Security+K+–+Turner

We’ll be working on a critique of mainstream approaches to international relations and security. I’ve generated a set of cites for us to work from in order to speed up the generic process and get you all reading relevant articles right away. This set of cites is designed to provide a set of link arguments to a variety of likely affirmative advantage areas. A strength of this generic should be the ability to adjust the 1NC based on the aff selection of advantages. Successful starting points for criticism often center on asking a set of questions often left unanswered/only implicitly answered by a 1AC. For example, many 1ACs will make claims about war and conflict versus stability and peace in describing likely consequences of the plan. Each of these advantages presumes to benefit to vast majority, we ought to ask: -What/who is being secured? What interests are at stake in providing a certain type of stability or security in the international system? Affirmatives this year will alter some aspect of U.S. military presence but often in order to ensure that the larger system of U.S. alliances and a U.S. led global-order remains largely in place (for example through preventing overstretch/improving burden-sharing, arguing that changes in the type of US presence are required for the success of existing strategy, or arguing for a change in US strategy in pursuit of similar foreign policy goals like overall American primacy). -What assumptions about international politics have to be made in order for the 1AC advantage story to make sense? What about our own position, identity, or historical background accounts for our willingness to accept these assumptions? This is a generic sample of a shell for this argument against an affirmative that contains advantage arguments about escalating wars in the Middle East. A. the 1ac is grounded in an orientalist discourse of middle east security defined according to u.s. imperial interests.

Pinar **__Bilgin__**, @ Bilkent Univ, **__‘4__** [//International Relations// 18.1, “Whose ‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security,” p. 28] What I call __the ‘Middle East’ perspective__ is usually __associated with the U __nited __ S __tates and its regional allies. It __derives from a ‘western’ conception of security__ which could be summed up __as the__ __unhindered flow of oil at reasonable prices__, the __cessation of the Arab–Israeli conflict, the prevention of the emergence of any regional hegemon__ while __holding Islamism in check__, __and the maintenance of ‘friendly’ regimes__ that are sensitive to these concerns. __This__ was (and still is__) **a top- down conception** of security that privileged the security of states and military stability.__ It is top-down because __threats to security have been defined largely from the perspective of external powers__ rather than regional states or peoples. In the eyes of British and US defence planners, Communist infiltration and Soviet intervention constituted the greatest threat to security in the ‘Middle East’ during the Cold War. The way to enhance regional security, they argued, was for regional states to enter into alliances with the West. Two security umbrella schemes, the ill-born Middle East Defence Organisation (1951) and the Baghdad Pact (1955), were designed for this purpose. Although there were regional states such as Iraq (until the 1958 coup), Iran (until the 1978–9 revolution) and Turkey that shared this perception of security to a certain extent, many Arab policy-makers begged to differ.22 Traces of this top-down thinking were prevalent in the US approach to security in the ‘Middle East’ during the 1990s. In following a policy of dual containment,23 US policy-makers presented Iran and Iraq as the main threats to regional security largely due to their military capabilities and the revisionist character of their regimes that are not subservient to US interests. However, __these__ top-down __perspectives, while revealing__ certain __aspects of regional insecurity__, at the same time __hinder others__. For example the lives of women in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are made insecure not only by the threat caused by their Gulf neighbours’ military capabilities, but also because of the conservative character of their own regimes that restrict __women’s rights__ under the cloak of religious tradition.24 For it is women who suffer disproportionately as a result of militarism and the channelling of valuable resources into defence budgets instead of education and health. Their concerns __rarely make it into security analyses__. __This__ top-down __approach to__ regional __security in the ‘Middle East’__ was __com- pounded__ by __a conception of security__ that was __directed outwards__ – that is __threats to security were assumed to stem from outside the state whereas inside is viewed as a realm of peace__. Although it could be argued – following R.B.J. Walker – that __what makes it possible for ‘inside’ to remain peaceful is the presentation of ‘outside’ as a realm of danger__,25the practices of Middle Eastern states indicate that this does not always work as prescribed in theory. For many regional policy-makers justify certain domestic security measures by way of presenting the international arena as anarchical and stressing the need to strengthen the state to cope with external threats. While doing this, however, __they at the same time cause insecurity for__ some __individuals__ and social groups at home – __the very peoples whose security they purport to maintain.__ The practices of regional actors that do not match up to the theoretical prescriptions include the Baath regime in Iraq that infringed their own citizens’ rights often for the purposes of state security. __Those who dare to challenge their states’ security__ practices __may be__ marginalized at best, and __accused of treachery and imprisoned__ at worst. Pinar **__Batur__**, PhD @ UT-Austin – Prof. of Scociology @ Vassar, **__‘7__** [“The Heart of Violence: Global Racism, War, and Genocide,” in //Handbook of the The Soiology of Racial and Ethnic Relations//, eds. Vera and Feagin, p. 446-7] At the turn of the 20th century, the “Terrible Turk” was the image that summarized the enemy of Europe and the antagonism toward the hegemony of the Ottoman Empire, stretching from Europe to the Middle East, and across North Africa. __Perpetuation of this imagery in American foreign policy exhibited how__ capitalism met with __orientalist constructs in the white racial frame of the western mind__ (VanderLippe 1999). __Orientalism is based on the conceptualization of the “Oriental” othe__r—Eastern, Islamic societies __as static, irrational__, savage, fanatical, __and inferior to the peaceful,__ rational, scientific __“Occidental”__ Europe and the __West__ (Said 1978). __This is as an **elastic construct**__, proving __useful to describe whatever is considered as the latest threat to__ Western economic expansion, political and cultural **__hegemony, and__** global __**domination** for **exploitation and absorption**__. Post-Enlightenment Europe and later America used this iconography to define basic racist assumptions regarding their uncontestable right to impose political and economic dominance globally. When the Soviet Union existed as an opposing power, the orientalist vision of the 20th century shifted from the image of the “Terrible Turk” to that of the “Barbaric Russian Bear.” In this context, orientalist thought then, as now, set the terms of exclusion. __It racialized exclusion to define the terms of racial privilege and superiority__. By focusing on ideology, orientalism recreated the superior race, even though there was no “race__.” It equated the hegemony of Western civilization with the “right ideologic__al and cultural __framework.” It segued into **war and annihilation and genocide** and continued to foster and aid the recreation of racial hatred of others with the collapse of the Soviet “other.”__ Orientalism’s global racist ideology reformed in the 1990s with Muslims and Islamic culture as to the “inferior other__.” Seeing Muslims as opponents of__ Christian __civilization is not new,__ going back to the Crusades, __but the elasticity and reframing of this exclusion is evident in **recent debates**__ regarding Islam in the West, one raised by the Pope and the other by the President of the United States. Against the background of the latest Iraq war, attacks in the name of Islam, racist attacks on Muslims in Europe and in the United States, and detention of Muslims without trial in secret prisons, Pope Benedict XVI gave a speech in September 2006 at Regensburg University in Germany. He quoted a 14th-century Byzantine emperor who said, “show me just what Muhammad brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.” In addition, the Pope discussed the concept of Jihad, which he defined as Islamic “holy war,” and said, “violence in the name of religion was contrary to God’s nature and to reason.” He also called for dialogue between cultures and religions (Fisher 2006b). While some Muslims found the Pope’s speech “regrettable,” it also caused a spark of angry protests against the Pope’s “ill informed and bigoted” comments, and voices raised to demand an apology (Fisher 2006a). Some argue that the Pope was ordering a new crusade, for Christian civilization to conquer terrible and savage Islam. When Benedict apologized, organizations and parliaments demanded a retraction and apology from the Pope and the Vatican (Lee 2006). Yet, when the Pope apologized, it came as a second insult, because in his apology he said, “I’m deeply sorry for the reaction in some countries to a few passages of my address at the University of Regensburg, which were considered offensive to the sensibilities of Muslims” (Reuters 2006). In other words, he is sorry that Muslims are intolerant to the point of fanaticism. In the racialized world, the Pope’s apology came as an effort to show justification for his speech—he was not apologizing for being insulting, but rather saying that he was sorry that “Muslim” violence had proved his point. __ Through __ orientalist and __the white racial frame, those who are subject to__ racial hatred and __exclusion themselves become agents of racist legitimization__. Like Huntington, Bernard Lewis was looking for Armageddon in his Wall Street Journal article warning that August 22, 2006, was the 27th day of the month of Rajab in the Islamic calendar and is considered a holy day, when Muhammad was taken to heaven and returned. For Muslims this day is a day of rejoicing and celebration. But for __Lewis__, Professor Emeritus at Princeton, “this might well be deemed an appropriate date for the apocalyptic ending of Israel and, if necessary, of the world” (Lewis 2006). He __cautions that “it is far from certain that__ [the President of __Iran__] Mr. Ahmadinejad __plans__ any such __cataclysmic events__ for August 22, __but it would be **wise to bear the possibility** in mind__.” __Lewis argues__ that Muslims, unlike others, seek self-destruction in order to reach heaven faster. For Lewis, __Muslims in this mindset **don’t see the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction as a constraint**__ but rather as “an inducement” (Lewis 2006). In 1993, Huntington pleaded that “in a world of different civilizations, each. . .will have to learn to coexist with the others” (Huntington 1993:49). __Lewis__, like Pope Benedict, __views Islam as the apocalyptic destroyer of civilization__ and claims that reactions against orientalist, racist visions such as his actually prove the validity of his position. Lewis’s assertions run parallel with George Bush’s claims. In response to the alleged plot to blow up British airliners, Bush claimed, “This nation is at war with Islamic fascists who will use any means to destroy those of us who love freedom, to hurt our nation” (TurkishPress.com. 2006; Beck 2006). Bush argued that “the fight against terrorism is the ideological struggle of the 21st century” and he compared it to the 20th century’s fight against fascism, Nazism, and communism. Even though “Islamo-fascist” has for some time been a buzzword for Bill O’Reilly, Rush Limbaugh, and Sean Hannity on the talk-show circuit, for the president of the United States it drew reactions worldwide. Muslim Americans found this phrase “contributing to the rising level of hostility to Islam and the American Muslim community” (Raum 2006). Considering that since 2001, Bush has had a tendency to equate “war on terrorism” with “crusade,” this new rhetoric equates ideology with religion and reinforces the worldview of a war of civilizations. As Bush said, “. .  .we still aren’t completely safe, because there are people that still plot and people who want to harm us for what we believe in” (CNN 2006). __ Exclusion in physical space is only matched by exclusion in the imagination, and racialized exclusion has an internal logic leading to the **annihilation of the excluded**. __ __Annihilation__, in this sense, is not only designed to maintain the terms of racial inequality, both ideologically and physically, but **__is institutionalized with the vocabulary of self-protection__**. Even though the terms of exclusion are never complete, **__genocide is the definitive__** __point in the exclusionary racial ideology, and such is the **logic of the outcome**__ of the exclusionary process, that **__it can conclude only in ultimate domination__**. **__War__** __**and genocide take place with** compliant efficiency to serve the **global racist ideology with dizzying** **frequency**__. The 21st century opened up with genocide, in Darfur. c. rejecting their demand for immediate yes/no policy response is the only way to raise critical ethical questions about the discourse and practice of ir in the middle east. Shampa **__ BISWAS __** Politics @ Whitman **__‘7__** “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” //Millennium// 36 (1) p. 117-125 The recent resuscitation of the project of Empire should give International Relations scholars particular pause.1 For a discipline long premised on a triumphant Westphalian sovereignty, there should be something remarkable about the ease with which the case for brute force, regime change and empire-building is being formulated in widespread commentary spanning the political spectrum. Writing after the 1991 Gulf War, Edward Said notes the US hesitance to use the word ‘empire’ despite its long imperial history.2 This hesitance too is increasingly under attack as even self-designated liberal commentators such as Michael Ignatieff urge the US to overcome its unease with the ‘e-word’ and selfconsciously don the mantle of imperial power, contravening the limits of sovereign authority and remaking the world in its universalist image of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.3 Rashid Khalidi has argued that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq does indeed mark a new stage in American world hegemony, replacing the indirect and proxy forms of Cold War domination with a regime much more reminiscent of European colonial empires in the Middle East.4 __The ease with which a defence of empire has been mounted__ and a colonial project so unabashedly resurrected __makes this a__ particularly opportune, if not __necessary, moment__, as scholars of ‘the global’, __to take stock of our disciplinary complicities with power, to account for colonialist imaginaries that are lodged at the heart of a discipline__ ostensibly interested in power but perhaps far __too deluded by__ the formal equality of state __sovereignty and__ overly concerned with __security__ and order. Perhaps more than any other scholar, Edward Said’s groundbreaking work in //Orientalism// has argued and demonstrated the long and deep complicity of academic scholarship with colonial domination.5 In addition to spawning whole new areas of scholarship such as postcolonial studies, Said’s writings have had considerable influence in his own discipline of comparative literature but also in such varied disciplines as anthropology, geography and history, all of which have taken serious and sustained stock of their own participation in imperial projects and in fact regrouped around that consciousness in a way that has simply not happened with International Relations.6 It has been 30 years since Stanley __ Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites __ and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet __ there seems to be __ a curious __ amnesia __ and lack of curiosity __ about the __ political history of the __ discipline __, __ and __ in particular __ its __ own __ complicities in the production of empire __ .8 __ Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced __ , resurrected and re-energised is a question that __ should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine __ the contours of __ global power. __ Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, __ this __ article __ is an attempt to politicise and hence **render questionable** the **disciplinary traps** that have __, ironically, __ circumscribed the ability of scholars __ whose very business it is to think about global politics __ to actually think //globally// and //politically// __. What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that __ IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘global intellectual posture’ __. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as __ a disturber of the status quo __ speaking ‘truth to power’ and __ self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented __ and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking //politics// seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the //global// seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about //feeling and thinking globally// concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been __ a significant constriction of a democratic public sphere __, which __ has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent __ and a sharp delineation of national boundaries along with concentration of state power. __ The academy __ in this context __ has become a particularly embattled site with __ some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked __ the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ __ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But __ what has __ in part __ made possible the encroachment of such __ nationalist and __ statist agendas has been a larger history of __ the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘ __ professionalisation’ __ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert __ Reid has __ examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and __ critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where **academic bureaucrats** **engage in bureaucratic role-playing,** minor academic **turf battles mask the larger managerial power play** __ on campuses __ and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ __ have led to academics relinquishing their claims to public space and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. __ The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’ __, he argues, __ is __ ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and __ the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and __ most worrisome of all, their ability and __ willingness to be **seduced by power** __ .17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that create convergent perspectives and interests, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’.19 __ This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but __ indeed __ a larger question of **intellectual orientation** __. __ It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their __ scholarly __ conclusions __ in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured __ entirely in terms of policy wisdom __. Edward __ Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts __ - in the context of the first Gulf War20 __ is __ certainly even more __ resonant in the contemporary context __ preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a __ critical appraisal __ of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national debate __ wherein __ certain kinds **of** **__ ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis __**__ can simply **not be raised** __. In effect, what Said argues for, and __ IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is __ an __ understanding __ of ‘ __ intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile __, __ that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical __ and perhaps unanswerable __ questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, that is about //politics// (rather than techno-expertise __ ) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation.21 Sample AT: Perm Anthony **__Burke__**, Senior Lecturer @ School of Politics & IR @ Univ. of New South Wales, **__‘7__** [//Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence//, p. 3-4] These __frameworks are interrogated at__ the level both of their __theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: in their influence and__ __implementation **in specific policy contexts and conflicts** in__ East and Central Asia, the __Middle East__ and the 'war on tei-ror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that t__he meaning of powerful political__ __concepts__ cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they __all have histories__, often complex and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time__; and they are developed__, refined and deployed __in concrete struggles over power__, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity__, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential **must always be considered** in relation to their utilisation in systems of political,__ social and economic __power and their consequent worldly effects.__ Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth. . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, __the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis **relate not only to the** most destructive__ or controversial __approaches, such as the war in Iraq, **but also to their available**__ (and generally preferable) __alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine__, Indonesian militarism __or Israeli expansionism, **but also their mainstream critique**s__ - __whether they take the form **of liberal policy approaches**__ in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of __sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist__ Israeli __security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively__ (and often significant) __debate masks a deeper agreement **about major concepts**,__ forms of political identity __and the imperative to secure them. Debates__ about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, __mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security__, the effectiveness of strategic power, __the nature of progress__, the value of freedom __or the promises of__ __national__ and cultural __identity__. As a result, __political__ and intellectual __debate about insecurity, violent conflict and__ global __injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically **wards off critique.**__ General: Mark Neocleous //Critique of Security// ‘8 Anthony Burke //Beyond Security// ‘7 Shampa BISWAS Politics @ Whitman ‘7 “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” Millennium 36 (1) Marysia ZALEWSKI Women’s Studies @ Queens (Belfast) ’96 in International Theory: Postivism and Beyond eds. Smith, Booth and Zalewksi p. C.A.S.E. Collective ‘6 [Security Dialogues 37.4, “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe: A Networked Manifesto,” Sage Political Science, p.  David CAMPBELL Geography @ Durham ET AL ‘7 “Performing Security: The Imaginative Geographies of current US strategy” Political Geography 26 (4) Jan Nederveen PIETERSE Sociology @ Illinois (Urbana) ‘7 “Political and Economic Brinkmanship” Review of International Political Economy 14: 3 p. Liam KENNEDY American Studies @ University College (Dublin) AND Scott LUCAS American Studies @ Birmingham ‘5 “Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy” American Quarterly 57.2 Nermeen Shaikh, @ Asia Source, ‘7 [Development 50, “Interrogating Charity and the Benevolence of Empire,” Pinar Bilgin, @ Bilkent Univ, ‘4 [International Relations 18.1, “Whose ‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security,” p. Pinar Biligin, Prof. of IR @ Bilkent, ‘4 [Third World Quarterly, “Is the Orientalist Past the Future of Middle East Studies,” Pinar BILGIN IR @ Bilikent (Ankara) ‘2 “Beyond Statism in Security Studies? Human Agency and Security in the Middle East” Review of International Affairs 2 (1) Morten Valbjørn, PhD in the Department of Political Science @ Aarhus, ‘4 [Middle East and Palestine: Global Politics and Regional Conflict, “Culture Blind and Culture Blinded: Images of Middle Eastern Conflicts in International Relations,” p. Toine van Teffelen, Prof. in Discourse Analysis @ Birzeit Univ, ’95 [The Decolonization of imagination: Culture, Knowledge, and Power, p  Tarak Barkawi, Center for International Studies @ Univ. of Cambridge, Marke Laffey, Lecturer in International Politics @ SOAS, ’99 [European Journal of International Relations 5.4, “The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalization,” p.  Bruce Buchan ‘2 “Explaining War and Peace: Kant and Liberal IR Theory” //Alternatives// v. 27 Tim Dunne ‘9 International Relations Prof-Oxford, “Liberalism, International Terrorism, and Democratic Wars,” International Relations, March Stephen ROSOW ‘2K “Globalisation as Democratic Theory” //Millennium// 29 (1) Brett BOWDEN ‘4 “In the Name of Progress and Peace” //Alernatives// 29 Neil COOPER IR, Peace Studies @ Bradford ‘6 “Chimeric Governance and the extension of resource regulation” Conflict, Security & Development 6:3 Neil COOPER Peace Studies @ Bradford ‘5 “Picking out the Pieces of the Liberal Peaces: Representations of Conflict Economies and the Implications for Policy” Security Dialogue 36 (4) p. Neil COOPER Politics and IR @ Plymouth ‘3 “Liberal Governance, War Economies and the Emerging Control Agenda” Paper for the conference on: Resource Politics and Security in a Global Age University of Sheffield, 26-28 June 2003 http://66.102.1.104/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=cache:vJX6wlz_vf8J:www.shef.ac.uk/~perc/resourcepol/papers/cooper.pdf+ Pinar Bilgin, @ Bilkent Univ, ‘4 [International Relations 18.1, “Whose ‘Middle East’? Geopolitical Inventions and Practices of Security,” p. 28] Oliver RICHMOND IR @ St. Andrews ‘6 “The Problem of Peace: understanding the ‘liberal peace’” Conflict, Security & Development 6:3 p. Alexandros YANNIS Frmr Political Advisor to the Special Representative of the UN Sec. Gen in Kosovo and Research Associate in the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP) in Athens ‘2 “State Collapse and its Implications for Peace-Building and Reconstruction” Development and Change 33 (5) p. Moncef Kartas, Graduate Institute for International Studies Geneva, 2007, Annual Conference of the Nordic International Studies Association "Post-conflict Peace-building – Is the Hegemony of the ‘Good Governance’ Discourse Depoliticising the Local?" Mark Duffield and Nicholas Waddell Securing Humans in a Dangerous World International Politics, 2006, 43, (1–23) Pinar BILGIN IR @ Bilikent AND Adam David MORTON Senior Lecturer and Fellow of the Centre for the Study of Social and Global Justice IR @ Nottingham ‘4 “From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism” Politics 24 (3) p.  Pinar Biligin, Prof. of IR @ Bilkent, ‘4 [Third World Quarterly, “Is the Orientalist Past the Future of Middle East Studies,” p. 427 Alex BELLAMY Peace and Conflict Studies @ Queensland AND Paul WILLIAMS Visiting Int’l Affairs @ GW ‘5 “Introduction: Thinking Anew about Peace Operations” in Peace Operations and Global Order p. Morten BOAS Fafo Inst. for Applied Int’l Studies (Oslo) AND Kathleen JENNINGS Fafo Inst. for Applied Int’l Studies (Oslo) ‘7 “Failed States’ and ‘State Failure’: Threats or Opportunities” Globalizations 4:4 Michael PUGH Peace and Conflict Studies @ Bradford ‘5 “The Polictical Economy of Peacebuilding: a critical theory perspective” International Journal of Peace Studies 10 (2) Mustapha Kamal PASHA School of Int’l Service @ American ‘3 “Fractured Worlds: Islam, Identity and International Relations” Global Society 17 (2) p. David Shim, Phd Candidate @ GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, ‘8 [Paper prepared for presentation at the 2008 ISA, Production, Hegemonization and Contestation of Discursive Hegemony: The Case of the Six-Party Talks in Northeast Asia, [|www.allacademic.com/meta/p253290_index.html] ] Alexandra Homolar-Riechmann, @ Peace Research Institute Frankfurt & Kings College, ‘9 [Prepared for delivery at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, “Rebels without a cause: US  foreign policy and the concept of rogue states,” p. allacademic] Michael Williams. //The Realist Tradition and the limits of international relations// (Intro, Chapters 4 & 5) Jennifer STERLING-FOLKER Poli Sci @ Connecticut (Stamford) AND Rosemary SHINKO IR @ Connecticut (Stamford) ‘5 “Discourses of Power: Traversing the Realist-Postmodern Divide” Millennium 33 (3) Olav. F. Knudsen, Prof @ Södertörn Univ College, ‘1 [Security Dialogue 32.3, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization,” Vibeke Schou PEDERSEN Copenhagen ‘3 “In Search of Monsters to Destroy?” International Relations 17 (2) p. James GIBNEY Former Executive Editor of Foreign Policy and Special Asst. to Sec. State ‘6 in Globalization and Conflict p  Christian REUS-SMIT IR @ Australian Nat’l ‘4 American Power and World Order Rita Floyd ‘7 University of Warwick, Review of International Studies, Vol 33 p Alex Bellamy and Matt McDonald ‘4 Australian Journal of Political Science 39.2, “'Securing international society: towards an English school discourse of security” Stefano RECCHIA IR Grad Student @ Columbia ‘7 “Restraining Imperial Hubris: The Ethical Bases of Realist International Relations Theory” Constellations 14 (4) Emanuel ADLER IR @ Hebrew Univ (Jerusalem) AND Peter HAAS Poli Sci @ UMass ’92 “ Epistemic Communities, World Order, and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program” International Organization 46 (1) International relations--still an American social science? : toward diversity in international thought / edited by Robert M.A. Crawford and Darryl S.L. Jarvis. ’1 (Chapter by Jarvis) Wesley WIDMAIER Poli Sci @ St. Joseph’s ‘4 “Theory as a Factor and the Theorist as an Actor: The "Pragmatist Constructivist" Lessons of John Dewey and John Kenneth Galbraith” International Studies Review p. David OWEN Reader Political Theory @ Southampton ‘2 “Reorienting International Relations” Millennium 31 p.  Michael NICHOLSON IR @ Sussex ‘2K “What’s the use of international relations” Review of International Studies 26 p.  Friedrich KRATOCHWIL Political Sciences @ European University Inst. ‘7 “Of False Promises and Good Bets: a Plea for a Pragmatic Approach to Theory Building” Journal of International Relations and Development 10 (1) Brent STEELE Poli Sci @ Kansas ‘7 “’Eavesdropping on honored ghosts’: from classical to reflexive realism” Journal of International Relations and Development 10 p. Ken BOOTH E H Carr Professor of the Department of International Politics at Aberystywth University ‘5 Critical Security Studies and World Politics p. 272-276 John G GUNNELL Political Science @ SUNY Albany ’98 Politeia “Speaking politically: politics and the academic intellectual in the United States” Winter 1998 Ronald NIEZEN Anthro @ McGill ‘7 “Postcolonialism and the Utopian Imagination” Israel Affairs 13 (4)
 * B. Orientalist forms of security guarantee genocidal conflicts -- their perspective consolidates the racist hierarchies responsible for global exploitation. **
 * __ Hegemony: __**
 * __ Softpower __**
 * __ Middle East War __**
 * __ Democratic Peace Theory __**
 * __ Failed States: __**
 * __ North Korea __**
 * __ Aff: __**