We cannot easily bend other governments to our will. but pressure from Washington weighs heavily on most. Democracy prevents multiple scenarios for extinction, nuclear war, and environmental degradation Diamond 95 (Larry, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, December, PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN THE 1990S, 1p. [|http://www.carnegie.org//sub/pubs/deadly/diam_rpt.html]) Nuclear, chemical and bio logical weapons continue to prolif erate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty and openness. The experience of this century offers important lessons. Countries that govern themselves in a truly democratic fashion do not go to war with one another. They do not aggress against their neighbors to aggrandize themselves or glorify their leaders. Democratic governments do not ethnically "cleanse" their own populations, and they are much less likely to face ethnic insurgency. Democracies do not sponsor terrorism against one another. They do not build w eapons of m ass d estruction to use on or to threaten one another. Democratic countries form more reliable, open, and enduring trading partnerships. In the long run they offer better and more stable climates for investment. They are more environmentally responsible because they must answer to their own citizens, who organize to protest the destruction of their environments. They are better bets to honor international treaties since they value legal obligations and because their openness makes it much more difficult to breach agreements in secret. Precisely because, within their own borders, they respect competition, civil liberties, property rights, and the rule of law, democracies are the only reliable foundation on which a new world order of international security and prosperity can be built. B. Soft power is key to solving terrorism Joseph S. Nye Professor of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, 3-7-20 08, http://abs.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/51/9/1351 Etzioni is correct that a successful policy of security first will require the combi- nation of hard and soft power. Combining the two instruments so that they reinforce rather than undercut each other is crucial to success. Power is the ability to get the outcomes one wants. In the past,it was assumed that military power dominated most issues, but in today’s world, the contexts of power differ greatly on military, economic, and transnational issues **__.__** These latter problems, including everything from climate change to pandemics to transnational terrorism, pose some of the greatest challenges we face today, and yet few are susceptible to purely military solutions. The only way to grapple with these problems is through cooperation with others, and that requires smart power—a strategy that combines the soft power of attraction with the hard power of coercion. For example,American and British intelligence agen- cies report that our use of hard power in Iraq without sufficient attention to soft power has increased rather than reduced the number of Islamist terrorists throughout the past 5 years. The soft power of attraction will not win over the hard core terrorists but it is essential in winning the hearts and minds of mainstream Muslims,without whose sup- port success will be impossible in the long term. Yet all the polling evidence suggests that American soft power has declined dramatically in the Muslim world. There is no simple military solution that will produce the outcomes we want. Etzioni is clear on this and highly critical of the failure to develop a smart power strategy in Iraq. One wishes, however, that he had spent a few more pages developing one for Iran Terrorist attacks has devastating effects on economies [|Amy Zalman] [|, Ph.D.], Jul 23, 20 10, ( Economic Impact of Terrorism and the September 11 Attacks Direct Economic Impact Was Less than Feared, but Defense Spending Rose by 1/3, []) The economic impact of terrorism can be calculated from a variety of perspectives. There are direct costs to property and immediate effects on productivity, as well as longer term indirect costs of responding to terrorism. These costs can be calculated quite minutely; for example, calculations have been made about how much money would be lost in productivity if we all had to stand in line at the airport for an extra hour every time we flew. (Not as much as we think, but the line of reasoning finally gave me a rationale for the unreasonable fact that first class passengers wait less. Maybe someone is guessing, rightly, that an hour of their time costs more than an hour of mine). Economists and others have tried to calculate the economic impact of terrorism for years in areas beset by attacks, such as Spain's Basque region and Israel. In the last several years, most analyses of terrorism's economic costs begin with an interpretation of the costs of the September 11, 2001 attacks. The studies I examined are fairly consistent in concluding that the direct costs of the attack were less than feared. The size of the American economy, a speedy response by the Federal Reserve to domestic and global market needs, and Congressional allocations to the private sector helped cushion the blow. The response to the attacks, however, has been costly indeed. [|Defense] and homeland security spending are by far the largest cost of the attack. However, as economist Paul Krugman has asked, should the expenditure on ventures such as the Iraq war really be considered a response to terrorism, or a "political program enabled by terrorism." The human cost, of course, is incalculable. The direct cost of the September 11 attack has been estimated at somewhat over $20 billion. Paul Krugman cites a property loss estimate by the Comptroller of the City of New York of $21.8 billion, which he has said is about 0.2 % of the GDP for a year ("The Costs of Terrorism: What Do We Know?" presented at Princeton University in December, 2004). Similarly, the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) estimated that the attack cost the private sector $14 billion and the federal government $0.7 billion, while clean-up was estimated at $11 billi on. According to R. Barry Johnston and Oana M. Nedelscu in the IMF Working Paper, "The Impact of Terrorism on Financial Markets," these numbers are equal to about 1/4 of 1 percent of the US annual GDP--approximately the same result arrived at by Krugman. So, although the numbers by themselves are substantial, to say the least, they could be absorbed by the American economy as a whole. Hence the plan : The United States federal government should abide by the United States – Iraq Status of Forces Agreement. Contention 4 is solvency – Congressional action is crucial to assure on time withdrawal Raed Jarrar Senior Fellow on the Middle East for Peace Action & Peace Action Education Fund and Iraq Consultant to the American Friends Service Committee May 2010 http://www.counterpunch.org/jarrar05172010.html Within the U.S. peace movement, two equally damaging attitudes dominate: on the one hand, there are those who think Obama will end the war, and therefore they don't need to do anything about it. And on the other hand, there are those who think the occupation will never end, and therefor it is a lost cause. I personally stand in the middle. I think the withdrawal plan is good enough because it requires all U.S. armed forces and contractors to leave by the end of next year **__,__** but at the same time I don't think we have enough guarantees that it will become reality. Therefore, I believe we need to do a lot of work to make sure Obama implements the plan as promised. It is very important to understand how we've managed to reach to the the current plan, which is a good plan aimed at ending the occupation completely. But what is more important is to understand that this plan needs a lot of work until it becomes reality. We need to activate both our grassroot **__s__** oversight and the congressional oversight to make sure the Obama Administration will abide by the plan and fulfill its promises and obligations **__.__** These 2 approaching deadlines are recognized and supported by existing congressional language **__.__** Section 1227 of the defense authorization and section 9010 of the defense appropriations, both for fy10, recognize and support the deadlines and their guiding doctrines. This language provides some congressional oversight, but more is needed **__.__** A number of national organizations in the US, including Peace Action, are calling for more congressional oversight and White House accountability. You can learn more about Peace Action's campaigns here The August 31st deadline is being challenged by the spike of violence in Iraq and by a drumbeat in Washington trying to use that violence as an excuse to justify prolonging the occupation. Giving into skepticism will take us to no where, and believing that Obama will do our work for us is not the answer either. We need to work hard to make sure that the plan for withdrawal becomes reality, and that this tragic war with Iraq comes to an end. Only a //credible commitment to withdraw// on time stops escalating war & maintains US leadership Raed **Jarrar** senior fellow, peace action, The Progressive, 5/26/ **10** http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/05/26-1 While most Iraqis would agree that Iraq is still broken, delaying or canceling the U.S. troop removal will definitely not be seen as "flexibility," but rather as a betrayal of promises**__.__** Iraqis believe that prolonging the military occupation will not fix what the occupation has damage d, and they don't think that extending the U.S. intervention will protect them from other interventions. The vast majority of Iraqis see the U.S. military presence as a part of the problem, not the solution. Linking the U.S. withdrawal to conditions on the ground creates an equation by which further deterioration in Iraq will automatically lead to prolonging the U.S. military presence. Some of the current Iraqi ruling parties want the U.S. occupation to continue because they have been benefiting from it. Some regional players, including the Iran ian government, do not want an independent and strong Iraq to re-emerge. And other groups, including Al Qaeda, would gladly see the United States stuck in the current quagmire, losing its blood, treasure and reputation. Connecting the pullout to the prevalent situation would be an open invitation to those who seek an endless war to sabotage Iraq even further, and delaying it will send the wrong message to them. By contrast, adhering to the current time-based plan would pull the rug from under their feet and allow Iraqis to stabilize their nation, a process that may take many years but that cannot begin as long as Iraq's sovereignty is breached by foreign interventions. If the Obama administration reneges on its plans, it will effectively reward those responsible for the bloodshed and further embolden them. Such a decision would most likely have serious ramifications for the security of U.S. troops in Iraq, and will impede the security and political progress in the country. And delaying the U.S. pullout will not only harm the U.S. image around the world, which Obama has been trying hard to improve, but it will also be the final blow to U.S. credibility in Iraq. The mere promise of a complete withdrawal has boosted Iraqi domestic politics and enhanced the U.S. perception in the country. Unless Obama delivers on his promises, many of these achievements will be lost, and Iraq will be sent back to square one. Setting a deadline promotes a relationship with the Iraqi people needed to leave the country peacefully and without backlash. Lawrence J. Korb  Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress 2/27/20  09  “ The Promised Withdrawal from Iraq” < [] > President Obama today made a critical change in our nation’s foreign policy in Iraq, reaffirming his full commitment to the Status of Forces Agreement negotiated by the Bush administration late last year. Obama’s announced he will remove all U.S. combat troops from Iraq by August 31, 2010 and honor the 2011 SOFA deadline for a complete withdrawal of all U.S. forces. This shows he remains committed to the promise he made to the American people during his campaign—that he would finally act to end this needless, mindless, senseless war. During his campaign, Obama promised to remove U.S. combat troops within 16 months, leaving behind a residual force with limited responsibilities. His announcement today largely fulfills these pledges. While the 19-month deadline is an extension of his earlier estimate, it still offers a strong commitment to remove U.S. forces from the country. His plan will benefit both the United States and Iraq, moving both nations toward a new era of responsible engagement in the Middle East. By setting a deadline for withdrawing combat forces, Obama has sent an unmistakable message that the United States fully supports a sovereign Iraq and is serious about upholding the principles set out in the SOFA __.__ That agreement promised that U.S. troops would leave Iraqi cities by June 30, 2009, and vacate the country by the end of 2011. Obama’s plan would see all combat troops out of Iraq well before this deadline, leaving only a residual transition force in place until the agreement runs out. By strengthening our commitment to leave, and setting an earlier deadline for the end of combat operations, Obama has also taken an essential step in building trust with the Iraqi government and people. Even after the signing of the SOFA, some Iraqis publicly doubted whether the United States would leave the country. Obama’s announcement today is a definitive sign that he does not intend to keep forces in Iraq indefinitely, and will work toward fully turning over our responsibilities to the Iraqi government and security forces. This plan will also create momentum for Iraqi political progress. The set deadline will put Iraqi leaders and sectarian actors on notice that they must pursue meaningful reconciliation __.__ Last month’s provincial elections were carried out without major incident, yet signals from members of the Sunni Awakening—the tribal groups whose support and manpower were a key cause of the drop in violence over the last few years—that they might resort to violence if they determined that election fraud had taken place, indicate that Iraqis still have work to do in this area__.__ Obama’s announcement means that the Iraqis must take on the burden of ensuring the continuation of a peaceful political process. Obama’s announcement is the start of a meaningful shift in the American role in Iraq __.__ The president was careful to note that a U.S. military withdrawal will enable a more comprehensive U.S. engagement in the region. As combat troops leave, we will increasingly transfer to a tripartite support mission: pursuing the remnants of Al Qaeda in Iraq, training the Iraqi security forces to carry out missions, and protecting American personnel who remain in the country. This modified mission, along with the redeployment of combat troops, will reduce the stress on our already overburdened servicemen and women, paving the way for a full withdrawal at the end of 2011. Withdrawal causes political alignment, ending sectarian violence and increasing stability (Zaid Ad Ali, attorney at New York Bar, 1/19/ 07 , openDemocracy, “The United States in Iraq: The Complete Case For Withdrawal”, http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-iraq/withdrawal_4264.jsp) The explosion at Mustansiriyah University that killed more than seventy people on 16 January 2007 sent a clear message: no one is safe in today's Iraq. The Iraqi government has reacted to the atrocity in a typically lethargic and dishonest manner, offering empty promises of swift justice and increased security. Meanwhile, very few observers remain hopeful that the escalation that the George W Bush administration announced on 10 January - involving the deployment of around 21,500 additional United States troops in Iraq - will improve the desperate current situation. It is time for policymakers in the US to face up to the fact that the US occupation will never be able to achieve victory in Iraq, no matter how that goal is defined and what pattern of behaviour it entails. This article argues that there is a clear and ineluctable causal link between the mere presence of the occupation authorities and the failure to reestablish law and order in the country. The only viable course of action is therefore that the US army should withdraw from Iraq as soon as possible. The article ends by offering some suggestions as to what measures can be taken to ensure that the country's post-occupation phase will be as peaceful and successful as possible. A failure of reconstruction The prerequisite to recommending a specific course of action is to offer an honest diagnosis of what has happened in Iraq since March-April 2003. Fortunately, most commentators now agree that the US occupation of Iraq, after apparent military success in the war that preceded it, got off to a very bad start. By virtue of a series of misguided administrative decisions - including the dissolution of the Iraqi army and blanket de-Ba'athification - the occupation authorities managed to destroy the Iraqi state in one fell swoop. One of the consequences of these blunders is that the US created enough space for armed groups of all kinds to mushroom across Iraq within a short period. But this is only one part of the story. The combined effect of the US's policies in 2003 was the dismantling of the entire Iraqi state. The effect of everything that has happened since then, however, is even more disturbing. Despite all the efforts that have been made and all the monies that have been squandered, the US has clearly failed in the most important task that it had set itself: to put the pieces back together and rebuild a functioning state in Iraq. Baghdad is now but a shadow of its former self, resembling Mogadishu more than anything else. In many areas of the country, the state is completely absent. Where the state does make its presence felt, the services that it provides have continued to deteriorate since 2003 - as if there is a cancer eating away at the heart of the state itself. The Bush administration often cites the December 2005 parliamentary elections and the drafting of the new constitution as positive developments, but they at best represent a distraction. A combination of reasons is often cited - sabotage, insurgency, corruption - to explain the failure to reconstruct the state, but the cause is more fundamental: it can be found in the nature of the occupation itself. Whenever a society is occupied, the way in which it will interact with the occupying forces will be determined by a number of different factors. For example, it should be obvious that no occupation comes into existence in a historical vacuum. Indeed, the factual context in which an occupation comes into existence will have a major effect on the way the occupied society will react. In that sense, the fact that the US occupation of Japan took place after one of the most violent wars in human history and after the use of overwhelming force against the occupied country was one of the major reasons why there was no post-war Japanese resistance to speak of (see John Dower, "A warning from history", Boston Review, February/March 2003). By contrast, the circumstances leading up to the American occupation of Vietnam led the people of that country to assume that the US was intending to replace France as a colonial power. In that context, it is surprising how little attention observers, commentators and policymakers alike have paid to the incredibly sordid history of involvement in Iraq prior to its occupation of that country. The US has been involved in internal Iraqi affairs in different ways for at least half a century, and the more involved it has become the more disastrous the results for ordinary Iraqis. The details are often difficult to face up to, considering that we are talking about what should be the world's most important exporter of democracy and prosperity. From the start however, the US policy in relation to Iraq has been characterized by blind self-interest, inhumanity and racism. A sordid history Although it first became involved in Iraqi affairs through covert operations in the late 1950s, the US made its interests in the country abundantly clear during the Iraq-Iran war, when it offered billions of dollars in agricultural credits to the Iraqi regime, which was then able to divert monies to fund its costly war effort (1980-88) against Iran. The US also provided Iraqi generals with military support during the war. On a number of occasions it supplied them with advance warning of Iranian troop movements in order to facilitate the Iraqi war effo rt. This was done despite the fact that the Reagan administration was already aware at that point that the Iraqis were preparing to use chemical weapons on the battlefield, which is somewhat problematic considering the US's insistence that the rules of war should be respected at all times. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, the US seized on the opportunity to launch a full-scale war against the Iraqi people. Hussein was given five months to withdraw, and during that time, thirty countries, led by the US, massed their armies along the Saudi-Iraqi border and in the Gulf. In one of the negotiation sessions, James A Baker made the notorious announcement to Tariq Aziz that Iraq was going to be "bombed in the stone age". That is exactly what happened. In violation of just about every rule of war imaginable, the US and its allies destroyed every piece of infrastructure, every industrial plant, and every governmental institution within their reach, whether civilian or not. Within a few weeks, the Iraqi economy was utterly devastated - the US managed to knock Iraq, which had previously been considered a middle-income economy, back into third-world status. To make matters worse, and in complete contempt for the people that it supposedly cared so much for, the US military for the first time used depleted uranium (DU), a type of nuclear waste, in its munitions. DU is one of the heaviest substances known to man, and it was used in order to increase the efficiency of anti-tank shells. Southern Iraq was the main battlefield during the course of the war and it bore witness to a number of massacres: thousands of Iraqi tanks were laid to waste with DU munitions, even as they withdrew from Kuwait. The effect is that a vast swathe of southern Iraq has been transformed into a toxic wasteland. Its land and water will be contaminated for many thousands of years. In the meantime, cancer rates and the number of malformed births amongst the already poor and downtrodden indigenous people of that area have skyrocketed. Prior to 2003, US officials dismissed the appeals by local Iraqi doctors as Ba'athist propaganda; the fact that these same doctors have continued their campaign against DU in the post-Ba'athist era has apparently left officials in the US unimpressed (see Zaid Al-Ali, "Iraq: the lost generation", 7 November 2004). The next chapter of US-Iraqi relations proved even more deadly for the Iraqi people. After the initial invasion of Kuwait took place in August 1990, the United Nations Security Council imposed the most comprehensive sanctions regime ever devised on Iraq in order to coerce it to withdraw from the country. The rules of the sanctions regime were simple: Iraq could not import or export anything for whatever reason. The effect on Iraq's economy - which was heavily dependent on food imports and on revenues generated by its oil industry - was devastating. After the war, the sanctions were maintained in order to encourage the Iraqi state to destroy its arsenal of non-conventional weapons. Iraq did this within months and - contrary to allegations by US officials - Iraq's non-conventional weapons programmes were never reconstructed. Nevertheless, the US decided that the sanctions should be maintained at all costs, regardless of the price that the Iraqi people would have to pay. It therefore blocked all efforts by the international community to have the sanctions lifted. It was clear from the start of the sanctions regime that it was utterly inhuman and could not continue without causing the death of hundreds of thousands of poor Iraqis. But that is precisely what happened: after the 1991 war, poverty rates continued to increase at incredible rates, and an increasing number of Iraqis were dying from preventable diseases because of a lack of access to basic medicines. After a significant amount of pressure, the US acquiesced in the creation of the oil-for-food programme. This mechanism was in theory designed to alleviate the suffering of poor Iraqis, but in fact just prolonged their misery. It allowed the Iraqi government to sell a limited amount of oil in order to purchase basic necessities for its population. These limits were set according to what was calculated to be the minimum amount that each Iraqi required to survive. After it was discovered that Iraqis were still starving despite the program, the limit on the sale of oil was doubled. Then it was found that this still meant that UN sniffer-dogs were better fed than the average Iraqi, and the limit was lifted altogether. But the decision came years too late for hundreds of thousands of Iraqis who perished as a result of the hardships imposed on them. Each time, the US was the one to set the limits of the programme. The latest chapter in the story of US-Iraqi relations started in 2003, when the US launched its unprovoked and unjustified attack on Iraq. It is now commonly accepted that the occupation that followed has served to bring yet new miseries to the most vulnerable Iraqis. A state of corruption Most people living in the west tend to forget this history as they were never directly affected by it. Iraqis however are acutely aware of the way that they have been violently oppressed with the connivance, complicity, or direct exercise of power by successive US administrations. In light of this knowledge, and given the context that Iraqis are living through, it is worth considering what type of person would accept to collaborate with the occupation forces in Iraq. It was clear from the start, and the way the situation has played out in practice has proven beyond any shred of a doubt, that the Iraqi government is populated by officials who are morally corrup t. It is commonly accepted that what was left of Iraq in 2003 has now fallen apart, but insufficient attention has been paid to the fact that one of the main culprits behind this state of affairs is the Iraqi government itself. Most analysts, most notably the Iraq Study Group, have accepted the superficial narrative according to which the Iraqi government is a "government of national unity" that is "broadly representative of the Iraqi people". Others have realised that the government has failed to satisfy its obligations to reestablish the rule of law, but have instinctively attributed this failure to a lack of initiative on the part of senior Iraqi officials. It should be obvious from the way the Iraqi state has evolved in the past three years that this narrative is completely mistaken. If Iraq has become the most corrupt country in the middle east it is not because the government is not capable of dealing with the issue - it is because the senior government officials are actually amongst the most corrupt people in the country. If violence is increasing, it is not because the government is unable to combat it, but because it is in fact involved in promoting it. If Iraq is not rife with sectarianism, it is not because Iraqis are inherently that way - far from it. It is because it was the only system on offer by a political class that depends on sectarianism to be relevant. If the reconciliation process is failing, it is not because Iraqis are 1AC barbarians, as western commentary often suggests or implies - it is because senior politicians prefer to eliminate their opponents than to compromise. If public services are continuing to deteriorate, it is not because the government doesn't have sufficient expertise to repair them - it is because senior officials are not affected in any way, and so they don't care. And if 3,000 Iraqis continue to leave the country every day, the government fails to act not because it is incapable, but because they are disinterested - their families already live comfortably abroad anyway. What is to be done? There is clearly only one option available: the Iraqi government must go. But the solution cannot merely be to replace it with a different group of individuals, whether through elections or through an appointment process similar to what took place in 2004. It is not a coincidence that the Iraqi government has evolved in the way that it has - it was unavoidable given the presence of the US occupation. And as long as the occupation remains in place, any individual Iraqi that will accept to work in government will much more likely than not be of the same stock as the individuals currently in power. The presence of the US army in Iraq has a deeply corrosive influence on Iraqi society, and this is what policy makers in the US should come to terms with. In order for Iraq to function, the US military should withdraw from the country as soon as possible. There are many Iraqis who are competent, honest, and non-sectarian and who would be willing to rebuild their country, so long as the circumstances are correct. What this means in practice is that t he US army must leave in order to create enough s pace for these people to contribute. Hussein al-Muayed, Jawad al-Khalissi, Abdul Hussein Sha'ban and many others have been waiting in the wings for the past four years and will continue to boycott the political process so long as the occupation remains in place. They are all household names in Iraq, respected for their integrity, their intelligence, and their non-sectarian credentials, but they remain largely unknown in the west precisely because they refuse to collaborate with the occupation. Some would no doubt argue that a withdrawal of US troops in Iraq would merely lead to an increase in violence. I would suggest that the alternative - staying the current course and maintaining the presence of US forces in Iraq - is much more likely to lead to more violence. A withdrawal will force a realignment of political forces in Baghdad. The government would probably collapse - not an unattractive proposition - and because truly competent and honest political forces would accept to participate in the post-occupation phase, there is a strong likelihood that the political wrangling that would ensue would lead to a more effective and non-sectarian government. In any event, if the US does decide to withdraw, it could do so and still play a constructive role by implementing certain measures that would reduce the potential for violence. It could start by offering to take all collaborators with them as they withdraw from Iraq, in the way that President Ford did when US forces withdrew from Vietnam. In that case, 150,000 Vietnamese were resettled in the US. In Iraq, the numbers would necessarily be far lower considering that the apparatus established in Baghdad is nowhere near the size of what it was in Saigon. This initiative could be financed merely by redirecting a small fraction of what it is costing the United States to maintain the occupation in place. Today, there are no good solutions to the catastrophe that the US has created in Iraq. There are only those options that we know will lead to a further escalation of the conflict, and those that have a chance of leading to a positive conclusion. At this stage, it is certain that the deployment of additional US troops to Iraq will merely lead to more death and suffering. On the other hand, a unilateral and immediate withdrawal of US troops offers the possibility and some hope that an effective and non-sectarian system of government may emerge in the aftermath. After all, and in the final analysis, what the Iraqi people need  now is not more armies, more war, and more violence. What they need is to recover their independence and to be given the space to govern themselves, by themselves. What they want and what they need is to be free once and for all. The ISF is strong enough to maintain internal Iraqi stability, staying any longer only serves to risk a step backward Timothy R. Reese, US Army Colonel on the Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team, 7-31- 09 , “Text of Colonel Reese’s Memo” NYT, [] As the old saying goes, “guests, like fish, begin to smell after three days.” Since the signing of the 2009 Security Agreement, we are guests in Iraq, and after six years in Iraq, we now smell bad to the Iraqi nose. Today the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are good enough to keep the Government of Iraq (GOI) from being overthrown by the actions of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the Baathists, and the Shia violent extremists that might have toppled it a year or two ago. Iraq may well collapse into chaos of other causes, but we have made the ISF strong enough for the internal security mission. Perhaps it is one of those infamous paradoxes of counterinsurgency that while the ISF is not good in any objective sense, it is good enough for Iraq in 2009. Despite this foreboding disclaimer about an unstable future for Iraq, the United States has achieved our objectives in Iraq. Prime Minister (PM) Maliki hailed June 30th as a “great victory,” implying the victory was over the US. Leaving aside his childish chest pounding, he was more right than he knew. We too ought to declare victory and bring our combat forces home. Due to our tendency to look after the tactical details and miss the proverbial forest for the trees, this critically important strategic realization is in danger of being missed. Equally important to realize is that we aren’t making the GOI and the ISF better in any significant ways with our current approach. Remaining in Iraq through the end of December 2011 will yield little in the way of improving the abilities of the ISF or the functioning of the GOI. Furthermore, in light of the GOI’s current interpretation of the limitations imposed by the 30 June milestones of the 2008 Security Agreement, the security of US forces are at risk. Iraq is not a country with a history of treating even its welcomed guests well. This is not to say we can be defeated, only that the danger of a violent incident that will rupture the current partnership has greatly increased since 30 June. Such a rupture would force an unplanned early departure that would harm our long term interests in Iraq and potentially unraveling the great good that has been done since 2003. The use of the military instrument of national power in its current form has accomplished all that can be expected. In the next section I will present and admittedly one sided view of the evidence in support of this view. This information is drawn solely from the MND-B area of operations in Baghdad Province. My reading of reports from the other provinces suggests the same situation exists there. The US withdrawal is key to stabilize the region and prevent sectarian violence Jonathan Steele, “Defeat in Iraq: The Challenges for Obama and the Region” 20 10 Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 4: 1, 23-34 []) Questions about Iraq’s medium-term stability remain. Most Sunni leaders seem to have reconciled themselves to having a Shia-led government for the foreseeable future. They see their task not as trying to overthrow it, but as pressing it to be inclusive, fair and non-sectarian. The risk of a new outburst of Sunni versus Shia violence cannot be discounted, if the Shia-led government frustrates legitimate Sunni demands for a fair share of government jobs and reconstruction money. But most Iraqis are tired of the blood-letting of 2006 and 2007 and would not easily sanction another round of it. In early 2009, the greater threat was that Arabs and Kurds might come to blows. Tensions were growing over the oil-rich region of Kirkuk and the various districts of Nineveh province around Mosul, which the Kurds claim as historically theirs. Iraq’s federal constitution planted several mines which could explode during negotiations between Baghdad and the Kurdistan regional government over sharing taxes, oil revenues and other wealth. A violent flare-up over Kirkuk could precipitate moves by the Kurds to secede, leading to the country’s collapse into a Kurdish north and an Arab south. Apocalyptic scenarios are easily drawn. Pessimistic forecasts tend to be described as realism, while those who make the opposite case often stand accused of naivety. In policy-making circles the default option is that worse is more probable than better. Iraq suggests this may be wrong. Whatever apprehension there may be in some quarters, the evidence of 2008 is that life has improved for Iraqis as they begin to assume the US is finally leaving.
 * __Anti-Americanism has increased in the past few years.__** Thomas Pickering, a seasoned diplomat, considered 2003 "as high a zenith of anti Americanism as we've seen for a long time." Polls **__show that our soft power losses can be traced largely to our foreign policy. "A widespread and fashion able view is that the United States is a classically imperialist power.__** ... That mood has been expressed in different ways by different people, from the hockey fans in Montreal who boo the American national anthem to the high school students in Switzerland who do not want to go to the United States as exchange students." An Australian observer concluded that " **__the lesson of Iraq is that the US's soft power is in decline. Bush went to war having failed to win a broader military coalition or UN authorization. This had two direct consequences: a rise in anti-American sentiment, lifting terrorist recruitment; and a higher cost to the US for the war and reconstruction effort."__** A Gallup International poll showed that pluralities in fifteen out of twenty-four countries around the world said that American foreign policies had a negative effect on their attitudes toward the United States.